



signed objects for production into wood and plastic. Then we prototype designs, then, finally, making images of the horrors laying in store for us, for the perpetuation of which the fables and speeches. No longer anything outside it; and the unemployed—or here the destitute, the paupers—are as it were employed by capital to be unemployed; they fulfill an economic function by way of their very non-functioning.*
Love,

—
* Frederic Jameson, *Representing Capital* (2011).



Dear ----,
The good, the infinite, are nothing less than pure construction. Let's dare hope, let's dare build something! I went to wash my clothes in the Seine!*
Love,

* Antonio Negri.



Dear ----,
The problem of architecture is not that of being seen from without or that of living within. It is in the dialectical relation interior-exterior, at the level of urbanism (houses-streets) and at the level of the house (interior-exterior). Build an entire city in order to make love there with only one girl for a few days.*
Love,

—
* Guy Debord, *Reflections on Architecture* (1959).



Dear ----,
If the positive gesture of cooperation has been saturated and digitalized in a neutral space, only a sharpened tool can reveal the movements of the parasite. As profit has taken the impersonal form of rent, its by-effect is the anonymity of sabotage. As rent changed its coordinates of exploitation, a new theory of rent demands a new theory of sabotage before aiming to any new form of organization. Rent is the other side of the commons.*
Love,

—
* Matteo Pasquinelli, "The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage" (2010).



Dear ----,
Collectivize identically! With waves of oceanic expanse and consistency.
Love,

* Antonio Negri.



Dear ----,
This is the moment to prepare insurrection. It's better to be frank on this point: our future is over. We have to be radical, as the situation has become extreme. Financial capitalism is destroying our lives. I beg your pardon if my language may seem emphatically tragic. Unfortunately the tragedy is not an effect of my imagination.*

Love,

—
* Franco Bifo Berardi, "March 25: A Call to Teach In European Banks" (2011).

Frankcija

Casopis za izvedbene umjetnosti

No. 58/59

ISSN 1331-0100
Barcode
9 771331 010006



Dear ----,
Whatever utopia is, whatever can be imagined as utopia, this is the transformation of the totality. And the imagination of such a transformation of the totality is basically very different in all the so-called utopian accomplishments—which, incidentally, are all really like you say: very modest, very narrow. It seems to me that what people have lost subjectively in regard to consciousness is very simply the capability to imagine the totality as something that could be completely different.*
Love,

—
* Theodor Adorno, "Debate with Ernst Bloch" (1964).



Dear ----,
For example, Lefebvre speaks of the "moment of love." From the point of view of the creation of moments, from the situationist point of view, one must envisage the moment of a particular love, of the love of a particular person. Which means: of a particular person in particular circumstances. The maximum "constructed moment" is the series of situations attached to a single theme—that love for a particular person—a "situationist theme" is a realized desire. In comparison to Henri Lefebvre's moment, this series of situations is particularized and unrepeatable. In analyzing the "moment," Lefebvre has revealed many of the fundamental conditions of the new field of action across which a revolutionary culture may now proceed: as when he remarks that the moment tends toward the absolute and departs from it. The moment, like the situation, is simultaneously proclamation of the absolute and awareness of passing through it. It is, in fact, on the path toward a unity of the structural and the conjectural; and the project for a constructed situation could also be defined as an attempt at structuring the conjunction between the two.*
Love,

—
* Lisa Robertson, *Occasional Work and Seven Walks from the Office for Soft Architecture* (2003).




Dear ----,
But to the extent that gender still structures the world, to the extent that the capitalist devaluation of reproductive work translates into a devaluation of WOMEN, we cannot discard this category, if not at the cost of making large areas of social life virtually unintelligible and losing a crucial terrain of collective resistance to capitalism. We need a radical movement that programmatically places at the center of its struggle the eradication of social inequalities and the eradication of the divisions between production and reproduction, school and home, school and community, inherent to the capitalist division of labor. It is above all the task of women to ensure that this will occur.*
Love,

—
* Maya Gonzalez and Caitlin Manning, *Political Work with Women and as Women in the Present Conditions: Interview with Silvia Federici* (2010).




Dear ----,
When there was a call for images we would fan through the neighborhood constructing our documents. Our method was patience. We would slowly absorb each image until we were what we had deliberately chosen to become. We would closely observe strangers to study how, in a manner, or in a touch, we might invent the dream of the congress of strange shapes. We would make use of their resistance; it showed us our own content. As I said, our intentions were documentary.*
Love,

—
* Lisa Robertson, *Occasional Work and Seven Walks from the Office for Soft Architecture* (2003).




Dear ----,
Empire is everywhere nothing is happening. Everywhere things are working. Wherever the normal situation prevails. To get organised means: to start from the situation and not dismiss it. To take sides within it. Weaving the necessary material, affective and political solidarities. The name we give to the situation that we are in is "world civil war". For there is no longer anything that can limit the confrontation between the opposing forces. The 'we' that speaks here is not a delimited, isolated we, the we of a group. It is the we of a position. In these times this position is asserted as a double secession: secession first with the process of capitalist valorisation; then secession with all the sterility entailed by a mere opposition to empire, extra-parliamentary or otherwise; thus a secession with the left. Here "secession" means less a practical refusal to communicate than a disposition to forms of communication so intense that, when put into practice, they snatch from the enemy most of its force. We contest nothing, we demand nothing. We constitute ourselves as a force, as a material force, as an autonomous material force.*
Love,

—
* Alain Badiou, "The Subject of Art" (2007).



Dear ----,
If the subjective process is something like a new creation in the world, we have an infinity of consequences. In fact, there are no limits. There are potentially—virtually (to speak as Deleuze)—we have virtually an infinity of consequences. But this infinity is not a transcendent one; it's an immanent infinity. It is the infinity of the body itself in relation to the trace. So we have to understand what is an immanent infinity and not a transcendent infinity.*
Love,

—
* Anonymous, *Call*.




Dear ----,
OCCUPY EVERYTHING! WILDFLOWERS EVERYWHERE!



Dear ----,
When the airplanes are grounded, we travel by boat. We may be secretly in love, but they haven't neutralized us. And nothing can prevent us from taking up our task once again: to re-elaborate a perspective that is capable of removing from us the state of collective impotence that strikes us all. Not exactly a political perspective; not a program; but [an analysis of] the technical and material possibilities of a practical route towards other connections with the world and other social connections, and this by being ready for the existing constraints, the actual organization of this society, its subjectivities as well as its infrastructures. Because it is only through a keen knowledge of the obstacles to the upheaval that we will manage to clear the horizon. This will be a long-term task, and it doesn't make any sense for us to pursue it alone. This is an invitation.*
Love,

—
* Tarnac 10, "Why We Will No Longer Respect the Judicial Restraints Placed Upon Us" (2009).

* Lisa Robertson, *Occasional Work and Seven Walks from the Office for Soft Architecture* (2003).



Dear ----,
Where were you when you heard. Thousands of RED-winged blackbirds fell from the sky. It's not a good shortcut if everyone dies. We should not simply refuse modern culture; we must seize it in order to negate it. We must recall that while any genuinely experimental attitude is usable, that word has very often been misused in the attempt to justify artistic actions within an already-existing structure. The only valid experimental proceeding is based on the accurate critique of existing conditions and the deliberate supersession of them. We have to define new desires in relation to present possibilities. Our central idea is the construction of situations.*
Love,

* Guy Debord, *Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency's Conditions of Organization and Action* (1957).



Dear ----,
We've built, seemingly by vulgar and beautiful chance, a party. The occupation. The mob. A mobile force. A machine. This is to say many of us are you, and likely many of you are us. We are all bound together merely by inhabiting the same arena. Useful dreams are only dreamt in struggle.*
Love,


* Communiques from Occupied California, *After the Fall* (2010).



Dear ----,
I am watering the tree in OUR BEDROOM.
Love,




Dear ----,
In certain circumstances straight lines and curves may be the same. But even lower mathematics teems with contradictions. In Russia, there was a fundamental difference between the contradiction resolved by the February Revolution and the contradiction resolved by the October Revolution, as well as between the methods used to resolve them. To deny contradiction is to deny everything.*
Love,
— — —
* Mao Tse-Tung, *On Contradiction* (1937).



Dear ----,
We've covered this ground before, the place between opacity and oracle in my library mouth. There is no automaticity to a clinamen inclination. As hostile as honey, or as sweet. Are your figs local to where I live? Yes. Can we mobilize as a hammer? Yes. Can you build something from honey, wood, and fire? You have to. Is this a standoff, us against them?

Love,

* Agustin Garcia Calvo, *Protest in Puerta del Sol* (2011).



Dear ----,
The normal course of things was the alliance of the market economy and parliamentary democracy, an alliance that was the only tenable norm of general subjectivity. Such is the meaning of the term "globalisation": that subjectivity became global subjectivity. If it is true that, as Marx predicted, the space where emancipatory ideas are realised is a global space, then the phenomena of Western enclosure cannot be part of genuine change. What would genuine change be? It would be a break with the west, a "dewesternisation", and would take the form of an exclusion.* A dream, you are thinking. Not a dream.


Love,

* Alain Badiou, *Tunisia, Riots, Revolution* (2011).



Dear ----,
We have no use for 'democracy.' I'm sorry, but I have to insist. I understand that choosing slogans such as 'Real Democracy Now' could be a less confrontational tactic, because it seems that to be upfront and say 'No to any State, democratic or otherwise' could sound bad, but I think its time to let go of the deceit of democracy. Democracy is a trick. Kratos means power and Demo is supposedly the people... and the people can never have power: power is against the people. The contradiction is inherent in the very word, democracy. The democratic regime is simply the most advanced, the most perfect, the one that has produced the best results, that has produced this Regime of Well-Being that they say we live in; but really it is still Power, the same as always. A better democracy is an illusion. It's not the way, and if your uprising gets organized in a way that resembles the administration of the State, it will already be lost, it will be doing nothing more than repeating history with other colors. I urge you to renounce ideas of a better state. I would [also] erase from the list of demands put forth by your leaders [demands for a better future]. The Future is your enemy. The future is what is used to deceive people, especially, the youth. They say 'you have a future' or 'you have to create your future,' which really means to resign yourself to death, to a future death. This future is what Capital needs. The future is theirs: it's their weapon. Don't let it seem like it's something blessed or beneficial: their future should sound to us like death. The future is the future of Business, of Finance, of Capital. You don't have a future! You need to have the courage to denounce this.*
Love,

* Alain Badiou, *The Communist Hypothesis* (2010).



Dear ----,
Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies how opposites can be identical. Each is the condition for the other's existence.*

Love,

* Mao Tse-Tung, *On Contradiction* (1937).

to be moved

Frakcija 58/59



Dear ----,
In order to anticipate, at least ideologically or intellectually, the creation of new possibilities, we must have an idea. An idea that of course involves the newness of the possibilities that the truth procedure of which we are the militants has brought to light, which are real-possibilities, but an idea that also involves the formal possibility of other possibilities, ones as yet unsuspected by us. An Idea is always the assertion that a new truth is historically possible. And since the forcing of the impossible into the possible occurs via subtraction from the power of the State, an Idea can be said to assert that this subtractive power is infinite.* We built a wooden house inside of the wooden house. When the porch rots we dream of its decay and when the kitchen sags with the weight of our appetites it is an extremely beautiful curve.

Love,


* George Kalamara & Eric Baus, *Births Incurred/your recently collected saliva* (2003).



Dear ----,
She could easily think back to the times when the development was spread across the city, spread across different functions. Particularly intense at the periphery. Nothing had to be built in a clearing between two buildings. The clearing could remain. But at one point the space became the private domain. It started to contract and concentrate. Capital-driven development required capital-intense organization of space. It is only by concentrating, creating even narrower circles of centrality, that scarcity could be maintained. She felt complicit, displaced.*

Love,

* BADco., *Responsibility for Things Seen: Tales in Negative Space* (2011).



Dear ----,
The walls that line our bedroom are nodal points to a communist city space. Privatizing is a reaction to an anxiety, rather than a becoming antagonism resolvable in civil war. We disavow an intimacy contained to drywall. We don't build private spaces. Private spaces speculate on private futures. Our spaces are designed not for a future we speculate on but rather a future we consist in as possibility now and nownot.

Love,

* Silvia Federici, *Feminism And The Politics Of The Commons* (2010).




Dear ----,
The public library is full of thieves who will not pay for how the earth reads their bodies back each day as indented in snow. Be altruistic as wheat.*

Love,

* Valerie Solanas, *Scum Manifesto* (1968).



Dear ----,
How we sleep when we sleep.
Love,



Dear ----,
Every situation can be cracked open from the inside, reconfigured in a different regime of perception and signification. To reconfigure the landscape of what can be seen and what can be thought is to alter the field of the possible and the distribution of capacities and incapacities. This is what a process of political subjectivation consists in: in the action of uncounted capacities that crack open the unity of the given and the obviousness of the visible, in order to sketch a new typography of the possible. Collective understanding of emancipation is not the comprehension of a total process of subjection. It is the collectivization of capacities invested in scenes of dissentus. It is the employment of the capacity of anyone whatsoever, of the quality of human beings without qualities. As I have said, these are unreasonable hypotheses.*

Love,

* Jacques Ranciere, *The Emancipated Spectator* (2009).



Dear ----,
SCUM will destroy all useless and harmful objects—cars, store windows, 'Great Art,' etc.*

Love,

* Valerie Solanas, *Scum Manifesto* (1968).



Dear ----,
They are building the Louvre, again, in Abu Dhabi. It looks like an architecture of labor power and destruction and super-speculation, an industry of the interlocking monopolies of late capitalism that makes money out of what used to be called culture. I am led to affirm that the Utopian impulse is profoundly economic, and that everything in it, from the transformation of personal relations to that of production, of possession, of life itself, constitutes the attempt to imagine the life of a different mode of production, that is to say, of a different economic system.*

Love,

* Frederic Jameson, "A New Reading of Capital," *Meditations* (2010).



Dear ----,
In circumstances of this kind it makes no sense for you or me to go with the grain of the Western consensus that says: 'we absolutely have to remain in charge of everything happening'. We have to make a stand against the grain, and demonstrate that the real target of Western bombers and soldiers is in no way the wretched Gaddaffi, a former client of those who are now getting rid of him in the way of their higher interests. For the target of the bombers is definitely the popular uprising in Egypt and the revolution in Tunisia, it is their unexpected and intolerable character, their political autonomy, in a word: their independence. To oppose the destructive interventions of the powers means supporting the political independence and the future of these uprisings and revolutions. This is something we can do, and it is an unconditional imperative.*

Love,

* Alain Badiou, "An open letter from Alain Badiou to Jean-Luc Nancy" (2011).




Dear ----,
How we sleep when we sleep.



Dear ----,
This is not simply a matter of a momentary encounter with the impossible: that would be heroism, not courage. Heroism has always been represented not as a virtue but as a posture: as the moment when one turns to meet the impossible face to face. The virtue of courage constructs itself through endurance within the impossible; time is its raw material. What takes courage is to operate in terms of a different durée to that imposed by the law of the world.*

Love,

* Alain Badiou, *The Communist Hypothesis* (2010).



Dear ----,
If by 'system' is meant—and this is the minimal sense of the word—a sort of consequence, coherence, and insistence—a certain gathering together—there is an injunction to the system that I have never renounced and never wished to.*

Love,

* Jacques Derrida.



Dear ----,
Half the word filament is night. If typing is talking with a single sound, I can always tell when you're thinking of the sun. The way I asked you to say what you saw made me blind for half the morning. You are roughly equivalent to my lips turning RED. Your letters turn to means in the thinking dust.*

Love,

* Eric Baus, *The To Sound* (2004).

Dear ----,
Every revolution, Marx remarked, begins with flowers.

Love,

* Michele Bernstein, *No Useless Leniency* (1958).



Dear ----,
In the beginning, we designed objects for production, designs to be turned into wood and steel, glass and brick, or plastic. Then we produced neutral and usable designs, then, finally, negative utopias, forewarning images of the horrors which architecture was laying in store for us, with its scientific methods for the perpetuation of existing models. Then images disappeared, as if in a mirror: now there remain only fables and parables, descriptions and speeches. No longer figures, but traces of a mode of behavior directed towards suggesting the magnificent possibilities of rediscovering and of governing ourselves. The only project is thus the project for our lives and our relationships with others. The only project is thus one of militant love and uncivil sieve, the coordinates of which can be found in abandoned blueprints and an idea about synergy antagonistic to accumulation.

Love,

* Superstudio, "Fragments From A Personal Museum" (1973).



Dear ----,
Dear ----,

The result of these new objective conditions has been to force certain opportunist elements into open opposition. Certain wait-and-see attitudes have also ceased to be tolerable, and those of our allies who have not seen fit to join us immediately have thereby unmasked themselves as adversaries. We have become stronger and therefore more seductive. We don't want innocuous relationships and we don't want relationships that might serve our enemies. But we don't have an idealist, abstract, absolutist conception of breaks. As I said at the beginning, a collective project such as the one we have undertaken and are pursuing cannot avoid being accompanied by friendship. But it is also true that it cannot be identified with friendship and that it should not be subject to the same weaknesses. Nor to the same modes of continuity or looseness.*

Love,

* Michele Bernstein, *No Useless Leniency* (1958).



Dear ----,
The walls that line our bedroom are nodal points to a communist city space. Privatizing is a reaction to an anxiety, rather than a becoming antagonism resolvable in civil war. We disavow an intimacy contained to drywall. We don't build private spaces. Private spaces speculate on private futures. Our spaces are designed not for a future we speculate on but rather a future we consist in as possibility now and nownot.

Love,

* Jacques Ranciere, *The Emancipated Spectator* (2009).



Dear ----,
Every revolution, Marx remarked, begins with flowers.

Love,



Dear ----,
Dear ----,

The walls that line our bedroom are nodal points to a communist city space. Privatizing is a reaction to an anxiety, rather than a becoming antagonism resolvable in civil war. We disavow an intimacy contained to drywall. We don't build private spaces. Private spaces speculate on private futures. Our spaces are designed not for a future we speculate on but rather a future we consist in as possibility now and nownot.

Love,

* Jacques Ranciere, *The Emancipated Spectator* (2009).



Dear ----,
Every revolution, Marx remarked, begins with flowers.



Dear ----,

I am writing to you from the most public library in the world.*

Love,

* George Kalamaras & Eric Baus, *Births Incurred/your recently collected saliva* (2003).

rakcija: to be moved eklektični je broj sastavljen od radova koji kruže oko pojmove emocija, njihove reprezentacije, afekata, odnosa i kretanja, ili pak ti pojmovi lete poput duhova njihovim tekstualnim tkivom. Nerijetko su suprotstavljeni u osnovnim polazištima, te su, kako svjetonazorski, tako i stilski, posve različiti.

Uломak iz teksta Melisse Gregg i Gregoryja J. Seigwortha "Inventar svjetlucanja", ujedno i uvodni tekst knjige *The Affect Theory Reader*, bačena je udica, teaser za moguća istraživanja sila susreta i intenziteta. Osobito mi je drago da u ovom broju *Frakcije* objavljujemo tekst Darka Suvina, u kojem se autor pozabavio interpretacijom Brechtova djela kao "bezosjećajnog" ("Nije jasno tko je iskovao oznaku 'klasik razuma', ali ova komercijalna propaganda svakako izvanredno sažima varku koja je čitavu generaciju njemačkih školaraca natjerala da mrze Brechta kao kugu"), kako bi je, uz pomoć razlike između pojmove empatije i simpatije (u borbi protiv hegemonijske empatije), doveo u pitanje. Suvinova je akademska žestina osvježavajuća, jer on smatra da je "skandalozno primijeniti na njih [emocije] osakaćenu, mehaničku i zamagljujuću podjelu u kojoj se razum smatra muškim, analitičkim, svojstvenim umu, hladnim, objektivnim i univerzalnim, zdravim, javnim i uređenim, dok bi emocija bila ženska, sintetička, svojstvena tijelu, topla, subjektivna i specifična, bolesna, osobna i politički nepouzdana." U "Putu od herojstva do zajedničke ranjivosti" Helene Vosters razotkriva probleme militarizirane poetike tugovanja na primjeru kanadskog fenomena Autoceste heroja, ispresjecajući ih s osobnim iskazima vezanima uz izvođenje svog performansa *Impact Afganistan War*. Polazeći od mehanizama zaborava, Ric Allsopp promatra koreografsku sliku hoda unatrag u smislu emocionalne dinamike, koja se opire dovršenosti tijela, iako sa sobom donosi punoču njegove prisutnosti. Nicholas Ridout govori o važnosti amaterizma u političkom životu, izvrćući naglavce odnos

amaterizma i profesionalizma jer je "ono što je amater ustvari imao za ponuditi, kao rezultat svoje slobode od zarađivanja za život kao profesionalac, ustvari bio profesionalizam." Ipak, oprezan je i prema pojmu rada iz ljubavi jer ga smatra ideološkim mamcem za ono što je, u osnovi, kapitalistički nadničarski rad. Naposljetu mu se ipak čini da je amaterska kazališna skupina Queen Mary Players, u svom liku amatera, uspjela uzrokovati prekid u *raspodjeli osjetilnog*. Vesna Vuković bavi se radovima Andreje Kulunčić kao primjera relacione umjetnosti, sa fokusom na kolektivnom procesu kao radnoj proceduri, uz ponešto skepse, odnosno, interesa za paradoksalno u politici inkluzije.

Dio *Frakcije* posvećen kritikama i prikazima fokusiran je uglavnom na po jedno umjetničko djelo, odnosno knjigu. Medakovo inzistiranje na teatru oduzimanja i uskraćivanja u analizi predstave *Work Every Day* Marjane Krajač u zanimljivoj je napetosti s većinom ostalih tekstova u ovom broju – dajte mi manje!, umjesto da se "upinjete da me obogatite". Louise Owen nalazi da je glavni problem *Audio Obscure* u tome što prividno kreirajući socijalnu situaciju zvučnom instalacijom, gledatelja/slušatelja zapravo pretvara u usamljenu figuru koja nikom ne vjeruje. Antonija Letinić kontrapunktira predstavu Janeza Janše *Slovensko narodno gledališče* sa video trilogijom Yael Bartane ... and Europe Will Be Stunned, koje se obje bave politikama isključivanja i njihovim posljedicama, fokus nalazeći u njihovu odnosu prema vremenu. Uz prikaze knjige Petre Sabisch *Choreographing Relations: Practical Philosophy and Contemporary Choreography* i Nataše Govedić *Emocionalna predanost i politika afekata*, tu je još i tekst Sarah Wishart, koja se, uz osrv na blog Toma Lubbocka, bori s emocionalnim posljedicama gubitka riječi između uma i usta. Za ovu su *Frakciju* posebno važni radovi Marije Cetinić, koja jednostavnim postupkom pretvaranja citata u (ljubavna) pisma, postiže tektonske pomake u načinu njihove percepcije.

Dear ----,
Love,
Frakcija

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rakcija: to be moved is an eclectic issue composed of works circling around terms related to emotions, their representation, affects, relations and movements, or situations where these terms linger like ghosts penetrating the fabric of the text. They are often opposed in their basic assumptions, and differ both in their viewpoints and style.

A fragment from the text by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth 'An Inventory of Shimmers', the introduction to the book *The Affect Theory Reader*, represents a bait, a teaser for a possible research on the forces of encounter and intensities. I am especially delighted that this issue of *Frakcija* opens with a text written by Darko Suvin, where the author analyses the interpretation of Brecht's work as 'unemotional' ('Who coined "The 'Classic of Reason"' tag is not clear, but its hype at any rate wondrously encapsulates the red herring which has made a whole generation of German school kids hate Brecht like the plague'), in order to put it in question by differentiating between terms like *empathy* and *sympathy* (in the struggle against hegemonic empathy). Suvin's academic fury is refreshing because he believes that it is 'scandalous to apply to them [emotions] the hackneyed, mechanical, and obfuscating division where reason is seen as masculine, analytic, proper to the mind, cold, objective and universal, sane, public, and orderly, while emotion would be feminine, synthetic, proper to the body, warm, subjective and particular, sick, private, and politically untrustworthy'. In 'Beyond Heroism And Towards Shared Vulnerabilities' Helene Vosters unravels the problems of militarized poetics of grief through the example of a Canadian phenomenon – The Highway of Heroes – cutting through the academic text with her personal testimonies in relation to her performance *Impact Afganistan War*. Starting from the mechanism of forgetting, Ric Allsopp analyses the choreographic image of walking backwards in terms of emotional dynamics that resist the final completion of a body, although bringing the fullness of its presence. Nicholas Ridout discusses the importance of amateurism in political life, turning the relation between amateurism and professionalism upside-

down since 'what the amateur really had to offer, as a result of his freedom from having to earn his living as a professional, was actually professionalism.' However, he is very careful when talking about 'working' for the love of it because he thinks that might be an ideological bait for something that is, basically, a capitalist labour. Finally, it seems to him that the amateur theatre company Queen Mary Players, in its amateur role, has managed to cause a disruption in the distribution of the sensible. Vesna Vuković writes about Andreja Kulunčić's works as examples of relational art, focusing on the collective process as a working procedure, with a pinch of scepticism, or rather, interest in the paradoxes of the inclusion policy.

The section of this issue dedicated to (re)views focuses mainly, although not exclusively, on a single artistic work or a book. Medak's insistence on theatre of subtraction and deprivation in the analysis of the performance *Work Every Day* by Marjana Krajač implies an interesting tension with most of the other texts in this issue: give me less!, instead of 'trying to enrich me'. Louise Owen believes that the basic problem of *Audio Obscura* is that this audio installation seemingly creates a social situation, while it actually turns the spectator/listener into a lonely figure unable to trust anyone. Antonija Letinić counterpoints Janez Janša's *Slovensko narodno gledališče* (*The Slovenian National Theatre*) with Yael Bartana's video trilogy... and *Europe Will Be Stunned*, dealing with both the exclusion policies and their consequences, focusing on their relation towards time. Together with reviews of Petra Sabisch's *Choreographing Relations: Practical Philosophy and Contemporary Choreography* and Nataša Govedič's *Emotional Dedication And the Policy of Affects*, this issue also presents the text by Sarah Wishart, who is reviewing Tom Lubbock's blog, and struggling with emotional consequences of a word lost somewhere between the mind and the mouth. This *Frakcija* also brings Marija Cetinić's collages where the author simply turns various philosophical and literary quotes into (love) letters, resulting in tectonic shifts in perception.

Dear ----,
Love,
Frakcija

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Dear ----,

Although some of us love its common and at times accidental beauty, we're truly exhausted by identity. We sink to the ground. We want to design new love for you because we are hungry for imprudent, sensational, immodest, revolutionary public gorgeousness. We need dignity and texture and fountains.*

Love,

* Lisa Robertson, *Occasional Work and Seven Walks from the Office for Soft Architecture* (2003).



Dear ----,

Meet me at the Office for Soft Architecture. Here is what we already know: the flesh is lovely and we abhor the prudery of monuments. Everything is something. We have plenty of time. The problem is not how to stop the flow of items and surfaces in order to stabilize space, but how to articulate the politics of their passage. We propose a theoretical device which amplifies the cognition of thresholds. It would add to the body the vertiginously unthinkable.*

Love,


* Lisa Robertson, *Occasional Work and Seven Walks from the Office for Soft Architecture* (2003).

Inventar svjetlucanja*

Gregory J. Seigworth & Melissa Gregg

S engleskoga prevela Tijana Gojić

* Preuzeto iz "An Inventory of Shimmers", iz *The Affect Theory Reader*, uredili Melissa Gregg i Gregory J. Seigworth, str. 1-28. Copyright, 2010, Duke University Press. Sva prava pridržana. Objavljeno u Frakciji uz dopuštenje autora i izdavača.



ako da uopće započnemo kada zapravo ne postoji čisto ili na bilo koji način izvorno stanje afekta? Afekt se pojavljuje usred *onoga između*: u mogućnostima da djelujemo i da se djeluje na nas. Afekt je sudar ili izbacivanje trenutačnog ili u nekim slučajevima dugotrajnijeg stanja odnosa *baš kao i prolaska* (i trajanja prolaska) sila ili intenziteta. Znači, afekt nalazimo u onim intenzitetima koji prelaze s tijela na tijelo (ljudsko, neljudsko, dio tijela i dr.), u onim rezonancama koje kruže oko ili među njima, a ponekad i prijanjaju uz tijela i svjetove, *no i u samim prolazima ili varijacima u tim intenzitetima i rezonancama* kao takvim. Afekt u svom najantropomorskijem izdanju, termin je kojim označavamo one sile – organske sile koje se kriju ispod, pored ili općenito, *izvan* svjesnog znanja, vitalne sile koje nadiru onkraj emocija – koje nas mogu povesti do trenutka, do misli i protežnosti, a koje nas isto tako mogu zadržati (kao u neutralnom) u jedva zamjetnom srastanju odnosa sila, ili nas preplaviti prividnom neukrotivošću svijeta. Zaista, afekt je trajan dokaz upravo stalne imerzije tijela, u i između tvrdoglavosti i ritmova svijeta, njegovih odbijanja koliko i poziva.

Afekt je umnogome jednakoznačan sa *silom* ili *silama susreta*. Termin "sila", međutim, može nas navesti na krivi trag jer afekt ne mora biti pretjerano snažan (iako u nekim slučajevima, npr. u psihanalitičkom istraživanju traume on to jest). Ustvari, prilično je vjerojatno da će afekt češće probijati pri najfinijim mogućim kratkotrajnim intenzitetima: svi oni minijaturni ili molekularni događaji neprimjećenog. Ono obično i njegovo ekstra-. Afekt se rađa u onome što je *između* stvari i boravi kao akumulativna *pored-nost*. Afekt možemo stoga promatrati kao gradijent kapaciteta tijela – meko prirastanje svemodulirajućih sila-odnosa-koje rastu i padaju ne samo različitim ritmovima i modalitetima susreta nego i kroz kanale i rešeto osjeta i osjetilnosti, prirastanje koje se poklapa s time da pripada ponašanju virtualno bilo kakvih i bilo kojih stvari. Otuda dolazi stalno imanentna mogućnost afekta da se i nadalje širi: i unutar i van međuprostora neživog i neživućeg, unutarstaničnih otkrivanja ekonomije žila, tkiva i crijeva, i magličastog iščezavanja netjelesnog (događaja, atmosfera, osjećaja-zvukova). Istovremeno intiman i neosoban, afekt se *akumulira* i povezanošću i prekidima u povezanosti, i tako postaje palimpsest susreta sila što presijecaju plime i oseke intenziteta koji prolaze kroz "tijela" (tijela ako ih definiramo ne po principu ovojnica-kože ili međe od kakve druge površine nego po njihovom potencijalu da uzvrte ili sudjeluju u prolasku afekta).

Vezivanje i razvezivanje, nastajanje i protunastajanje, neskladne dezorijentacije i ritmičko usklađivanje. Afekt obilježava *pripadanje* tijela svijetu susreta; ili – pripadanje svijeta tijelu susreta ali isto tako i *ne-pripadanje*, preko svih onih mnogo nesretnijih dekompozicija međusobnih ne-sumogućnosti. Uvijek tu ima i dvosmislenih ili 'mješovitih' susreta koji se više ili manje sudaraju i istiskuju, no najčešće pak pomalo od oboje.

U tom sveobuhvaćajućem povećavanju sila-odnosa (ili, obratno, u ljuštenju ili ispiranju takvih sedimentacija) skriva se prava moć afekta, afekta kao potencijala: to je *mogućnost* tijela da proizvede i doživi afekt. Kako tijelo, obilježeno u svom trajanju ovim raznim susretima s mješovitim silama, uopće dođe do toga da pretvara svoje afekte (svoje doživljavanje afekta) u djelovanje (mogućnost da proizvede afekt)? Sigmund Freud na jednom mjestu tvrdi, u svom ranom radu, da afekt uglavnom ne odražava ni ne misli; afekt djeluje.⁰¹ No Freud je isto tako smatrao da ti putevi afekta ostaju u neposrednoj blizini kretanja misli, toliko blizu da se trepetljike opažaja neprestano protežu između podsvjesnog (ili, bolje rečeno nesvjesnog) afekta i svjesne misli. U praksi stoga afekt i kognicija nikada nisu potpuno razdvojivi – ako ni zbog čega drugog a ono zbog toga što je misao također tijelo, ona je otjelotvorena. Izbačen svojim nezavršenim međustanjem, afekt je neodvojiv od neprestanog postajanja tijela (neprestano postajući drugačije, ma koliko nezamjetno, od onoga što već jest), povučen ponad svoje tobožnje vezanosti površinskom ograničenošću, pa i cijelim sastavom, sa silama odnosa. Uz pomoć afekta, tijelo se nalazi izvan sebe koliko i u sebi – premreženo svojim odnosima – dok na kraju takve čvrste distinkcije prestanu vrijediti.

U jednoj od do sada najcitatnijih tvrdnji o afektu, Baruch Spinoza kaže: "Nitko još nije utvrdio što sve tijelo može".⁰² Važno je odmah naglasiti dva ključna aspekta, odnosno ponovno ih naglasiti: najprije, kapacitet tijela nikada se ne definira samim tijelom nego ga uvijek potpomaže i podržava polje ili kontekst sila-odnosa; a drugo, ono "ne još" "poznavanja tijela" je i dalje vrlo prisutno već više od 330 godina od Spinozine *Etike*. Doduše, kao što je Spinoza detektirao, nikada to pitanje ne čini generičko shvaćanje nekog određenog "tijela" (bilo kojeg tijela) nego, puno singularnije, pokušaj da se konfigurira tijelo i njegovi afekti/afektiranost, njegovo neprestano afektivno stvaranje nekog svijeta, ovo-sti svijeta i tijela.

Eseji u ovoj zbirici se svaki na svoj način pokušavaju pozabaviti tom "još-ne-tošću" afektualnih djelovanja i protudjelovanja tijela. Svaki esej iznosi vlastito viđenje susreta sa silama i prolazima intenziteta koji opravdavaju, a povremeno i ogoljavaju, singularne i intimne neosobne – čak pod-osobne i pred-osobne slojeve pripadanja (ili ne-pripadanja) svijetu. To je taj neprestani izazov Spinozinog "ne još:" prenijeti osjećaj hitnosti koji transformira materiju ili važnosti afekta u etički, estetski i politički zadatok sve u jednom. Međutim, Spinoza je naravno morao znati da taj "ne još" afekta nikada nije ni trebao pronaći ikakvo konačno rješenje. Nitko neće konačno na kraju uzviknuti: "Aha! Sad znamo za što je sve tijelo sposobno! To smo riješili!" Upravo ovaj spinozijanski imperativ, koji se stalno obnavlja upoznatošću s tim "ne još" afektivnog djelovanja, vodi afekt – baš kao i teorije koje pokušavaju pregovaratati formativne sile afekta – prema sljedećem susretu sila, i onda sljedećem i sljedećem...

Ipak, bila bi prilično ozbiljna pogreška tumačiti suvremene teorije afekta tako da svaki od tih "ne još" i njihovih "sljedećih" doživljavamo poput kretanja unaprijed kao u kakvom integriranom vojničkom maršu. Ne postoji jedna, uopćavajuća teorija afekta: ne još a neće je (srećom) nikada ni biti. Ako ništa drugo, puno je primamljivije zamišljati da su jedino što može postojati

beskrajne i bezbrojne iteracije afekta i teorija afekta: teorija toliko različitih i singularno definiranih kao svoj vlastiti susret s tijelima, afektima, svjetovima. (Ne bi li teorija – bilo koja teorija sa ili bez velikog T – trebala biti takva?

Takva da barata makar i skromnom metodološkom vitalnošću umjesto da se nakalemljuje na svijet što se koprca pod njom kao kakva nabačena mreža švercajući interpretabilnost bilo koje vrste?) A takvo stanje stvari možda bi moglo objasniti zašto prvi susreti s teorijama afekta djeluju kao momentalan (a katkad i stalniji) metodološki i konceptualni slobodni pad. Gotovo svi isprobani i pravi rukohvati i nogostupi za toliko kritičko-kulturalno-filozofske potrage za teorijom – subjekta/objekta, reprezentacije i značenja, racionalnosti, vremena i prostora, unutrašnjeg i vanjskog, ljudskog/neljudskog, identiteta, strukture, pozadine/prvog plana itd. – postaju bitno manje samouvjereni i konzekventniji (a bilo kakva ideja “determinacije” ili direktnog linearog uzroka i posljedice pada u vodu). Kako afekt proizlazi iz mutne, neposredovane povezanosti a ne iz kakve dijalektičke pomirbe potpuno suprotnih elemenata ili primarnih jedinica, on omogućava da kompartmentalizacije prepuste mjesto granicama i tenzijama, mješavinama i zamućenjima. Kao što je Brian Massumi naglasio⁰³, pristupi afektu bi izgledali puno manje kao slobodan pad kad bi naši najčešći načini potrage počeli od pokreta a ne zastojia, s procesima koji se stalno odvijaju a ne sa zauzetih pozicija. Nije onda čudo da ih se, kada bi se teorije usudile dati makar i privremeno ili probno viđenje afekta, nerijetko optuživalo za naivno i romantično lutanje u neosnovane sfere bezbrojnih inter-implikacija svijeta ili tijela, gubeći se u preobilju razlika koje se roje i odronjavaju: loveći sićušne krijesnice intenziteta koji slabašno svjetluju u mraku, primjećujući ona odzvanjanja koja vibriraju, ništavna do seizmička, pod sirovim naletom danjeg svjetla, dramatizirajući (i zaista, za neuvjerene, teatralizirajući) ono što se često ne spominje. Ali, kako će naši suradnici pokazati, sudarajuća/istiskujuća pripadnost afekta svjetovima, tijelima i njihovim među-afektima u svojoj immanentnosti – signalizira i sam nagovještaj teorije afekta: bacajući svjetlo na “ne još” djelovanje tijela, bacajući udicu po nadajmo se (ali i pribjavamo) vrhuncu budućnosti koja se pojavljuje, okušavajući sreću s beskrajno povezivim, neosobnim i zaraznim pripadanjima ovom svijetu.


03 Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 2002)



Dear ----,

Now we are turning books into guns and barricading the windows; we are collectivizing beyond mere happenstance, mere rapture. This is a seismic NOW, FINALLY! where we sediment a different sort of density. We are tautological.

Love,



Dear ----,

We are unpacking our library. Yes, we are. The air saturated with the dust of wood, the floor covered with torn paper. It is the base and horizon of our militant intimacy, a structural function, and the measurement of our density. The ice is at the foot of this mountain. That is to say, we are gathering provisions for the long winter, the long campaign of.

Love,



Dear ----,

We will refer to this as THE LONG WINTER. As in: Remember the long winter? Or: Remember how long the long winter was? It will seem like a torturous impossibility. How did we make it through. Did we. We did.

Yours,

Emocije, Brecht, empatija naspram simpatije 01


Darko Suvin

S engleskoga prevela Marina Miladinov

01 Terminologija o emocijama neprohodna je prašuma suprostavljenih stručnih, pa čak i osobnih semantika. Stoga svatko tko se odluči baviti tom temom treba utrti vlastiti put i držati ga se, ili će propasti. Tako, na primjer, jedna škola smatra da "osjećaji" obuhvaćaju i psihološke emocije i fiziološke afekte; i tako dalje. Riječ "strast" ispočetka je na latinskom označavala pasivnu patnju (usp. Isusovu pasiju), dok se na engleskom i francuskom obično smatra intenzivno usmjerrenom prema nekom cilju. "Patos" je na engleskom teatralno i ne sasvim iskreno iskazivanje emocija. Situacija u drugim jezicima, poput njemačkog, nije ništa manje zamršena, iako na drugačiji način – vidi bilj. 6.

Zahvaljujem Zakladi Humboldt za nagradu koja mi je omogućila da radim u Brechtovu arhivu u nekoliko intervala između 1997. do 2000. godine, kao i Erdmutu Wizisli i osobljju arhiva. Također zahvaljujem Sabini Kebir i Thomasu Weberu što su me uputili na raznu građu.

Zbog ograničenosti prostora ovdje ne govorim o Brechtovu osobnom odnosu prema ženama, o kojemu je napisano mnogo neutemeljenih i naprosto pogrešnih stvari u kritikama Fuegjeva tipa. Prema mome mišljenju, najodmjerenije knjige o toj temi su one Sabine Kebir (vidi četiri naslova u Bibliografiji), o kojima sam pisao u *Brecht Yearbook* (Suvin, "A Very" i "Sabine Kebir").



ovom tekstu namjera mi je kombinirati dvije vrste argumenata, koji bi se trebali međusobno rasvjetiliti. Prva je općeniti pogled na emocije, koji koristi razne pristupe, dijelom i feminističko-materijalističku argumentaciju (prvenstveno, ali ne i isključivo onu Alison Jaggar), kao i Brechtove uvide. Čini mi se jednako važnim ukazati na neke ozbiljne – iako ne i ključne – slike točke u

Brechtovu tretmanu ženskog roda, bilo u životu, bilo u umjetničkom prikazu, i također pokazati da je on u svome shvaćanju subjektnosti ili osobnosti odbacivao patrijarhalnu ili militarističku degradaciju jednako kao i holivudsku ili filistarsku zlorabu. Druga se nadovezuje na argumente koje sam iznio drugdje,⁹² naime da je crvena nit važna za razumijevanje Brechtova djela i života, koja se iskristalizirala iz njegovih spoznajnih emocija i uvida, bila slika, pojam i praksa držanja (*Haltung*): kombinacija poze i mnjenja koja je subivstvena s interesom, koji pak nije moguće razdvojiti od određene vrste emocija. Ideja da je Brechtovo djelo bezosjećajno, ili pak raspeto između razuma i emocija, zastarjela je i pogrešna. Te dvije vrste mišljenja sjedinjuju se u raspravi o ključnoj razlici između empatije i simpatije, za koju smatram da je možemo i moramo ekstrapolirati iz Brechtova stajališta i djela.

1. Orientacijske napomene o emocijama

... i ovaj pojam morat ćemo pročistiti prije uporabe, budući da je star te su ga često koristili mnogi ljudi i u mnogobrojne svrhe.

Brecht, "Volkstümlichkeit und Realismus", 22.1: 408

Započet ću parafrazom onoga što smatram najrazumnijom mainstream-interpretacijom emocija. Iznio ju je Mandler (66-71 i *passim*), a dopunio Bruner: emocija je naziv za vid osobnog života koji se javlja kao interakcija između neke općenite situacije, koja u pravilu uključuje druge ljude, i unaprijed danih osobnih (pojedinačnih ili kolektivnih) sklonosti. Pojedinac

tumači ili obrađuje neki oštar zahtjev koji pred njega postavlja situacija – shvaćajući istu kao cjelovitu propoziciju ili *Gestalt* – u tjelesni podražaj, koji se zatim prosljeđuje u svijest (pojmovno mišljenje i odgovarajuće samoopažanje), kao i u spremnost na reakciju. Zaključujem da je emocija (subjekti na koje utječu drugi subjekti) tjesno isprepleteno naliče akcije (subjekti koji utječu na druge subjekte). Središnje pitanje koje se danas postavlja o emociji ili emocijama tiče se načina na koji one dopuštaju ili ometaju ove ili one akcije.

Kratkotrajnije i primitivnije emocije često se nazivaju afektima. Emocije koje su dugotrajnije od trenutnih – te stoga obično nisu ni toliko jednostavne – javljaju se kada se akcija na neko vrijeme prekine. Takve emocije imaju i evaluacijsku, očito spoznajnu dimenziju, iako mogu biti dane kao implicitna cjelina bez artikulacije. One su nužno povezane s načinom na koji se specifično djelovanje ili stanje neke osobe odnosi prema njezinu cjelokupnoj utjelovljenoj osobnosti, njezinim životnim obzorima, vrijednostima i (ne)ugodama (usp. Wolf 113-14), osobito njezinom držanju ili stajalištu. Moj pristup također usvaja radno razgraničenje emocija Jaggarove, koje isključuje "automatske tjelesne reakcije i nemjerne osjete, kao što su napadaji gladi" ("Love", 148). I najvažnije od svega, emocije se ne nalaze u nekoj vrsti potpuno neracionalnog vakuma ili "tuposti"; prema ovom "kognitivističkom" gledištu, one ne obuhvaćaju samo osjećaje, nego i orientaciju ili *intenciju*, "njihov intencionalni vid i s time povezani sud" (isto, 149).⁰³

02 Vidi: Suvin, "Haltung" i "Haltung (Bearing)". Sa zadovoljstvom primjećujem da je do tog zaključka već ranije došao Dümling (626), čija je izvrsna knjiga izrazito korisna u raspravi o Brechtovu držanju u raznim pitanjima – ne samo u pogledu glazbe.

03 Većina filozofskih pristupa od Husserla nadalje, osobito nakon 1950. godine, općenito bi se složila sa gledištem da su emocije namjerne, odnosno dijelom uspostavljene spoznajom i vrednovanjem, usp. Rorty i Stocker; slavni preteče takvog stajališta uključivali bi Rousseaua. Iz toga slijedi da se ljudi može smatrati odgovornima za djelovanje na osnovi emocija. No ne slijedi i to da emociju, iako je u načelu ili potencijalno spoznajna, treba naprosto poistovjetiti s razumom; zanimljiv je argument da ona upotpunjuje nedostatno (npr. presporo) rasuđivanje, usp. de Sousa.

Spoznaja i emocija ne nalaze se nužno u suprotnosti. Ubrojio bih u razumijevanje, spoznaju ili znanje sve ono što zadovoljava dva uvjeta: da nam može pomoći u suočavanju s našom osobnom i kolektivnom egzistencijom te da se njegova valjanost može dokazati putem primjene u toj egzistenciji, pri čemu je modificira i pritom biva i samo modificirano (više o tome u: Suvin, "On Cognitive"). Mišljenje, akcija i emocija predstavljaju "apstrakcije koje nameću velik teorijski trošak. Cijena koju plaćamo... napisljetu je ta da gubimo iz vida njihovu strukturalnu međuvisnost. Na kojoj god ih razini promatrali,... ta tri elementa sastavni su dio jedinstvene cjeline [koja postiže integraciju jedino unutar nekog kulturnog sustava]" (Bruner, 117-18). Što se tiče razuma, Brecht je primijetio da "ljudi čine mnogo toga što je razumno, a ipak ne prolazi kroz njihov Verstand [formalno rasuđivanje, DS]. Mi ne možemo funkcionirati bez toga." (GBFA 22.2: 825, navod prema svezak: stranica) Sistematisirani idejni konstrukti teže lažnom skladu i ideološkoj jednoglasnosti koja je nužno prisutna u svakom zatvorenom nauku ili Weltanschauungu (npr. 21: 414-17). "Učenik je važniji od nauka" (21: 531) – bila je središnja Brechtova smjernica. U takvim razmatranjima on se otkriva kao začuđujuće rani zagovornik *reintegracije tijela*, zajedno sa svim njegovim osjetima (što je u mладости zastupao i Marx), u praksi i teoriju našeg znanja: tijelo je za Brechta sidrište koje suodređuje stajalište. Mislim da je nekakvo stajalište prisutno u svim osobnim i posvojnim zamjenicama, u svakoj *deixis*, u svim metaforama viđenja i orientacije. To mu je napisljetu dopustilo da zaključi sljedeće: "Takvo mišljenje... ne suprotstavlja se osjećanju... Sada mi se to čini naprosto nekom vrstom ponašanja, naime društvenim ponašanjem. Čitavo tijelo sudjeluje u njemu sa svim svojim osjetima." (22.2: 753). U tome se slaže s Merleau-Pontijem (*Phénoménologie, kao i Structure*), prema čijim je riječima utjelovljenje proživljeno iskustvo tjelesnosti, kao i uvid da je tijelo mjesto spoznaje ili razumijevanja koje je i samo neodvojivo povezano s utjelovljenim djelovanjem kao priprema, nadomjestak, reakcija ili ovjeravanje povratne informacije.

Budući da emocije sudjeluju u spoznajnom procesu, na njih često utječu njegove kategorizacije, argumentacije i organizacija⁰⁴: mogu se intenzivirati ili umekšati, raspršiti po čitavom procesu ili pak svesti na beznačajnost. Nije korisno, nego je skandalozno primijeniti na njih osakaćenu, mehaničku i zamagljujuću podjelu u kojoj se razum smatra muškim, analitičkim, svojstvenim umu, hladnim, objektivnim i univerzalnim, zdravim, javnim i uređenim, dok bi emocija bila ženska, sintetička, svojstvena tijelu, topla, subjektivna i specifična, bolesna, osobna i politički nepouzdana. Sa stajališta koje ovdje zastupam (a koje se nastoji probiti kroz džunglu suprotstavljenih mišljenja), koji bi danas mogli biti održivi pogledi na emocije? Dotaknut ću se samo četiriju točaka.

Kao prvo, hegemonijsko je shvaćanje emocija da su one nužno uglavnom nesvesne i osobne: ustvari, one nikada nisu isključivo takve. Barem su u najvažnijim slučajevima (uključujući egzemplarni slučaj umjetnosti) aktivni angažman cjelokupne osobnosti, psihofizička stajališta. Emocije su tako tjesno stopljene s osobnošću da smo samo u sasvim ograničenoj mjeri ovlašteni tvrditi da za njih nismo odgovorni. One su nužna pratnja svakog obzora djelovanja, uključujući strah i ustručavanje od akcije. To je osobito istinito za dugoročne emocije, koje očito nisu afekti (usp. raspravu Majke Hrabrosti s Mladim Vojnikom o "dugom gnjevu" u 4. prizoru drame). Nakon što odbacimo štetnu kartezijansku podjelu na *cogito* i osjetilno tijelo, možemo vidjeti da emocije nisu ni sasvim namjerne ili svjesne ni sasvim nenamjerne ili iracionalne; "one su načini na koji se aktivno bavimo svijetom i čak ga uspostavljamo" (Jaggar, "Love", 152-53 i passim).

Kao drugo, Brecht je sasvim ispravno uvidio da se među najosnovnijim kategorijama u raspravi o bilo kakvoj psihologiji koja je usmjerena na akciju nalaze vrednovanje, promatranje i naposljetku namjera. Ne samo da se oni ne mogu razlučiti jedno od drugoga, nego je sve troje usko povezano s emocijama. To se čini jasnim za vrijednosne sudove, koji su u neprekidnom odnosu povratne informacije s emocijama. Na složenije načine to vrijedi i za promatranje, koje je također duboko isprepleteno s namjerama (interesima), od primarnih izbora na što se usredotočiti i čemu dati prednost pa sve do odabranih interpretacijskih okvira: "Promatranje je aktivnost odabira i interpretacije." Tu nije moguć Humeov jaz između vrijednosti i činjenice. Ono što će u određenoj situaciji i za određene aktere biti činjenica ovisi o "intersubjektivnim sporazumima, koji se dijelom sastoje od zajedničkih prepostavki o tome što su 'normalne' ili primjerene reakcije na određene situacije" (Jaggar, "Love", 154).

Kao treće, barem neki od presudnih čimbenika svake emocije sudjeluju i u kolektivnom angažmanu koji je moguće zacrtati ili zamisliti na tom sjecištu društvene povijesti – nesavršeno ili pak savršenije. Iako vjerojatno postoje i drugi zajednički čimbenici s "dugoročnim" (iako ne i vječnim i "intrinzično ljudskim") emocionalnim stajalištima, specifična i osobna emocija u tom je smislu uvijek i povjesni i društveni *Gestalt*, konstrukt koji geni ili neurobiologija ne određuju u potpunosti, pa čak ni presudno. To je osobito očito u vezi s vrijednosnim sudovima, namjerom i interesima o kojima sam upravo govorio (usp. Brecht 22.2: 657-59). Emocije su društveni konstrukti što koriste biološke potencijale na više načina koji su višestruko kulturno određeni. I sam pojam emocije ne razlikuje se samo od društva do društva, nego se čak zamišlja kao zatvoreno semantičko polje samo u nekima od njih. Na primjer, u japanskoj kulturi termin i pojam "kokoro" istovjetan je onome što se na engleskom jeziku podrazumijeva pod sklonostima, srcem, umom, osjećajima, duhom ili koncepcijom neke osobe, odnosno nečemu poput

⁰⁴ Za uvod u literaturu o kategorizaciji vidi Rosch, a za zanimljiv komplementarni pristup "kinestetskim slikovnim shemama" Johnsona. Čak i ultraformalistički Kripke dopušta da je osjećaj bitna sastavnica pojma, budući da su sva svjesna mentalna stanja neodvojiva od sirovog osjećaja doživljaja, dok je psiholog Lazarus u opsežnim raspravama (citiram najnoviju koju sam pronašao) ustvrdio da je situacijska ocjena osobne važnosti neophodna za emociju.

svjesne i osjećajne biti osobnosti (budući da istočnoazijska kulturna sfera ne poznaje kršćanski pojam "duše", svijest je ondje svijest o vlastitoj utjelovljenoj osobnosti, koja se ne dijeli na razum i emocije – usp. Suvin, "Soul"). Jaggarova tvrdi da, "ako emocije nužno podrazumijevaju sudove, onda je očito da su im potrebni i pojmovi, koji se mogu smatrati društveno konstruiranim načinima organiziranja i objašnjavanja svijeta" ("Love", 151). I obrnuto, važno je da "emocije daju iskustvenu osnovu vrijednostima", tako da se to dvoje uzajamno potiče (isto, 153); vrijednosti i vrijednosni sudovi nalaze se u odnosu bliske povratne sprege s emocijama. Sumnjam da su pojmovi koji su potrebni emocijama nužno sasvim jasni, ali izvjesno je da su emocije u svakoj osobi uvelike oblikovane semantičkim hijerarhijama u koje smo socijalizirani (npr. nedvojbeno snažne mačističke emocije o ženskom djevičanstvu ili kreposti). Što se tiče vrijednosti ili vrednovanja, oni se intimno oblikuju pojmovima, ali i u neposrednom iskustvu, koje je nedvojbeno emocionalno.

I napisjetku, ali stoga ne i manje važno, naši su životi u znatnoj mjeri oblikovani složenom društvenom hegemonijom, koja uključuje (nažalost) određenost političkom ekonomijom, kao i neposrednom političkom kontrolom i kontrolom društvene skupine, ustvari – kako argumentira Raymond Williams – svim

odnosima dominacije i podređenosti, u njihovim oblicima praktične svijesti, ustvari prožetošću cjelokupnog životnog procesa. . . Ona [hegemonija] je čitav skup praksi i očekivanja, tijekom čitavoga života: naši osjeti i raspodjela energije, naše oblikovanje sebe samih i našega svijeta. To je sustav značenja i vrijednosti koji živimo. . . (109-10, naglasak dodan)

Nasreću, unutar te hegemonije mnogi ljudi posjeduju čitav spektar oporbenih, subverzivnih i potencijalno produktivnih emocija koje su neuskladive s dominantnim opažajima i vrednovanjima. Takve emocije mogu slijediti naša uvjerenja ili im čak mogu prethoditi – na primjer, kada "svim osjećajima ovlada nezaposlenost" (Brecht 19: 668). Međutim, "samo kada promišljamo o našoj ispočetka zbumujućoj razdražljivosti, gnušanju, gnjevu ili strahu, možemo osvijestiti svoju 'hagonsku' svijest da se nalazimo u situaciji prisile, okrutnosti, nepravde ili opasnosti" (Jaggar, "Love", 161).

Sve u svemu, nužno je iznova promisliti odnos razuma i emocije kao elemenata koji se uzajamno konstituiraju, a ne pobijaju. Umjesto da emocije i vrijednosti priječe mogućnost pouzdanog znanja, treba pokazati da su i jedne i druge nužne za znanje (Jaggar, "Love", 156-57). Dobar primjer je Brechtovo promišljanje iz 1938. godine o osobnim korijenima njegova prognostva:

Kada razmislim o tome do čega me doveo *Mitgehen* [zajedničko putovanje, kretanje u korak, uz aluziju na *Mitfühlen* – DS], a u čemu mi je pomoglo neprestano preispitivanje, moram se prikloniti ovom potonjem. Da sam pokleknuo pred onim prvim, još uvijek bih živio u svojoj domovini, ali da nisam zauzeo ovu potonju poziciju, ne bih bio poštena osoba. (26: 308)

Izrazimo li sve ovo tehničkim terminima: iako emocija u ontogenetskom i filogenetskom smislu možda prethodi pojmovnosti, ona je aksiološki nužna i intimna komponenta svakog rasuđivanja ili spoznaje. U našim osobnim životima emocije mogu slijediti naša konceptualizirana uvjerenja ili im pak prethoditi. U svakom slučaju, povratne sprege između emocija i svjesne

refleksije o njima nužne su za svaku učinkovitu intervenciju u društvenu stvarnost – osobito za društvene skupine koje se bore za "pogled na stvarnost koji je dostupan sa stajališta potlačenih", koji optimistički možemo shvatiti kao "perspektivu koja omogućuje manje pristran i iskrivljen te stoga vjerodostojniji pogled" (Jaggar, "Love", 162). Ali to pak znači da se "epistemički potencijal emocija" (isto, 163) mora shvatiti ozbiljno želimo li da bilo koja pozicija bude stabilna (usp. također: Hartsock; Jaggar, Feminist; Jameson; Lukács; Suvin, "On Cognitive", "Subject" i *To Brecht*, pogl. 4). Epistemički potencijal ne pridaje nikavu magičnu učinkovitost bilo emocijama, bilo sistematiziranim pojmovima, nego jedino mogućnost uporabe ili zloporabe. Ne mogu to bolje izraziti od Brechtova ulomka iz spisa *Me-Ti "Über die Prüfung der Gefühlsbewegungen"* ("O preispitivanju emocija"):

Kada smo bili mлади, reče Me-ti, učili su нас да не вјерујемо разуму, и то је било добро. Али такођер су нас учили да вјерујемо својим осјећајима, и то је било лоše. Извор наших емоција једнако је затрован као и извор наших судова: јер он је једнако доступан људским накртима и стога га непрестано загађујемо и ми и други. . . .
ПРЕПОСТАВИТИ да постоје емоције без разума знаћи погреšно шватити разум.
(18: 138-39)

2. O emocijama kod Brechta

Malo je izjava o umjetnosti које су ме се дојмиле као она Meier-Graefeova о Delacroixu: Kod њега је вруće срце кукало у хладном човјеку.

Brecht, *Tagebuch 1922*, 26: 270

2.1. "Jubilejsko izdanje" Brechta у шест сvezaka које је Suhrkamp objавио 1998. године, *Ausgewählte Werke in 6 Bänden* (4000 stranica, 128 DM) најављено је и рекламирано у проспекту као "Bertolt Brecht – Der 'Klassiker der Vernunft'". Није јасно тко је исковао ознаку "klasik razuma", али ова комерцијална propaganda свакако изванредно сажима варку која је читаву генерацијуnjemačkih školaraca natjerala да mrзе Brechta као kugu. Ipak, та је ознака или погрешна (suprotstavimo li razum emocijama) илиpak прilično нејасна (ne razjasnimo li što bi "Vernunft" могao зnačiti за Brechta i kod Brechta, i kakvo je doista било njegово stajalište prema emocijama i njihovoј uporabi). У настојању да то откриjem, прикупio sam pedesetak propozicija које отvoreno споминju osjećaje ili emocije, а које се могу прonaći u 33 sveska најновије goleme zbirke Brechtovih sabranih djela (GBFA). Међу њима сам пронашао dvije ili tri ranijeg datuma које doista suprotstavljaju "emotio" i "ratio", s kulminacijom u "Anmerkungen zur Oper Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny" ("Bilješkama uz operu Uspon i pad grada Mahagonija"), које је Brecht objavio zajedno s Peterom Suhrkampom 1930. године (24: 74-84). Taj primjer uвijek se iznova citira, vjerojatno зato što te bilješke nisu bile само провокативно ошtre, па стога i kratke i jasne, nego i зato što су one jedini dokaz koji је било MOGUĆE прonaći за Brechta као "klasika razuma" u уžem smislu riječi. Preispitao sam ga опсезnije u članku "Haltung (Bearing)", a ovdje ћу само ukratko сažeti svoje nalaze.

"Bilješke" sadrže mnoge druge važne теме, попут definicije središnjeg stajališta постојеће опере као "kulinarskog (или hedonističkog, geniesserische)"

stajališta”, ili tvrdnje da je “današnji povijesni oblik [užitka] roba” te da je u Mahagoniju ta “provokativna” tema podvrgнутa određenom preispitivanju: “Na primjer, kada se u 13. odjeljku Proždrljivac preždere do smrti, on to čini zato što prevladava glad” (24: 76-77). Emocije se spominju u čuvenoj kantovskoj tablici s dva suprotstavljenia stupca, koja je postala osnovom svih dalnjih sporova. Neke od njezinih mnogobrojnih kratkih stavki ističu kazalište koje ne projicira gledatelja u akciju na pozornici, paralizirajući time njegovo djelovanje, nego ga čini promatračem i na taj način stimulira njegovo djelovanje, budući da mu ne daje mogućnost emocija, nego ga “prisiljava na odluke”; to je kazalište gdje “osjećaji nisu sačuvani”, nego se “intenziviraju u spoznaju”, gdje se ljudi ne prepostavljaju kao već poznati, nego postaju “predmetom ispitivanja”. Naposljetku, tablica završava dvjema suprotnostima: prva je preuzeta iz kratkog sažetka u Marxovu *Predgovoru Kritici političke ekonomije* (MEW 13: 8), a druga je ono čemu smjeram upravo u ovoj raspravi:

Mišljenje određuje biće
Emocija [Gefühl]

Društveno biće određuje mišljenje
Razum [Ratio]

Ovaj mali nacrt ili tablica kasnije je nekoliko puta tiskana zasebno, izvan “Bilježaka o Mahagoniju”, što je pomoglo da se zaboravi Brechtova važna početna rezerva da ta tablica obilježava promjenu u naglasku (*Gewichtsverschiebung*), a ne neku krutu metafizičku suprotnost. Ali bez obzira na to, zamijećena opreka bila je podvrgнутa žestokim napadima, ne samo buržoaskih konzervativaca, nego prvenstveno Lukácsa i njegovih sljedbenika u službenom, sve više staljinistički usmjerenom tisku Komunističke partije. Godine 1938. Brecht je reagirao na pojednostavljene provokacije kojima se on bio služio u weimarskom razdoblju, te je razjasnio i dijelom modifcirao svoju poziciju preradivši tablicu. Osim omanjih skraćivanja i promjena, dodao je suprotnost između “onoga što bi ljudi trebali činiti” i “onoga što ljudi moraju činiti”, odnosno između etičkog propisa i ekonomsko-fizičke nužnosti; također je izbrisao krajnju suprotnost između emocije i razuma (24: 85).

Nadalje, u važnom pismu koje je u srpnju 1939. poslao nekom “drugu M.” iz Švedske Brecht komentira:

[Ovo] su bilješke za kazališne predstave i stoga su napisane u više ili manje polemičkom tonu. One ne sadrže potpune definicije i stoga često navode onoga tko ih izučava na pogrešno shvaćanje koje ga ometa u tome da ih koristi na teorijski produktivan način. Osobito operni članak o Mahagoniju treba dopuniti kako bi rasprava postala plodonosna. Ljudi su iz njega iščitali da sam zauzeo stranu “protiv emocionalnog i za racionalno”. To, dakako, nije slučaj. Ne znam kako bi se mišljenje moglo odvojiti od emocija. Čak niti onaj dio suvremene književnosti koji je, kako se čini, pisan bez razuma (*Verstand*) rijetko odvaja inteligenciju od emocije. U njemu je emocionalno jednako trulo kao i racionalno. . . . Ne bih ti sve ovo pisao da moja djela ustvari ne sadrže formulacije koje bi mogle gurnuti raspravu u smjer iz kojega ništa neće proizaći. Jer rasprava tipa “emocija ili razum” zamagljuje glavni rezultat koji se može pronaći u mojim djelima (bolje rečeno pokušajima): da se pojava koja se do sada smatrala estetski konstitutivnom, EMPATIJA, u zadnje vrijeme više ili manje izgubila u nekim umjetničkim djelima. (To očito nipošto ne znači da se izgubila i emocija.) (29: 149-50)

To je ključno pojašnjenje. Svaka daljnja rasprava o Brechtovom stajalištu prema emocijama može biti plodonosna samo ako od početka ozbiljno shvatimo ovo pismo.

2.2. Tako se Brecht veoma brzo udaljio od svake retorike protiv emocija. "Ta vrsta (epskog) prikazivanja", primjetio je oko 1931. povodom Majke, "ne odriče se emocionalnog učinka: ustvari, njezine emocije samo su pojašnjene... i nemaju nikakve veze s opijenošću (*Rausch*)" (22.1: 162). Godine 1940. pak piše da i "nearistotelovsko kazalište koristi kritiku zasnovanu na emocijama (*gefühlsmässige*)" (26: 438). To očito vrijedi i za mnoge druge ulomke i likove iz njegovih drama i pjesama – oni su uvijek jasno razgraničeni i deautomatizirani, što znači da su lišeni svake filistske sentimentalnosti. Zanemarujući ovdje mnoga druga svjedočanstva iz Brechtovih godina emigracije, kao što su njegova glavna teorijska djela *Razgovori o kupnji mjedi* i *Mali organon za Teatar*, citirat ću samo dvije bilješke iz njegova dnevnika. Čini mi se da one svojom kratkoćom sačinjavaju dva dijela njegova konačnog, izbalansiranog pogleda na općeniti pristup "militantnoj poziciji 'razum protiv emocije'" (vidi citat dolje). Prvi dio bavi se kazališnom umjetnošću, a drugi umjetnošću življenja.

U dnevničkoj bilješci od 15. studenoga 1940. Brecht je definirao svoje kazalište – "za promjenu" u odnosu na uobičajene "loše definicije [kao posebno intelektualističke]" – "u emocionalnim kategorijama":

To je moguće bez ikakvih problema, budući da u epskom teatru emocionalna i intelektualna linija ostaju istovjetne, kako u glumcu, tako i u gledatelju. Bilo bi nužno za takvo definiranje izgraditi na osnovama radoznalosti i susretljivosti skup emocija koji će biti protuteža skupu zasnovanom na užasu i žaljenju. Dakako, postoje i druge osnove za emocije. Tu je prije svega ljudska produktivnost, koja je najplemenitija od svih. (26: 441)

Čitava Brechtova teorija osobnosti, uključujući emocionalnost, mogla bi se rekonstruirati oko te temeljne pozicije produktivnosti. Ona se na razne načine povezuje ne samo s radoznalošću, nego i sa srećom, prijateljstvom, ljubavlju i "indignacijom, afektom koji je u društvenom smislu izrazito produktivan" (27: 140).

Naposljeku, Brecht je u bilješci od 4. ožujka 1941. mogao već sasvim dosljedno izjaviti kako "moramo napustiti militantnu poziciju 'emocije protiv razuma'":

Odnos *ratio – emotio* treba precizno istražiti u svim njegovim proturječjima, i ne smijemo dopustiti da naši protivnici prikazuju epski teatar naprsto kao racionalan i antiemocionalan. S jedne strane nalaze se "nagoni, automatizirane reakcije na doživljaje koje su postale oprečne našim interesima. Zamućene, jednotračne emocije koje više ne kontrolira razum. S druge strane, emancipirani *ratio* fizičara s njihovim mehaničkim formalizmom. . . Epska načela jamče kritičku poziciju u publici, ali ta je pozicija eminentno emocionalna. Tu kritiku ne treba brkati s kritikom u isključivom, znanstvenom smislu; ona je daleko inkluzivnija i uopće nije specijalizirana (*fachbegrenzt*), nego je daleko praktičnija i elementarnija. (26: 467)

Sve u svemu, nema koristi od pretvaranja da se Brecht nije upuštao u provokativno jednostrana pretjerivanja kako bi šokirao buržuje, a zatim mijenjao mišljenje pod pritiskom iskustva. Priznao je Benjamina 1934. da njegova misao povremeno zauzima "agitatorsku" (*hetzerische*) poziciju (GS 6: 531), a 1938. mu je to dodatno pojasnio: "Dobro je kada nekoga tko je zauzeo ekstremnu poziciju pretekne reakcionarno razdoblje; tako dospije na mjesto u sredini" (GS 6: 535). Brecht je bio neuobičajeno svjestan pritisaka krvave politike našega stoljeća: "Fašizam, sa svojim grotesknim naglaskom na emocionalnomete, a možda jednako toliko i određena dekadencija racionalnog elementa marksističke doktrine, potaknuli su me da snažnije naglasim racionalno. Međutim, upravo ta najracionalnija forma, 'poučna drama' (*Lehrstück*), pokazuje najemocionalnije učinke." (22.1: 500)

Jednu od Brechtovih stalno prisutnih nota nalazimo u njegovoj obrani određene vrste gipkog, ali kritičkog razuma, odbacivanju nekritičkog uranjanja u glupost i pokvarene emocije, kao i u pokušaju da na proturječne načine pomiri emociju i razum u prikladnom stavu (usp. npr. 26: 324-25 i 28: 564-65). Stoga smatram da se nameću barem tri smjera dalnjeg rada želimo li u potpunosti iskoristiti Brechtove uvide za svoju današnju orientaciju.

Prvi smjer bio bi otkriti barem otprilike što su, prema njegovu mišljenju, emocije unutar "skupa zasnovanog na" radoznalosti, susretljivosti i indignaciji – pa ponekad čak i na "mješavini užitka i užasa (što ne bi trebalo postojati, zar ne?)" ili na "pionirskoj avanturističnosti" (22.1: 418 i 559). Smatram da bi središnje mjesto zauzeo brižljivo odmijeren raspon emocionalnih stajališta (vidi 21: 99 već 1921. godine), ali nikada ravnodušnost. Dva stožera takvog raspona bili bi središnja pozicija Brechtova kasnog razdoblja, *prijaznost*, i njegova gotovo uvijek prakticirana, ali diskurzivno ne tako često isticana kategorija (ali usp. 22.2: 810-11 i 817) *ljupkosti* koja ujedinjuje "strast i razum" – kao u njegovu prijedlogu himne, za koju mi je itekako žao što nije današnja njemačka himna (kao što nije bila niti u DDR-u):

Anmut sparet nicht noch Mühe
Leidenschaft nicht noch Verstand
Dass ein gutes Deutschland blühe
Wie ein andres gutes Land.
("*Kinderhymne*", 12: 303)

Ne mogu ovdje prevesti tu dražesnu snagu, ali barem ču je pokušati prenijeti u rimovanu prozu:

Ne štedite mara ni truda / Ni strasti ni razuma ne štedite / Da procvate
Njemačka nam dobra / I kao svaka dobra zemlja vrijedi.

Drugi smjer istraživanja bio bi otkriti kako u Brechtovoj praksi (predstava, pjesništva i proznih djela) različite emocije gipko djeluju jedna na drugu kao i u povratnoj sprezi s pojmovnim propozicijama, na preciznim mjestima i s precizno doziranim naglascima. Brecht se itekako brinuo o gipkosti, te taoistička mekoća kod njega pobijeđuje nad krutošću (to je možda najdojmljivije sažeto u njegovoj pjesmi *Legenda o nastanku knjige "Tao-te-king"*). Započet ču s raspravom o spomenutim horizontima u trećem ulomku ovoga teksta. Smatram da je strateška napetost ili suprotnost na koju se valja usredotočiti ona između svrgavanja iluzionističke, sentimentalne, nekritičke i pseudosućutne empatije (*Einfühlung* se ističe u citiranom pismu iz 1939. godine, a druga svjedočanstva nalaze se u svescima 22-23 i 26-27 izdanja

GBFA, koja sam uglavnom naveo u svome članku "Haltung [Bearing]" i potencijalno intenzivne, ali uvjek razumne simpatije. Ta opreka između *Einfühlung* i *Mitgefühl*, empatije i simpatije, koju možemo naći u Brechtovim poetskim, scenskim i drugim umjetničkim (kao i praktičnim) pozicijama, može se primjeniti i na empirijsko ponašanje.

Treći smjer pristupio bi Brechtovoj središnjoj poziciji da produktivnost uključuje ljubav, a ljubav je produktivnost. Pristupio sam toj struji drugdje (vidi moj članak "Brecht: Bearing", koristeći pionirske indikacije Haffadove i Nussbaumove), i nadam se da će se još vratiti toj temi.

3. O empatiji naspram simpatije: pitanje kritičke razdaljine

Emocije također sudjeluju u kritici, i možda je upravo tvoj zadatak organizirati kritiku kroz emocije.

Brecht, *Messingkauf Dialogues*, 22.2: 751

Iznenađenje i prostorna ili vremenska razdaljina... jednako su potrebni kako bi shvatio što te okružuje... tako očito da više to ne možeš jasno vidjeti.

Braudel, "History and the Social Sciences"

05 O Lippsovoj "projekcijskoj empatiji" i povijesti tog termina do Brechta i kod njega vidi: Weber.

Najvažnije bavljenje emocijama koje se okvirno tiče "simpatije" ili "posrednog razumijevanja", odnosno usmjerenoosti na druge ljudе, bila je u Brechtovoj Njemačkoj kompleksna rasprava Maxa Schelera, koja je danas dijelom prilično zastarjela, ali je u svoje vrijeme imala znatan autoritet. Njegova terminologija često nije sasvim jasna, a ponekad je upravo zbumnjuća, ali moja je namjera izvući iz nje sljedeće indikacije, mijenjajući ih ondje gdje to bude potrebno za moju svrhu.

Scheler oštro razlučuje suosjećanje (*Mitgefühl*) od sućuti (*Mitleiden*) kao i od zajedničkog radovanja (*Mitfreude*), a i od puko distancirane reprodukcije (*Nachvollzug*) tuđih osjećaja ili iskustva, u kojima se uopće ne sudjeluje. S jedne strane, u namjernom oponašanju ili reprodukciji (*Nachvollzug*) osjećamo općenitu kakvoću tuđe nesreće, ali ne patimo zajedno s drugim, ili pak osjećamo tuđu radost, ali se sami ne radujemo. Osjećaji druge osobe dani su s odmakom, predstavljeni "poput krajolika koji subjektivno 'vidimo' u sjećanju, ili pak melodije koju 'čujemo' na sličan način" (9/20). Dakako, to već podrazumijeva neko početno poimanje i razumijevanje činjenice da drugi ljudi imaju vlastite doživljaje. Međutim, iako ostaje nejasno kako ta "intuitivno shvatljiva i unutarnja veza između pojedinca i doživljaja" djeluje između dvaju agensa, ona ne uključuje nužno empatiju opažatelja (mene). Druga osoba ima "zasebno sebstvo, različito od našega", koje mi "nikada ne možemo u potpunosti razumjeti, budući da je uronjeno u vlastite psihičke doživljaje...". Možemo samo imati "svoj pogled na nj, uvjetovan našom vlastitom, zasebnom naravi" (10/21). Scheler stoga izričito polemizira protiv svake teorije "projekcijske empatije"⁰⁵ koja bi se zasnivala na istovjetnosti pojedinaca, ili pak na Schopenhauerovoj metafizici jedinstvenoga Bića koje se protivi iluzornoj individualizaciji (51/66), i u kojemu je Drugi, podvrgnut patnji, "još jedno Ja (*Ich noch ein Mal*)". S druge strane, u suosjećanju se "u meni zbiva istinski doživljaj sličan onome što se događa u drugoj osobi...", ali nipošto istovjetan – čak niti u kraćem ili slabijem obliku (11/22).

Tako ovdje imamo posla s djnjema krajnostima: potpunim pomanjkanjem interesa i dodira (beskonačna razdaljina) i potpunim

stapanjem (nulta razdaljina). Negdje između tih dviju krajnosti nalazi se srednja zona, koju on naziva suosjećanjem. Potpuno duhovno i praktično posvećivanje nekom cilju i/ili osobi, na primjer u vjerskom ili kripto-vjerskom poistovjećivanju poput nacionalizma i fašizma, Scheler naziva "emocionalnom zarazom" (*Gefühlsansteckung*, 14/25s), iako i o tome raspravlja na prilično nejasan način. Ipak, on ispravno ukazuje na to da je u pravilu "vjerovanje u" neku karizmatičnu ličnost sasvim različito od bilo kakvog "vjerovanja da", koje se može argumentirati (86/96). Upravo tu je moguće pokazati ključnu važnost Brechtovog doprinosa, kao i vektora koji se na njemu zasnivaju i koje je moguće nastaviti. Da napomenemo: Brecht je i sam želio odučiti ljudе od "suosjećanja (*mitzuempfinden*)" tako što će se utjeloviti u junaku, u prilog "nekoj višoj vrsti interesa: onome u usporedbi, u drugome, neproračunljivom i iznenađujućem" (26: 271; usp. 21: 534).

Zaključujem da je danas korisno razlikovati tri stajališta: ravnodušnost bez emocija; potpunu emocionalnu zarazu (*Mitleiden* ili *Mitfreude*), koja se obično naziva empatijom; i suosjećanje, za koje predlažem da koristimo termin simpatija. Ono se najbolje može prikazati u smislu spoznajne (idejne i također emocionalne) razdaljine između opažatelja i opaženoga, promatrača i promatranih događaja.

Razdaljina je neophodan sastavni dio svakog razumijevanja. To je metafora prema kojoj se prostor koristi za neki moralni i/ili spoznajni pojam kada se bavimo psihološkim iskustvom uključenosti u ono što se događa ili postoji, a to su prvenstveno drugi ljudi i njihovo djelovanje. Ona prepostavlja svijest o njihovoj odvojenosti; kao što je to formulirao Simmel, razdaljina je ključna "kako bi se pojmilo specifično značenje (*Eigenbedeutung*) stvari.... Objekt nam je jukstaponiran samo u onoj mjeri u kojoj nije naprsto uključen u naš odnos prema njemu" (*Philosophie* 41-42). Razrađenije (ili zamršenije) rečeno:

Slika do koje se dolazi posredstvom na bilo koji način uspostavljene razdaljine/intervala (*Abstand*) ima vlastiti značaj i ne može se nadomjestiti ili ispraviti drugom slikom, do koje se došlo posredstvom druge razdaljine/intervala.... Jedino specifični ciljevi spoznaje mogu odlučiti o tome treba li se neposredno pojavna ili proživljena stvarnost preispitati s obzirom na (*befragt werden soll auf*) neki osobni ili kolektivni subjekt.... (*Grundfragen* 11-12)⁶

Smatram da Brechtova "začudnost" (*Verfremdungs-Effekt*, NE otuđenost!) znači da bi gledatelj (a sasvim očito i društveni akter izvan kazališta) trebao prema onome što se događa i postoji zauzeti razdaljinu koja je prikladna za razumijevanje kako bi mogao biti iznenađen njegovom specifičnom nesličnošću s onime što poznajemo, mada u mogućnosti da razumije pomoći njihovih generičkih sličnosti. Prikladna razdaljina trebala bi odgovarati materiji koju se razmatra, oscilirajući prema potrebi u skladu sa situacijom, ali tako da ne bude ni ravnodušnost ni potpuno poistovjećivanje, nego uvijek nešto kao Schelerov *Mitgefühl*. Ta simpatizirajuća razdaljina (oba termina ove napetosti jednako su važna) prije svega znači da vrijednosni sudovi i interesi agensa nužno sadrže i odobravanje i kritiku, iako u sasvim različitim razmjerima u skladu sa situacijom i njegovim ili njezinim interesima. Ovdje mogu samo aludirati na presudnu antropološku argumentaciju da doživljaji velikim dijelom djeluju implicitno, tako da se u prijenosu među ljudima, koji nikada nemaju istovjetne prepostavke, implikacije nužno mijenjaju (usp. Gendlin 399 i *passim*). Potpuno poistovjećivanje uvijek je iluzorno: ono je i

⁶ Simmelova najvažnija rasprava o razdaljini vjerojatno je "The Stranger" [Der Fremde]. – Osim Brechta i dvojice mislilaca na koje se on u tom pogledu nadevezuje, Nietzschea i Šklovskoga, u ugodno interdisciplinarnoj literaturi o razdaljini smatram osobito korisnima Blumenberga, Bullougha, Ginzburga i Scarryjevu, Phillipsov pregled s povodom bibliografijom i bogatu građu kod Ute Osterkamp. Ona ističe kako su neki znanstvenici nazvali dihotomiju afekata i složenijih emocija *Gefühle* (osjećaji) vs. *Emotionen*, ali to manjinsko gledište kosi se s Brechtovom uporabom termina *Gefühl* i *Emotion* kao sinonima, kao i s engleskom uporabom riječi "emotion" za oba značenja.

samo iluzija te uvijek usmjerava život prema nerealističkoj iluziji. Moje emocije mogu imati bol ili patnju drugoga za svoj namjerni predmet, ali stvarna kakvoća bola neizbjegno je moja vlastita. Već je pionir na tom polju, Adam Smith, uočio sljedeće: "Budući da nemamo neposrednog iskustva s onime što osjećaju drugi ljudi, ne možemo oblikovati nikakvu predodžbu o načinu na koji su ti ljudi pogodeni, osim tako da zamislimo kako bismo se sami osjećali u sličnoj situaciji" (I.i.1.2). I napisljeku, empatija je važna metoda nekritičkog poistovjećivanja u politici, kao što je Hitler uvidio i izrazito učinkovito upotrijebio – Benjamin je to 1930-ih godina nazvao "empatijom u pobednika" (GS 1: 696).

Brechtovo glavno usmjerenje, koje je u skladu s današnjom najzanimljivijom antropološkom psihologijom, stoga je odbacivanje empatije kao alfe i umege u prilog precizno rangiranoj i argumentiranoj simpatiji. Simpatija čak i etimološki znači "su-osjećanje" (za razliku od empatije kao "u-osjećanja"); kao što je ustvrdio Smith, kada se ispravno definira, ona nužno uključuje refleksiju i imaginaciju, budući da se radi o mnjenju. Brecht je naglašeno ustvrdio kako njegovo kazalište "nipošto ne odbacuje emocije. Osobito ne osjećaj pravednosti i težnju ka slobodi (*Gerechtigkeitsgefühl, Freiheitsdrang*), kao ni pravednički gnjev.... 'Kritičko stajalište', kojemu to kazalište nastoji privesti svoju publiku, za nj nikada ne može biti odviše strastveno" (23: 109). Naprotiv, za Brechta je empatija (*Einfühlung*) stajalište do kojega dovodi "sugestija" u kojoj se "gledateљa... sprečava da zauzme kritičku poziciju prema reprezentiranome razmjerno umjetničkoj učinkovitosti reprezentacije" (26: 437).⁰⁷

Međutim, Brecht je također snažno, iako štedljivo, koristio i napisljeku počeo teoretizirati prolazno empatijsko poistovjećivanje s nekim postupcima ondje gdje oni podrazumijevaju aktivaciju gledatelja pomoću emocija – najočitiji je primjer indignacija zbog gubitka ljudskih života u represivnim situacijama poput rata ili nezaposlenosti. Takvo emocionalno poistovjećivanje moglo bi se naći, dopustio je, u mnogim likovima koji okljevajuće i ponekad samo djelomično prilaze ispravnom stajalištu, ali ga napisljeku usvoje. To bi vrijedilo za njegove ženske likove Pelageju Wlassowu u *Majci*, Joan Dark u *Sv. Ivani klaoničkoj* i gospođu Carrar u istoimenoj drami (22.1: 161-62, 26: 455, 22.2: 677), kao i za Katrinin gnjev i žaljenje dok bubnja kako bi spasila grad i njegovu djecu u drami *Majka Hrabrost i njezina djeca*. Za Galileja bi to vrijedilo samo mjestimično (usp. Suvin, "Heavenly").

Tako Brechtovo djelo artikulira životnu borbu protiv hegemonijske empatije. Njegova glavna motivacija bila je to što je u 20. stoljeću bio svjedok tolikih varijanti zagađenih emocija: "Izvori osjećaja i strasti [neke osobe] jednako su zamućeni kao i izvori njezinih spoznaja" (15: 295). Vampirska praksa pasivne publike koja se emocionalno "uvlači" u kožu veličanstvenog pojedinca na pozornici, koji veličanstveno i pati, i koji će misliti, osjećati i živjeti za svakog gledatelja i umjesto njega, što je Brecht dojmljivo analizirao u djelu *Razgovori o kupnji mjedi*, suprotstavlja se samoodređenju. Brecht je sasvim ispravno prepoznao da je to središnji mehanizam "teatralike" ili sporazumno povezivanja vođe i vođenoga u fašističko jedinstvo. Kao što kaže nacistički slogan: "Der Führer denkt für uns!" ("Vođa misli za nas!"); a s time se složio i razvijeni staljinizam.

Nažalost, Brechtova zabrinutost nije zastarjela. Illuzionizam se otada pomaknuo u nove, "disneyfisirane" filmske tehnologije pod vodstvom Amerike, a iz njih u televiziju i njezine nasljednike (to sam opsežno raspravio u članku "Utopianism"). Istraživanja su pokazala da postoje mnogi ljubitelji sapunica koji brkaju, odnosno stapaju likove i glumce, iako nitko ne zna točno

07 Ovdje Brecht i nije bio toliko daleko od Aristotela, koji u svojoj *Retorici* (par. 6, 2.8) ispravno primjećuje da patnja bez razdobljene nije vrijedna žaljenja, nego je užasna. Žaljenja može biti samo ondje (recimo u kazalištu) gdje je promatrač dovoljno blizu patnji drugih, ali se ne poistovjećuje s njome u potpunosti.

koliko njih to čini koliko dugo: najpreciznija procjena koju sam pronašao je da ih se možda oko 5-10% nalazi u "dimenziji zaluđenosti" (usp. oprečna stajališta u: Harrington-Bielby, 104-10 i 120-21). Nekritička uporaba empatije, od obožavanja junaka do okreta prema "stvarnosti kao spektaklu" u doba kasnog imperijalizma, arogantno odriče drugome status osobe koja je poput mene – nekoga tko je u danim ključnim vidovima potrebe za životom i pravednošću isti kao ja – ali i drugačiji od mene, budući da ima vlastitu volju i prava. To je popraćeno ograničenjem moje vlastite slobode i identiteta. Empatija tako ostaje središnji mehanizam iluzije i iluzionizma, psihološka i politička prijetnja. Može se izbjegći jedino neprestanom interakcijom znanja i neznanja, onoga što se već značajno razumjelo i onoga što tek treba značajno razumjeti.

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Emotion, Brecht, Empathy vs. Sympathy

01

01 The terminology about emotion is a jungle of competing disciplinary or indeed personal semantics, so that anybody venturing upon it must hew out her own path and stick to it, or founder. For ex. One school holds that "feeling" encompasses both psychological emotions and physiological affects; and so on. "Passion" started out in Latin as passive suffering (for ex. the Passion of Jesus), it is in English and French generally regarded as intensely goal-directed. "Pathos" is in English a theatrical and not quite genuine representation of emotion. The situation in other languages, such as German, is not less but differently intricate – see note 6.

My thanks go to the Humboldt Foundation for a Prize which allowed me to work in the Brecht Archive during the tenure at some intervals in 1997-2000, and to Erdmut Wizisla and the Archive staff. Also to Sabine Kebir and Thomas Weber for indications of materials. All the unattributed translations from non-English texts are mine. For reasons of space I am not discussing here Brecht's personal relationships to women, about which much misleading and simply wrong stuff has been written in criticism of Fuegi's type. The most balanced books on this theme seem to me those by Kebir (see the four titles in Works cited), about which I have written in *Brecht Yearbook* (Suvin, "A Very" and "Sabine Kebir").

02 See Suvin, "Haltung" and "**Haltung** (Bearing)." I find with pleasure that this conclusion has been earlier arrived at by Dümling (626), whose excellent book is most useful for discussing Brecht's bearings – not only as concerns music.

Darko Suvin

wish to pursue here in tandem two lines of argument for mutual illumination. The first one is a general view of emotions which uses, among other approaches, some feminist-materialist argumentation (primarily but not only of Alison Jaggar) and insights by Brecht. It seems to me important equally to show some serious--though not central--blind spots in Brecht's treatment of the female gender in life or in effigy, and to show that he had an understanding of subjecthood or personality that refused the patriarchal or militaristic downgrading of emotion as well as its Hollywoodian or philistine misuse. The second one builds on my argument in other places⁰² that the red thread central to understanding Brecht's work and life, which crystallized out of Brecht's own cognitive emotions and insights, was the image, concept, and practice of stance or bearing: *Haltung*, a posture-cum-attitude consubstantial with an interest, which is in turn not to be disjoined from certain kinds of emotion. The notion that his work is unemotional, or split between reason and emotion, is obsolete and misleading. The two lines are united in a discussion of the pivotal distinction between empathy and sympathy which I think can and must be extrapolated from Brecht's stance and writings.

1. An Orientation about Emotion

...this concept too we shall have to clean before using, as a ancient concept, used much and by many people and for many purposes. Brecht, "Volkstümlichkeit und Realismus," 22.1: 408

I shall start by paraphrasing what I take to be the most reasonable mainstream interpretation of emotion by Mandler (66-71 and passim), supplemented by Bruner: An emotion is the name given to an aspect of personal life that arises as interaction between a general situation, as a rule involving other people, and a pre-existing personal (single or collective) disposition. A sharp demand from the situation is interpreted or reworked by

the individual--who understands it as a given overall intimation or *Gestalt*--into bodily arousal, with outputs both to consciousness (conceptual thought, and resulting self-perception) and to response readiness. I conclude that emotion (subjects being affected by subjects) is an intricately intertwined obverse of action (subjects affecting other subjects). The central question about emotion/s today is how they permit or hinder which actions.

Briefer and more primitive emotions are often called affects. More than momentary emotions, which are usually therefore also less simple, result when action is for a while interrupted. Such emotions also have an evaluative, clearly cognitive, dimension, though they may be given as an implicit whole without articulation. They have to do with the way in which a person's particular activity or state relates to her/his whole embodied personality, its life-horizons, values, and (dis)pleasures (cf. Wolf 113-14), and in particular its bearing or stance. My approach also adopts Jaggar's working delimitation of emotions which excludes "automatic physical responses and nonintentional sensations, such as hunger pangs" ("Love" 148). Most important, emotions are not in some kind of totally non-rational limbo or "dumb"; in this "cognitivist" view, they comprise not only feelings but also orientation or intention, "their intentional aspect, the associated judgment" (*ibidem* 149).⁰³

There is no necessary opposition between cognition and emotion. I would count as understanding, cognition or knowledge anything that satisfies two conditions: that it can help us in coping with our personal and collective existence; that it can be validated by feedback with its application in the existence, modifying it and being modified by it (cf. more in Suvin, "On Cognitive"). Thought, action, and emotion represent "abstractions that have a high theoretical cost. The price we pay... in the end is to lose sight of their structural interdependence. At whatever level we look, ...the three are constituents of a unified whole [that achieves its integration only within a cultural system]." (Bruner 117-18) As to reason, Brecht noted that "people do much that is reasonable yet does not pass through their *Verstand* [formal reasoning, DS]. We cannot well do without this." (GBFA 22.2: 825, further used by Volume: Page) The systematized notional constructs tend to false harmony and ideological univocity necessarily present in any closed doctrine or *Weltanschauung* (e.g. 21: 414-17): "The learner is more important than the doctrine" (21: 531) was Brecht's central orientation. In such considerations, he is an astonishingly early pioneer of a reintegration of the body, with all its senses (as the young Marx also was), into the practice and theory of our knowledge: the body is for Brecht the co-determining anchorage for stance. A stance is present, I think, in all personal and possessive pronouns, all *deixis*, and all metaphors of vision and orientation. It allowed him finally to conclude: "Such a thinking... does not oppose feeling.... It seems to me now simply a kind of behaviour, namely a societal behaviour. The whole body with all the senses participates in it." (22.2: 753). This dovetails well with Merleau-Ponty (*Phénoménologie*, also *Structure*), in whose terms embodiment is both a lived experience of being body and a realization that the body is the site of cognition or understanding, which is itself inextricably tied to embodied action as preparation, surrogate, response or feedback validation.

As emotions participate in the cognitive process they are often affected by its categorizations, arguments, and organization⁰⁴: they may be intensified or softened, diffused to the whole process or dwarfed into insignificance. It is not useful but scandalous to apply to them the hackneyed, mechanical, and obfuscating division where reason is seen as

03 Most philosophical approaches from Husserl on, especially after 1950, would generally agree with the view that emotions are intentional, that is, in part constituted by cognition and evaluation, cf. Rorty and Stocker; illustrious precursors of such a stance would include Rousseau. From this it follows that people can be held responsible for acting on basis of emotions. But it does not follow that emotion, though in principle or potentially cognitive, is to be simply identified with reason; an interesting argument is that it supplements inadequate (for ex. too slow) reasoning, cf. de Sousa.

04 See for an introduction to the literature on categorization Rosch, and for an interesting complementary approach on "kinesthetic image schemas" Johnson. Even the ultra-formalist Kripke allows that feeling is essential to concepts, since all conscious mental states are inseparable from a raw feel of experience, while the psychologist Lazarus has in extensive discussions (I cite the latest I found) argued that a situational appraisal of personal significance is indispensable for an emotion.

masculine, analytic, proper to the mind, cold, objective and universal, sane, public, and orderly, while emotion would be feminine, synthetic, proper to the body, warm, subjective and particular, sick, private, and politically untrustworthy. From the stance adopted here (which attempts to find a way amid a jungle of contrasting opinions), what may today be tenable views on emotion? I shall touch only upon four points.

First, the hegemonic notion about emotions is that they must be largely involuntary and private: but in fact they are never only such. At least in the most significant cases (including the exemplary case of art), they are active engagements of the whole personality, psychophysical stances. The emotions are so intimately interfused into personality that only to a rather limited degree are we entitled to disclaim responsibility for them. They are necessary concomitants of any horizon of action, including fear of and horror at actions. This is particularly true for long-term emotions, which are obviously not affects (cf. Mother Courage's discussion of "the long rage" with the Young Soldier in Scene 4 of that play). Once we have refused the pernicious Cartesian split between the *cogito* and the sensual body, it is possible to see that emotions are neither fully intentional or conscious nor fully non-intentional or irrational; "[r]ather, they are ways in which we engage actively and even construct the world" (Jaggar, "Love" 152-53 and *passim*).

Second, as Brecht quite correctly realized, among the most fundamental categories when discussing any psychology geared toward action are evaluation, observation, and finally intention. Not only are they not to be sundered from each other, but all of them are closely related to emotions. This seems clear for value-judgments, which are in constant feedback with emotion. In complex ways, this holds for observation too, which is also deeply enmeshed with intentions (interests), from the primary choices what to focus on and privilege, to the interpretive frames chosen: "Observation is an activity of selection and interpretation." In it, the Humean chasm between value and fact is not possible. What will in a given situation be, by given agents, taken for facts depends on "intersubjective agreements that consist partly in shared assumptions about 'normal' or appropriate emotional responses to situations" (Jaggar, "Love" 154).

Third, at least some determining factors of any emotion participate also in some collective engagement that is at that juncture of social history possible to sketch out or imagine--imperfectly, or perhaps more perfectly. While probably sharing other factors with "long duration" (though not eternal and "intrinsically human") emotional stances, a particular and personal emotion is in that sense always also a historical and social *Gestalt*, a construct not fully or even decisively determined by genes or neurobiology. This is particularly clear in connection with the value-judgments, intention, and interests just discussed (cf. Brecht 22.2: 657-59). Emotions are social constructs which use biological potentialities in a number of culturally overdetermined ways. The concept itself of emotion is not only different in different societies but indeed invented as a closed semantic field only in some of them. I would instance that in Japanese culture the term and concept of "kokoro" means equally what is in English expressed by a person's disposition, heart, mind, feeling, spirit or conception, i.e. something like the aware and feeling essence of personality (since the East Asian cultural sphere has no Christian concept of "soul," awareness is awareness of one's embodied personality, not split between reason and emotions--cf. Suvin "Soul"). Jaggar argues that "[i]f emotions necessarily involve judgments, then obviously they

require concepts, which may be seen as socially constructed ways of organizing and making sense of the world" ("Love" 151). Conversely, it is important that "emotions provide the experiential basis for values," so that these two induce each other (*ibidem* 153); values and value judgments are in close feedback with emotion. I would doubt that the concepts required for emotions are necessarily very clear, but certainly emotions are in each person hugely inflected by the semantic hierarchies we are socialized into (e.g. the undoubtedly strong macho emotions about female virginity or chastity). As for values or evaluations, they are both intimately inflected by concepts and in immediate experience, no doubt, emotional.

Last but not least, our lives are largely shaped by a complex societal hegemony, that includes (alas) the determinations by political economy as well as direct political control and social group control, in fact – in the argument of Raymond Williams – all

the relations of domination and subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness, as in effect a saturation of the whole process of living. . . . It [hegemony] is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values. . . . (109-10, emphasis added)

Fortunately, within any hegemony many people possess a range of oppositional, subversive, and potentially productive emotions incompatible with the dominant perceptions and evaluations. Such emotions may follow on our convictions or they may indeed precede them--say, when "all feelings are dominated by unemployment" (Brecht 19: 668). However, "Only when we reflect on our initially puzzling irritability, revulsion, anger or fear may we bring to consciousness our 'gut-level' awareness that we are in a situation of coercion, cruelty, injustice or danger" (Jaggar, "Love" 161).

In sum, it is necessary to rethink the relation between reason and emotion as mutually constitutive rather than oppositional. Far from precluding the possibility of reliable knowledge, emotion as well as value must be shown as necessary to knowledge (Jaggar, "Love" 156-57). A good example is Brecht's 1938 reflection on the personal roots of his exile:

When I reflect what has *Mitgehen* [fellow travelling, falling into step, with an allusion on *Mitfühlen*--DS] led me to and in what has repeated examining helped me, I must counsel the latter. Had I succumbed to the former stance, I would still be living in my homeland, but had I not taken up the latter stance, I would not be an honest person. (26: 308)

To put all of this into technical terms: while emotion may be ontogenetically and phylogenetically prior to conceptuality, it is axiologically a necessary, intimate component of all reasoning or cognition. In our personal lives, emotions may follow on our conceptualized convictions or they may precede them. In any event, the feedback between emotions and conscious reflecting on them is necessary for any efficient intervening into societal reality--and particularly for societal groups struggling for a "perspective on reality available from the standpoint of the oppressed," which we might optimistically take as "a perspective that offers a less partial and distorted and therefore a more reliable view" (Jaggar, "Love" 162). But this means, in turn, that the "epistemic potential of emotion" (*ibidem* 163) has to be taken

seriously if any stance is to be stable (cf. also Hartsock; Jaggar, *Feminist*; Jameson; Lukács; Suvin, "On Cognitive," "Subject," and *To Brecht*, ch. 4). An epistemic potential does not confer any magical efficacy on either emotions or systematized concepts, simply a possibility for use or misuse. I cannot put it better than Brecht's *Me-Ti* section "Über die Prüfung der Gefühlsbewegungen" ("Examining the Emotions"):

In our youth, said Me-ti, we were taught not to trust reason, and that was good. But we were also taught to trust our feelings, and that was bad. The source of our emotions is just as contaminated as the source of our judgments: for it is just as accessible to people's designs and therefore continually polluted by ourselves and others. . . . To assume there are emotions without reason means to understand reason wrongly.

(18: 138-39)

2. On Emotion in Brecht

Few statements about art have so struck me as Meier-Graefe's one about Delacroix: In him a hot heart beat in a cold person.
Brecht, *Tagebuch 1922*, 26: 270

2.1. The 1998 Suhrkamp six-volume "Jubilee edition" of Brecht, *Ausgewählte Werke in 6 Bänden* (4000 pages, 128 DM) was announced in a flyer and advertised as "Bertolt Brecht – Der 'Klassiker der Vernunft'." Who coined "The 'Classic of Reason'" tag is not clear, but its hype at any rate wondrously encapsulates the red herring which has made a whole generation of German schoolkids hate Brecht like the plague. However, the appellation is either false (if reason is opposed to emotion) or quite unclear (if it is not argued what "Vernunft" may mean for and in Brecht, and what his stance toward and use of emotions really were). In an attempt to find this out, I collected ca. 50 propositions overtly mentioning feeling or emotion to be found in the 33 volumes of Brecht's latest giant collected edition (GBFA). Among these, I have found two or three early ones which indeed oppose "emotio" to "ratio," culminating in the "Anmerkungen zur Oper *Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny*" ("Notes to the Opera *Mahagonny*") published by Brecht together with Peter Suhrkamp in 1930 (24: 74-84). This one example has been cited again and again, probably because these notes were not only provocatively pointed and thus brief and clear but also because they were the only proof that COULD be found for Brecht as "the classic of reason" in the narrow sense. I have examined it at some length in "*Haltung* (Bearing)" and I shall here just briefly summarize my finding.

The "Notes" contain many other significant themes, such as defining the central stance of existing opera "a culinary (or enjoying, *geniesserische*) stance," and further that "the present historical form [of enjoyment is] that of commodity" and that in *Mahagonny* this "provocative" thematics is subjected to some examination: "When for example in Section 13 the Glutton eats himself to death, he does so because hunger dominates" (24: 76-77). Emotion is mentioned in a memorable Kantian table with two opposed columns, which then became the bone of all future contentions. Some of its many brief entries stress a theatre that does not project the audience member into the action on the stage and thus paralyze his activity, but

rather makes of him an onlooker and thus stimulates his activity, that does not give him the possibility for emotions but rather "forces him into decisions"; a theatre where "the feelings are not conserved" but rather "heightened into cognitions," where people are not presupposed as known but rather become "an object to be examined." Finally, the table ends with two oppositions: the first is taken from a brief summary in Marx's *Preface to For a Critique of Political Economy* (MEW 13: 8), and the second is what I am leading up to in this particular discussion:

Thought determines being Emotion [Gefühl]	Social being determines thought Reason [Ratio]
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This little scheme or table was then several times reprinted by itself, outside of the "Notes to *Mahagonny*," which made it easy to forget Brecht's initial important qualification that his table marked a change of stress (*Gewichtsverschiebung*) rather than a rigid metaphysical opposition. Nonetheless, the perceived opposition was then subjected to strong attacks not only by bourgeois conservatives but primarily by Lukács and his followers within official, increasingly Stalinist KP press. In 1938, reacting against oversimplifying provocations to which he was prone in the Weimar epoch, Brecht clarified and partly modified his position by rewriting this table. Together with minor cuts and modifications, he added an opposition between "what people ought to do" and "what people have to do," i.e. between ethical prescription and economical-cum-physical necessity; and he suppressed the final opposition between emotion and reason (24: 85).

Furthermore, in an important letter from Sweden in July 1939 to a "comrade M," Brecht commented:

[These] are notes to theatre performances and thus written in a more or less polemical vein. They do not contain full definitions and therefore often lead their student to misunderstandings which prevent him from working with them in a theoretically productive way. In particular, the opera article about *Mahagonny* needs some additions in order for the discussion to become fruitful. People have read out of it that I take the party "against the emotional and for the rational." This is, of course, not so. I would not know how thoughts could be separated from emotions. Not even that part of contemporary literature which seems to be written without reason (*Verstand*) really separates intelligence from emotion. In it, the emotional is just as rotten as the rational. . . . I would not write you all this had my works not in fact contained formulations which may push the debate toward a direction from which nothing follows. For, a discussion about "emotion or reason" obscures the main result that can be found in my works (or better attempts): that a phenomenon so far held as esthetically constitutive, the EMPATHY, has lately been more or less dispensed with in some works of art. (This obviously does not at all mean that emotion has been dispensed with.) (29: 149-50)

This is a crucial clarification. Any further discussion of Brecht's stance toward emotions can only be fruitful if it begins by taking this letter seriously.

2.2. Thus, Brecht very soon retreated from any rhetoric against emotion. "This type of (epic) presentation," he noted around 1931 a propos of *The Mother*, "does [not] renounce emotional effect: in fact, its emotions are only clarified... and have nothing to do with intoxication (*Rausch*)" (22.1: 162). Or in 1940, "non-aristotelian theatre uses also a critique based on emotions (*gefühlsmässige*)" (26: 438). This obviously holds for many other passages and figures of his plays and poems--always clearly delimited and de-automatized, which means wrested away from philistine sentimentality. Slighting here many other testimonies from Brecht's emigration years, such as his major theoretical writings *The Messingkauf Dialogues* and *A Short Organon for the Theatre*, I shall cite here only two diary notes. In their brevity, they seem to me to constitute the two parts of his final, balanced view of a general approach to the "militant position of 'reason vs. emotion'" (see the quote below). The first part deals with the art of theatre, and the second with the art of living.

In the diary note from Nov. 15, 1940, Brecht defined his theatre--"for a change" from the usual "bad definitions [as especially intellectualistic]" --"in emotional categories":

This is possible without any problems, since in the epic theatre the emotional line and the intellectual line remain identical in the actor and in the spectator. It would be necessary [for such a defining] to build on the basis of curiosity and helpfulness a set of emotions which balances the set based on terror and pity. Of course, there are other bases for emotions too. There is above all human productivity, the noblest of them all. (26: 441)

A whole Brechtian theory of personality, including emotionality, could be reconstructed around this basic stance of productivity. It is variously associated not only with curiosity but also with happiness, friendliness, love, and "indignation, this socially highly productive affect" (27: 140).

Finally, Brecht could quite consistently announce, in the note of March 4, 1941, "that one must get out of the militant position of 'emotion vs. reason'":

The relationship of *ratio* to *emotio* in all its contradictoriness should be exactly researched, and one should not allow our opponents to present epic theater as simply rational and anti-emotional. [On the one hand], "instincts", automatized reactions to experiences, have become opposed to our interests. Muddled, one-track emotions, no longer controlled by reason. On the other hand the emancipated *ratio* of the physicists with their mechanical formalism. . . . The epic principles guarantee a critical stance in the audience, but this stance is eminently emotional. This critique is not to be confused with a critique in an exclusive scientific sense, it is much more inclusive, not at all specialized (*fachbegrenzt*), much more practical and elementary. (26: 467)

In sum, there is no use pretending Brecht did not indulge in provocatively one-sided exaggerations to shock the bourgeois, and then change his mind under the pressure of experience. He confessed to Benjamin in 1934 that his thinking had at times an "inflammatory" (*hetzerische*) stance (GS 6: 531), and in 1938 further explained to him: "It is good when one who has taken up an extreme position is overtaken by a reactionary period; one gets then to a

location in the middle" (GS 6: 535). Brecht was uncommonly aware of the pressures of bloody politics in our century: "Fascism, with its grotesque stress on the emotional, and perhaps no less a certain decadence of the rational moment in the Marxist doctrine stimulated me to a stronger stress on the rational. Nonetheless, precisely the most rational form, the 'play for learning' (*Lehrstück*), shows the most emotional effects." (22.1: 500)

A constant tenor of Brecht's may be found in his defense of a certain type of flexible but critical reason, refusal of uncritical submersion in both stupidity and corrupt emotions, and attempt at contradictory reconciliations of emotion and reason in a proper stance (cf. e.g. 26: 324-25 and 28: 564-65). Thus, if we want to make full use of Brecht's insights for our orientation today, I think at last three directions of further work are indicated.

The first direction would be to find out at least approximately what were in his opinion the emotions within "the set based on" curiosity, helpfulness, and indignation--indeed, sometimes based on "a mixture of pleasure and horror (which should not exist, no?)" or on "pioneering adventurousness" (22.1: 418 and 559). I believe a central place would be taken by a carefully weighted spread of emotional stances (see 21: 99 already in 1921)--but never indifference. Two pivots of such a spread could be the central stance of Brecht's late period, friendliness, and his almost always practiced though not so often discursively stressed category (but cf. 22.2: 810-11 and 817) of grace uniting "passion and reason"--as in his proposed anthem, for which one much regrets it isn't the German national anthem today (as it wasn't in the GDR):

Anmut sparet nicht noch Mühe
Leidenschaft nicht noch Verstand
Dass ein gutes Deutschland blühe
Wie ein andres gutes Land.
("Kinderhymne," 12: 303)

[I cannot translate this gracious force here but will put it into rhyming prose at least:

Spare not any toil nor grace/ Spare not passion nor reason/ That a good Germany, as any good place, / Might come to its flowering season.]

The second direction of investigation should be to find out how in Brecht's practice (of performances, poetry, and prose writings) differing emotions flexibly interact with each other and with notional propositions in precise places and precise dosages of emphasis. Brecht is much exercised with flexibility and a Daoist softness winning over rigidity (this is perhaps most memorably encapsulated in his poem *Legend on the Coming About of the "Tao-te-king" Book*). I shall begin discussing both these horizons in the third section below. I believe the strategic tension and opposition to be focussed upon is one between the dethroning of illusionistic, sentimental, uncritical, pseudo-compassionate empathy (*Einfühlung*--this is stressed in the cited 1939 letter, and other testimonies are in GBFA volumes 22-23 and 26-27, mostly adduced in my "*Haltung* [Bearing]") and a possibly intense but always reasonable sympathy. This opposition between *Einfühlung* and *Mitgefühl*, empathy and sympathy, found in Brecht's poetic, scenic, and other artistic (as well as practical) stances, may be used as applicable to empirical behaviour.

A third direction would approach Brecht's central stance that productivity encompasses love and that love is a production. I have approached this strand elsewhere (in "Brecht: Bearing," using the pioneering indications by Haffad and Nussbaum) and hope to return to it.

3. On Empathy vs. Sympathy: A Matter of Critical Distance

Emotions too participate in critique, maybe it is precisely your task to organize critique through emotions.

Brecht, *Messingkauf Dialogues*, 22.2: 751

Surprise and [spatial or temporal] distance... are both equally necessary for comprehending what surrounds you... so evidently that you can no longer see it clearly.

Braudel, "History and the Social Sciences"

05 On Lipps's "projective empathy" and the history of the term up to and including Brecht, see Weber.

The most important and enduring treatment of emotions pertaining vaguely to "sympathy" or "vicarious understanding," i.e. to orientation toward other people, was in Brecht's Germany Max Scheler's intricate, today in places quite obsolete but in his time authoritative discussion. Its terminology ranges from not always clear to obfuscating, but I propose to dig out the following indications, changing them where need be for my purposes.

Scheler sharply differentiates fellow-feeling (*Mitgefühl*) both from commiserating with (*Mitleiden*)--or rejoicing with (*Mitfreude*)--and from a mere distanced reproduction (*Nachvollzug*) of others' feeling or experience with no participation in it. On the one hand, in a putative imitation or reproducing (*Nachvollzug*) we feel the general quality of the other's sorrow without suffering with her, or of his rejoicing without rejoicing with him. The other's feeling is given at a remove, represented "like a landscape which we 'see' subjectively in memory, or a melody which we 'hear' in similar fashion" (9/20). Of course, this already presupposes an initial grasping and understanding of the fact that other people have their own experiences. However, while it remains unclear how this "intuitible intrinsic connection between individual and experience" works between two agents, it does not necessarily involve empathy on the part of the percipient (me). The other person has "an individual self distinct from our own," which "we can never fully comprehend..., steeped as it is in its own psychic experience...". We can only have "our own view of it..., conditioned as this is by our own individual nature" (10/21). Scheler therefore polemicizes expressly against any theory of "projective empathy"⁰⁵ based on identity between individuals, or on Schopenhauer's metaphysics of unified Being as against illusory individuation (51/66), in which the Other, subject to suffering, is "another I (*Ich noch ein Mal*). On the other hand, in fellow-feeling "a genuine experience takes place in me... similar to that which occurs in the other person...," but not at all identical--not even in a perhaps briefer or weaker form (11/22).

We have thus to do here with two extremes, total lack of interest and contact (infinite distance) and total fusion of feeling and will (zero distance). Somewhere in between the two extremes, there is a middle area which he calls fellow-feeling. Full spiritual and practical entrusting of oneself to a cause and/or a person, say in religious or crypto-religious identification such as nationalism and fascism, is by Scheler called "emotional contagion" (*Gefühlsansteckung*, 14/25ff.), though again discussed in rather unclear ways.

Still, he rightly points out that as a rule “belief in” a charismatic person is quite different from any argumentable “belief that” (86/96). It is here that Brecht’s contribution, and vectors based on it that can be carried further, may prove of central importance. To foreshadow: Brecht himself wanted to wean people from “feeling together (*mitzuempfinden*)” by incarnating themselves in the hero, in favour of “a higher kind of interest: the one in similes, in the other, the incalculable, the surprising” (26: 271; cf. 21: 534).

I conclude that what is useful today is to distinguish three stances: indifference without emotion; full emotional contagion (*Mitleiden* or *Mitfreude*), which is usually called empathy; and fellow-feeling, for which I propose to use the term sympathy. This can be best discussed in terms of cognitive (both notional and emotional) distance between the percipient and the perceived, the observer and the observed events.

Distance is an indispensable constituent and component of all understanding. It is a metaphor by which space is used for a moral and/or cognitive tenor when dealing with the psychological experience of involvement with events or existents, primarily other people and their actions. It presupposes an awareness of their separateness; as Simmel put it, distance is crucial “in order to cognize the specific meaning (*Eigenbedeutung*) of things.... The object... is juxtaposed to us only as far as it is not merely included into our relationship to it.” (*Philosophie* 41-42) And more developed (or convoluted):

The image reached by means of a however constituted distance/interval (*Abstand*), has its own right, it cannot be replaced or corrected by another image reached by means of another distance/interval.... Only the particular goals of cognition may decide whether the immediately appearing or lived reality should be examined in view of (*befragt werden soll auf*) a personal or a collective subject.... (*Grundfragen* 11-12)⁶

o6 Simmel's most important discussion on distance is perhaps in "The Stranger."
--Besides Brecht, and the two people on whose shoulders he here stands, Nietzsche and Shklovsky, in the pleasingly interdisciplinary secondary literature on distance I found useful Blumentberg, Bullough, Ginzburg, Scarry, the survey by Phillips with a larger bibliography, and the rich materials in Osterkamp.
Osterkamp points out that the dichotomy of affects vs. more complex emotions is by some scholars termed *Gefühle* (feelings) vs. *Emotionen*, but this minority view is at odds with Brecht's usage of *Gefühl* and *Emotion* as synonyms as well as with the English use of "emotion" for both.

I believe Brecht's Estrangement (*Verfremdungs-Effekt*, NOT alienation!) means that the spectator (and quite overtly also the social agent outside the theater) ought to take up a distance proper for understanding towards events and existents so that she might be surprised by their specific unlikenesses to what we know yet not prevented from understanding by their generic similarities. The proper distance should fit the matter treated, oscillating as required by the situation but always somewhere within the range of Scheler's *Mitgefühl* rather than indifference or full identification. This sympathizing distance (both terms of this tension being equally significant) most importantly means that the agent's value-judgments and interests necessarily contain both approval and critique, though in quite various proportions according to the situation and her interests. I can here only allude to the decisive anthropological argument that experiences function in large part implicitly, so that when they cross between people, who never have quite the same presuppositions, the implications necessarily change (cf. Gendlin 399 and passim). A full identification is always illusory: it is itself an illusion and it works towards a life of unrealistic illusion. My emotion may have another's ache or suffering as its intentional object, but the actual quality of the ache is inescapably my own. Already the pioneering Adam Smith had realized: “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” (I.i.1.2). Last

not least, empathy is an important method of uncritical identification in politics, as Hitler most efficaciously realized – Benjamin called it in the 1930s “empathy into the victor” (GS 1: 696).

Brecht's main orientation, in line with today's most interesting anthropological psychology, is therefore a refusal of empathy as the be-all and end-all in favour of precisely graded and argued sympathy. Sympathy means, even etymologically, “feeling with” (as opposed to empathy's “feeling into”); as Smith argued, when rightly defined it necessarily involves reflection and imagination since it is an opinion. Brecht emphatically stated that his theater “in no way dispenses with emotions. And in particular not with the feeling for justice, urge toward freedom and righteous anger.... The 'critical stance', to which it attempts to bring its audience, can never be too passionate for this theatre.” (23: 109) To the contrary, for him empathy (*Einfühlung*) is a stance brought about by “suggestion” in which “the spectator is . . . prevented from taking up a critical position toward the represented in proportion to the artistic efficacy of the representation” (26: 437).⁰⁷

Nonetheless, Brecht also powerfully, though sparingly, used and eventually began to theorize a transitory empathetic identification with some actions where they include emotions activating the spectator--most clearly, an indignation against the waste of human lives in oppressive situations of war or unemployment. Such an emotional identification may be found, he allowed, in many figures who reluctantly and sometimes only partially approach the right stance, but finally do take it up. This would hold for his female protagonists Pelagea Wlassowa in *The Mother*, Joan Dark in *St. Joan of the Slaughterhouses*, and Señora Carrar in the eponymous play (22.1: 161-62, 26: 455, 22.2: 677), as well as for Katrin's anger and pity when she is drumming to save the city and its children in *Mother Courage and Her Children*. For Galileo, it would hold only in patches (cf. Suvin, “Heavenly”).

Thus, Brecht's work articulates a lifelong battle against hegemonic empathy. His main motive was that he witnessed in the 20th Century too many variants of polluted emotions: “The sources of [a person's] feelings and passions are just as muddied up as the sources of his cognitions” (15: 295). The vampiric praxis of a passive audience emotionally “creeping into” the skin of the great as well as greatly suffering individual on the stage who will think, feel, and live for and in lieu of any spectator, which was memorably analyzed in *The Messingkauf Dialogues*, militated against self-determination. It was quite correctly identified by Brecht as the central mechanism of a “theatralics” or consensus-bonding of fascist unity between the leader and the led. As the Nazi slogan had it, “Der Führer denkt für uns!” (“The Leader thinks for us!”); and High Stalinism agreed.

Alas, his concern is not outdated. Illusionism has since shifted into the new US-led or “disneyfied” technologies of movie, and then TV and its successors (I discuss this at length in “Utopianism”). Research has shown there are many soap-opera fans who (con)fuse characters and actors, though nobody knows just how many sustain it for how long: the best guesstimate I found is that perhaps 5-10% are in a “lunatic dimension” (cf. the conflicting views in Harrington-Bielby 104-10 and 120-21). The uncritical use of empathy, from hero worship to the turn to “reality as spectacle” in late imperialism, arrogantly denies the Other the status of a person who is like me--somebody who is in given essential aspects of needfulness for life and justice the same as me--but also unlike me, having her own will and rights. Concomitant to this, my own freedom and identity are also slighted. Empathy thus remains

07 Here Brecht was not that far from Aristotle, who in his *Rhetoric* (¶ 6, 2.8) rightly observes that suffering without distance is not pitiable but horrible. There can only be pity (say in theatre) when the onlooker is sufficiently near to the suffering of others yet not completely identified with it.

the central mechanism for illusion(ism), a psychological and political menace. It may only be avoided by a constant interaction of knowing with not-knowing, of the already significantly understood and the now for the first time to be significantly understood.

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Dear ----,

We thaw and thin everything around us. We are the warmest ice on earth. You could shape my mouth to believe in the body, militancy, and sugar. Our barricades are the kind that take thousands of years to granulate. We are a manifesto for everyone's future.

Love,



Dear ----,

We can protect each other from everything, at least until there is nothing left from which to be protected, at which point our year ZERO will be everyone's year ZERO and all cops will be gardeners.

Love,

Put od herojstva do zajedničke ranjivosti: mogućnost drugačije afektivne uporabe tugovanja za kanadskim vojnicima poginulim u Afganistanskom ratu

Helene Vosters

S engleskoga prevela Marina Miladinov

Dnevnik: Impact Afghanistan War, 5. veljače 2011.

Stoj. Padni. Stoj. Padni. Stoj. Padni. Udar tijela o zemlju. Iznenadujuća prilagodba površini. Prvi snijeg te godine bio je mekan i udoban, ali sada, kako se zima odužila, zemlja je poprimila topografiju mjeseceva krajolika. Padanje je lakši dio – čudnovata arhitektura tijela i udova. Ustajanje, dizanje, to je teško. Stoj. Padni. Diši. Promet, pjev ptica, udaljeni glasovi u prolazu, jastreb koji kruži, udovi stabala, avion koji reže nebo, snijeg. Padanje. Zemlja postaje nekakvo međumjesto gdje doživljavam nepreglednost svoje udaljenosti od svih onih koji su pali ili padaju u Afganistanu, ali i svoju bliskost s njima. Udaljenost jer sam akutno svjesna neprikladnosti svoje geste. Padam svojevoljno. Nisu me pokosili. Nisam ranjena. Mogu ustati. Ustajem. Ali upravo je ta svijest o udaljenosti ono što me povezuje. Svaki je pad utjelovljena meditacija o nejednakoj raspodjeli ranjivosti u našem geopolitičkom krajoliku. Sa svakim padom uviđam – "mogla" bih to biti ja, ali nisam ja, i uviđam razloge zbog kojih nisam.

01 Izvornom nazivu operacije, "Operacija konačne pravde", usprotivili su se islamski duhovni vođe s obrazloženjem da "jedino Bog može udijeliti konačnu pravdu". Derek Brown (27. rujna 2001.) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/sep/27/afghanistan.terrorism5>.

02 Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), News Room NR 02.001 (7. siječnja 2002.). Dostupno na: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=oo&id=351>.

03 Toronto Star (24. studenog 2010.). Dostupno na: <http://www.thestar.com/special/article/897222--have-your-say-on-canada-s-afghan-mission>. Harperova je vlada tvrdila da nije potrebno novo glasovanje u Parlamentu kako bi se produžila misija, budući da kanadske trupe neće ostati u Afganistanu u borbenom svojstvu, nego na vježbi.

04 Canada, DND, "Fallen Canadians" (8. kolovoza 2011.) <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/fallen-disparus/index-eng.asp>.

05 U.S. Department of Defense, News Transcript, Public Affairs, "Enduring Freedom Operational Update" (30. listopada 2001.) <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2232>. Iako je politika nebrojanica smrtnih slučajeva bila često osporavana (i nedosljedno provođena), redovito su je isticali glasnogovornici američke vojske i Pentagona tijekom desetljeća rata u Afganistanu. Godine 2006. je Donald Rumsfeld, tadašnji ministar obrane, objasnio kako je ta politika obrnuta od američke prakse tijekom rata u Vijetnamu: "Prisjetimo li se rata u Vijetnamu, tada su se poginuli brojali dan za danom... Time se impliciralo da pobijedjete ako se broj poginulih penje, a gubite ako se broj poginulih smanjuje." Time U.S. (2. lipnja 2009.) <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1902274,00.html#ixzz1WETDevB4>.

ana 7. listopada 2001. Sjedinjene Američke Države (praćene britanskim snagama) pokrenule su takozvanu "Operaciju trajne slobode" (Operation Enduring Freedom ili OEF), odnosno rat u Afganistanu.⁰¹ Iako u tom početnom napadu nije sudjelovalo kanadsko vojno osoblje, tadašnji premijer Jean Chrétien je u činu diskurzivne angažiranosti odmah obznanio predanost Kanade

da pridonese međunarodnoj "kampanji protiv terora" u vojnem pogledu te je u veljači 2002. kanadska vojska poslala prvih 750 kopnenih jedinica u Afganistan.⁰² U studenome 2010., devet godina nakon početka američkog rata u Afganistanu, premijer Steven Harper i njegova konzervativna vlada obznanili su svoju odluku da produže (nakon 2011. godine, roka koji je odredio parlament) kanadsku vojnu prisutnost u Afganistanu do 2014.⁰³

Od početka napada na Afganistan pod američkim vodstvom nakon 11. rujna umrlo je ili poginulo 157 pripadnika kanadskog vojnog osoblja.⁰⁴ Iako je svaki od tih slučajeva bio komemoriran u kanadskim medijima i službenim ceremonijama repatrijacije, kao i narodnim komemoracijama tipa "Autoceste heroja", ne postoje točni podaci o tome koliko je Afganistanaca poginulo ili umrlo kao posljedica ratnog stanja tijekom tog razdoblja. Taj nedostatak preciznih brojki kada se radi o afganistanskim ratnim žrtvama velikim je dijelom rezultat američke politike "no-body count", kakvu je u prvom mjesecu rata najavio američki vojni glasnogovornik, kontraadmiral John D. Stufflebeam: "Kao vojna ustanova, mi obično ne brojimo mrtve, ili ih barem ne brojimo sada. Možda se to činilo u prošlim ratovima. Ali sada to ne činimo."⁰⁵ Nedostatak brojki također odražava ono što je Judith Butler nazvala "diferencijalnom raspodjelom tugovanja po narodima", pri čemu se zapadnjački životi procjenjuju kao vrijedni tugovanja, dok životi nezapadnjačkih "drugih" ostaju izvan domene tugovanja (2009, 24).

Nakon povratka prvih kanadskih vojnika poginulih u Afganistanskom ratu u proljeće 2002. godine Kanađani su se počeli "spontano" okupljati duž repatrijacijske trase dugačke 172 kilometra, između vojne baze u Trentonu, Ontario i Ureda za sudsku medicinu u Torontu.⁰⁶ Mase su se okupljale uz autocestu 401 u Ontariju i na njezinim izlazima i nadvožnjacima, čekajući ponekad satima na vrućini, kiši ili ledenoj hladnoći kako bi odale počast povorci vozila s tijelima kanadskih vojnika. Komemoracijski fenomen "Autoceste heroja" od samog je početka najšao na pozitivan odjek u medijima širom Kanade (kao i u SAD-u),⁰⁷ što je dovelo do službenog preimenovanja dijelova repatrijacijske trase u "Highway of Heroes" (2007.) i "Route of Heroes" (2010.) te nadahnulo mnoštvo pjesama i komemoracijskih video spotova na YouTubeu.⁰⁸

Poput mnogih drugih narativa o kanadskom identitetu, Autocesta heroja postala je pričom o tome koliko su Kanađani drugačiji od svojih južnih susjeda. Za razliku od Amerike, gdje je vlada G. W. Busha zabranila medijima da objavljaju slike lijesova američkog vojnog osoblja poginulog u Afganistanu i Iraku, u Kanadi je javno izražavanje "narodnog" tugovanja za mrtvim vojnicima pridonijelo već ionako plodnom arsenalu dokaza o altruističkoj superiornosti kanadske nacije.⁰⁹ Međutim, pažljiviji pogled na komemoracijski fenomen poput Autoceste heroja otkrit će drugu stranu tog narativa.

Ovaj članak kombinira fenomenološko, teorijsko i povjesno istraživanje uloge utjelovljenih i afektivnih izraza tugovanja u konstruiranju narativa smrti koji su povezani s militarizmom i ratom, uspoređujući kritičku analizu komemoracijskog fenomena Autoceste heroja i autoetnografsko promišljanje

06 Provizorni rasporedi (zasnovani na očekivanom vremenu dolaska zračnog transporta na CFB u Trentonu) za obrede repatrijacije objavljaju se u svim glavnim medijima, kao i u društvenim glasilima.

07 Primjer američkog medijskog izvješća je "A hard road: The Highway of Heroes", koje je emitirano u glavnem terminu 11. studenog 2008. (Dan sjećanja u Kanadi, Dan veterana u SAD-u) na MSNBC-u. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/27651384#27651384>.

08 Kanadska rok-grupa The Trews (s Gordiejem Johnsonom) napisala je i izvela hit-singl 2010. godine s refrenom: *Carry me home down The Highway of Heroes / People above with their flags flying low. / Carry me softly, down The Highway of Heroes. / True Patriot Love, / There was never more.*

09 Propali pokušaj premijera Stevena Harpera 2006. da oponaša zabranu Bushove vlade samo je istaknuo razlike, pokažavši superiornu sposobnost Kanade da se suprotstavi vladinoj cenzuri.

10 Kampanja naslovljena "America: Open for Business" krenula je iz San Francisa, a ubrzo su je prihvatali gradovi širom SAD-a. San Francisco Chamber of Commerce (2. rujna 2011.) http://www.sfvirtualshop.com/mayor_brown.htm.

o svakodnevnom javnom obredu komemoracije, koji se služi poetikom zajedničke ranjivosti i nastoji poslužiti kao sredstvo diskursa zajednice i mobilizacije kao odgovora na militarizam i rat. Nadovezujući se na suvremene teorije tugovanja u geopolitičkom kontekstu (Butler 2009, 2006, 2003; Taylor 2004) i državne modulacije afekta u smjeru militarizacije civilne psihologije (Orr 2006, 2004; Massumi 2010, 2005), kao i na feministička istraživanja u kojima se analizira povjesna uloga žena kao primarnih posrednika javnog tugovanja na Zapadu i pozadinskih ideoloških i strukturalnih snaga koje su pridonijele regulaciji, kontroli i obuzdavanju njihovih društveno situiranih praksi tugovanja (Holst-Warhaft 2000, 1992; Seremetakis 1991; Hockey 2001, 1997), ovaj članak preispituje način na koji fenomen Autoceste heroja – iako se često manifestira kao narodni pokret – odražava i podržava program državno sponzoriranih projekata vojnog sjećanja pomoću militarizirane poetike tugovanja.

Zabilješka na blogu: Impact Afghanistan War, 14. srpnja 2010.

Osjećam čudnovato olakšanje prepustajući se procesu doživljavanja šoka. To me čini svjesnim koliki dio svog života posvećujem njegovu izbjegavanju ili ublažavanju. Sjećam se kako je u danima netom nakon 11. rujna, dok su mnogi "Amerikanci" bili duboko pogođeni napadom na WTC, država hitro intervenirala kako bi uspostavila kontrolu nad emocionalnim reakcijama. Uklonjeni su oltari koje je zajednica podigla širom New Yorka. Kolektivno tugovanje sustavno je preusmjерeno u nacionalistički i domoljubni žar, a za koji tijedan lansirana je i kampanja nacionalnih razmjera pod nazivom "America: Open for Business" – uz popratnu sliku američke zastave kao torbe za kupovinu.¹⁰

Dana 1. srpnja (na Dan Kanade) 2010. godine, kao reakcija na kanadske popularne, javne i "diferencijalne" izraze tugovanja za poginulima u Afganistanskom ratu, započela sam s komemoracijskim projektom *Impact Afghanistan War*, u kojem padam 100 puta dnevno u javnom prostoru tijekom godine dana – a svaki pad simbolizira jednog poginulog Afganistanca. *Impact* je utjelovljeno istraživanje prostora između "nas" i "njih", između pojedinačnog i društvenog tugovanja, između osobnog obreda i javnog prosvjeda, između umjetnosti i politike. To je poduzeće ispitivanje važnosti afektivnog tijela, smještenog u javnost, kroz performans i proizvodnju društvene empatije, kao i ispitivanje uloge praksi javnog tugovanja u konstrukciji narativa smrti povezanih s militarizmom i ratom.

U knjizi *Okviri rata* (2010.) Judith Butler tvrdi kako je selektivno "uokvirivanje" ili "izgrađivanje doživljaja ključno u vođenju rata" (26). Butlerova se nadovezuje na Althusserovu ideju o višestrukim modalitetima materijalnosti, ističući kako "okviri rata" ne funkcioniraju samo kao njegove preteče ili komentari, nego kao "materijalne instrumentalnosti nasilja" (xiii). Narodna podrška vojnim akcijama često je uvjetovana uokvirivanjem "neprijateljskih" populacija tako što se one izbacuju iz onoga što se smatra normalnim područjem "ljudskih" vrijednosti i smještaju u drugost koja je shodno tome izvan dometa našeg suojećanja i empatije (2003, 22). U najotvorenjem obliku ta je "derealizacija" očita u demonizaciji "neprijatelja" koja vladama, vojskama i pojedinačnim vojnicima nudi opravdanje za vođenje rata. Međutim, Butlerova također tvrdi da derealizacija djeluje u širem

11 I Diana Taylor je u svojoj analizi uloge spektakla u argentinskom "prijavom ratu" istaknula kako je medijski utjecaj na vidljivost nekih stvari, dok druge ostaju nevidljive (ili sasvim nestanu) pridonio "percepticidu", u kojemu je šira javnost postala slijepa za okrutnosti kojima je svakodnevno svjedočila tijekom vojne diktature (1997.).

12 Makov cvijet postao je simbolom sjećanja u svim nacijama Commonwealtha (nešto manje u SAD-u) netom nakon Prvog svjetskog rata i osobito je važan Kanadima. Pjesma Johna McCraea, medicinskog časnika u Prvom svjetskom ratu, koja komemorira golemi broj ratnih žrtava, započinje riječima: "In Flanders fields the poppies blow". Kanađani su pretrpjeli osobito velike gubitke u tom ratu – od 7,5 milijuna gotovo ih je 70 tisuća poginulo na bojištu, a ranjeno je još 140 tisuća osoba (Royal Canadian Legion, "Teachers Guide", 29. kolovoza 2011.) http://www.legion.ca/_PDF/Teachers/T_GUIDE_E.pdf. Generacije kanadskih školaraca učile su napamet i recitirale stihove "In Flanders Fields". Danas nastavni program o kanadskoj vojnoj povijesti, značenju makova cvijeta i drugih vojnih komemorativnih ceremonija, kao i odgovarajuće školske aktivnosti, određuju "Vodići za učitelje" koje objavljaju Royal Canadian Legion i Veterans Affairs Canada.

društvenom spektru tako što čitave populacije smješta izvan dometa našeg kolektivnog tugovanja, olakšavajući time empatični odmak velikih razmjera u odnosu na rezultate vojnih akcija naše nacije. Primarni mehanizam kojim ta derealizacija djeluje u društvenoj sferi je "diferencijalna alokacija tugovanja", pri čemu se "tugujućima" dodjeljuju institucionalno održavane lokacije za "slavljeničko javno tugovanje" uz odgovarajuću "zabranu javnog tugovanja za životima drugih" (25):

Okvir uvijek nešto odbacuje, izostavlja, uvijek de-realizira i de-legitimizira alternativne verzije stvarnosti, odbačene negative službene verzije.... U tom smislu okvir nastoji uspostaviti neku zabranu tugovanja: tu nema uništenja i nema gubitka. Čak i ako se okviri aktivno angažiraju na reduplicaciji ratnog uništenja, oni samo glaćaju površinu melankolije čiji gnjev treba suzbiti, što često nije moguće (2010, xiii).¹¹

Zabilješke na blogu: Impact Afghanistan War, 11. studenoga (Dan sjećanja) 2010.

Dok sam padala danas u Queen's Parku, pedesetak metara ispred mene stajao je vojnik u stavu mirno. Nakon svakoga pada ustala sam i našli bismo se oči u oči. I tako stotinu puta. Bio je predaleko od mene da bih jasno razabrala njegovo lice, ali izgledao je mlado. Mlado i krihko. Kada sam dovršila svoje padove, ostala sam kako bih svjedočila pozdravu 21 hica: vojnici u stavu mirno. Naredba za paljbu prošla je zapovjednom ljestvicom. Zatim eksplozivna rika topa. I dim. Dvadeset jedan put.

Krcata simbolima nacionalizma, Autocesta heroja, baš kao i ceremonijal na Dan sjećanja kojemu sam prisustvovala, dio je šireg projekta kanadskog kulturnog sjećanja, koje se ne proizvodi naprosto propagandnim mehanizmom odozgo prema dolje, nego putem složene mreže zainteresiranih organizacija i institucija koje su se uvježbale u korištenju popularnih medija (Fremeth 2010, 53). Vojni projekti sjećanja nisu puke komplikacije specifičnih povijesnih narativa, nego imaju vlastitu poetiku, koja se sastoji od znakova, simbola i gesti. Na Autocesti heroja sve vri zastavama. Raspete su preko nadvožnjaka, veterani ih podižu, a civilni mašu njima i privijaju ih na prsa. Dok prolazi povorka vozila s mrtvim tijelima, njihovim obiteljima i vojnom pratinjom, uniformirano osoblje – vojska, policija, vatrogasci i prva pomoć – stoje mirno i salutiraju. Neuniformirani građani oponašaju militarističke geste. Neki salutiraju. Drugi odabiru više "civilnu", ali jednakom domoljubnu i nacionalističku gestu polažući ruku na srce. Žalost, kao afektivno gorivo, generira zajedničku i javnu zakletvu koja se proteže mnogo dalje od vremenskih i tjelesnih granica komemoracijskog događaja kroz njegovu reprezentaciju i re-reprezentaciju u društvenom mediju: kako u njegovoj glavnoj struci, tako i u "pučkoj" varijanti.

Građansko sudjelovanje u militariziranim komemoracijama uglavnom se odlikuje ritualiziranom šutnjom. Fizički rekviziti – zastava, top, makov cvijet,¹² žuta traka – ne označavaju samo sjećanje na mrtve i odavanje počasti, nego i prenose poruku da ovo nije ni vrijeme ni mjesto za raspravu o vanjskoj politici, izražavanje neslaganja ili dovođenje u pitanje geopolitičkih uvjeta koji su

¹³ U knjizi *Panic Diaries: A Genealogy of Panic Disorder* (2006.) i članku "The Militarization of Inner Space" (2004.) Jackie Orr prati povijest suvremenog načina na koji američka vlada manipulira nesigurnošću i terorom kako bi militarizirala civilnu psihologiju i stvorila "civilne vojnike". Slično tome, Brian Massumi je u člancima "Fear (The Spectrum Said)" (2005.) i "The Future Birth of the Affective Fact: The Political Ontology of Threat" (2010.) ustvrdio kako je modulacija straha kroz njegovu proizvodnju kao "afektivne činjenice" postala sveprisutna i instrumentalizirana politička strategija u SAD-u nakon 11. rujna.

¹⁴ CBC News/World (27. ožujka 2011.) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/03/27/afghanistan-soldier.html>.

¹⁵ CBC News/World (11. travnja 2010.) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/04/11/afghanistan-canadian.html>.

¹⁶ CBC News/World (20. srpnja 2010.) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/07/20/afghanistan-cdn-soldier-killed.html>.

¹⁷ Iako McCready govori o migraciji popularne američke kampanje Yellow Ribbon u Kanadu kao o odrazu šireg trenda sve veće militarizacije kanadske kulture, kroz čitav svoj članak prenosi tu argumentaciju i na druge aspekte kanadskog projekta vojnog sjećanja, uključujući komemoracije na Autocesti heroja i ceremonije na Dan sjećanja.

rezultirali gubitkom vojnog osoblja za kojim se tuguje (McCready 2010). Dok vojska ima vlastiti, interni skup obreda i praksi kojima je svrha pretvoriti regrute u ratnike spremne na borbu, vojni projekti sjećanja djeluju stvarajući neku vrstu "civilnog vojnika": stojimo u stavu mirno. Pridržavamo se pravila angažmana – čak i ako je to privremeno.¹³ Sudjelovanjem u narodnim komemoracijama repatrijacije na Autocesti heroja ili u obredima na Dan sjećanja, nošenjem makova cvijeta (ili šutnjom dok smo okruženi njihovim obilnim sezonskim cvatom na reverima jakni i kaputa) privremeno smo mobilizirani kao "civilni vojnici" (Orr 2004, 452).

Dok civilni sudionici komemoracije na Autocesti heroja izvode svoju ritualiziranu predstavu domoljubne šutnje, vojni i državni službenici oblikuju narative koji pridaju značenje smrti:

"Nepokolebljiva predanost desetnika Scherrera i drugih hrabrih Kanađana u Afganistanu izvor je ponosa za sve Kanađane." (Premijer Steven Harper o poginulom desetniku Yannicku Scherreru).¹⁴

"Pripadnici naših kanadskih snaga ... koji se suočavaju s neprijateljem učinit će sve kako bi osjetili njegovo napredovanje. Hrabrost koju je pokazao vojnik Todd rječito govori o njegovoj posvećenosti našoj zemlji i ovoj misiji" (Ministar obrane Peter MacKay o smrti vojnika Tylera Williama Todda).¹⁵

"Hrabrost i zadržljiva predanost Kanađana poput Sappera Collier-a donose sigurnost i stabilnost afganistanskom narodu... Njihov trud i rad svakodnevno štite naše interese i vrijednosti ovdje, kod kuće, kao i širom svijeta. Žrtva Sappera Collier-a neće biti zaboravljena (Premijer Steven Harper o poginulom Sapperu Brianu Collieru)."¹⁶

Spektakularne i medijski izrazito eksponirane javne komemoracije na Autocesti heroja, zajedno s neproblematiziranim narativima herojstva i dobrohotnog militarizma, kao i odsutnost bilo kakvog priznanja afganistanskih žrtava, predstavljaju "okvir" kroz koji Kanađani kao građani shvaćaju Afganistanski rat (i sudjeluju u njemu). Ono što je unutar tog okvira – herojski poginuli kanadski vojnici i njihova dragovoljna žrtva – učinjeno je vidljivim, dok ono izvan okvira – afganistanske žrtve i bilo kakva krivica kanadske vojske (i kanadske javnosti) za njihovu smrt – ostaje izvan vidokruga, pa stoga i neshvatljivo. Pristajanjem na ta prešutna pravila angažmana, pravila koja određuju za kime i kako trebamo tugovati – tiho i s neupitnim domoljubnim ponosom – mi se u ritualnom smislu mobiliziramo.

Kao uokvirujući mehanizam, komemoracije na Autocesti heroja i njihova militarizirana poetika služe nekolicini međusobno povezanih svrha: one su mehanizam kojim se osjećaj gubitka zbog kanadskih ratnih žrtava afektivno povezuje s nacionalističkim narativima herojstva i kanalizira u njih. Povezano s time, kroz "potvrdu i veličanje određenih omiljenih nacionalnih tema: muževnih, normativnih i moralno besprijekornih mladića (i u manjoj mjeri žena), čija žrtva nije samo spas nacionalnog karaktera, nego je retrospektivno postala i njegovim temeljem i jamcem", one ušutkavaju javnu raspravu i protivljenje ratu (McCready 2010, 34).¹⁷ Naposljetku, osiguravanjem institucionalno podržavanog lokaliteta za "svečano javno tugovanje" za onima – kanadskim vojnim osobljem – koji su proglašeni "vrijednim tugovanja", one proizvode odgovarajuću "zabranu javnog tugovanja za životima drugih [Afganistanaca]" (Butler 2006, 37).

¹⁸ Pearsonu je 1957. godine dodijeljena Nobelova nagrada za mir za njegovu ulogu u "stvaranju snaga "Plavih šljemova" koji su pratili naseljavanje Sueskog kanala" (Coulon i Liégeois, 2010: v), a nakon toga je od 1963. do 1968. godine bio 14. kanadski premijer.

¹⁹ Diskurs o kanadskom vojnem angažmanu u Afganistanu kao humanitarnom činu širi se kroz službena glasila kanadske vlade i Ministarstva narodne obrane (DND): mrežna stranica kanadske vlade koja govori o "vojnoj prisutnosti Kanade u Afganistanu" navodi kao četiri prioriteta sljedeće: "(1) investiciju u budućnost afganistske djece i omladine kroz razvojne programe na području obrazovanja i zdravstva; (2) rad na sigurnosti, unapređenju pravde i ljudskih prava, osiguranjem maksimalno 950 vojnih instruktora, pomoćnog osoblja i otprilike 45 pripadnika kanadske civilne policije kako bi se pri pomoglo obuci afganistanskih snaga Nacionalne sigurnosti; (3) promicanje redovne diplomacije; i (4) pomoći u osiguranju humanitarne pomoći" (<http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/index.aspx?lang=eng>).

²⁰ Vidi također analizu američke državne i vojne manipulacije straha kao mehanizma u interpolaciji "građanina-vojnika": Jackie Orr (2006, 2004).

Butler ističe kako bi "egalitarnije žalovanje", koje bi ustrajalo na tome da su svи životi vrijedni tugovanja, žalovanje koje bi se zasnivalo na spoznaji da je ranjivost primarni (i zajednički) uvjet života, moglo potaknuti "etiku nenasilja i politiku radikalnije preraspodjele humanizirajućih učinaka" (Butler 2003, 9). Međutim, budući da piše u američkom kontekstu, ona također tvrdi da bi takvo tugovanje uništilo nacionalnu samopercepciju i zahtijevalo "odustajanje od same ideje svijeta kao suverene odgovornosti SAD-a, za čijim bi se gubitkom žalilo na način na koji se nužno gube i žale narcističke i megalomske fantazije" (2006, 40).

Proširujući analizu Butlerove sjeverno od američke granice, možemo zamisliti da bi, kada bi Kanađani usvojili egalitarniji pristup žalovanju vezanom uz Afganistanski rat, kolektivni identitet od kojega bismo morali odustati i žaliti za njime vjerojatno bila (možda ne toliko narcistička, ali jednako megalomska) ideja o nama samima kao dobrohotnim globalnim mirotvorcima, identitet koji je povjesno i institucionalno utemeljila vodeća uloga koju je tadašnji kanadski ministar vanjskih poslova Lester B. Pearson odigrao u osnivanju prvih mirovnih snaga Ujedinjenih naroda (UN), koje su poslane 1956. godine kao odgovor na krizu u Sueskom kanalu.¹⁸ Međutim, noviji istraživači na područjima kao što su Kanadski studiji ili Obrana i vanjski poslovi slažu se u tome da suvremena kanadska vojna politika jedva sliči njezinu povjesnom mirotvornom mandatu (Berland i Fitzpatrick, 2010; Fremeth, 2010; Coulon i Liégeois, 2010). Dok je Pearson pridonio oblikovanju preduvjeta za prve operacije mirovnih snaga UN-a, koje su uključivale uvjete kao što su "sporazum o primirju; dogovor zaraćenih strana; nepristrandost mirovnih snaga; uporaba sile koja je strogo ograničena na samoobranu; i izvršna odgovornost Generalnog tajnika" (Coulon and Liégeois, 3), danas "kanadske vlade radije upleću Kanadu u vojne intervencije izvan struktura UN-a, u ovom specifičnom slučaju Afganistana, i u protuustaničke misije" (50).

Fremeth (2010) primjećuje da je paralelno s prijelazom Kanade sa samodefinirane vojne uloge "mirotvorca" na aktualnu borbenu ulogu u Afganistanskom ratu pod vodstvom SAD-a došlo do općenitijeg i sveprožimajućeg trenda militarizacije kanadske kulture. Fremeth smatra da je glavni čimbenik koji je pridonio i potaknuo taj pomak znatno povećanje institucionalne i fiskalne potpore širenju kanadskih projekata vojnih komemoracija tijekom posljednjeg desetljeća. Simultano potičući i kanalizirajući afekte koji su povezani s tugovanjem zbog kanadskih prošlih i sadašnjih ratnih žrtava u narative herojstva, požrtvovnosti i dobrohotne vojne intervencije, ti prošireni projekti vojnih komemoracija prikrivaju kanadsko sudjelovanje u "imperijalnom ratu agresije, odmazde i kontrole nad resursima" tako što "Kanadi daju osjećaj nacionalne nedužnosti" (McCready, 2010, 39).¹⁹

Brian Massumi (2005) objašnjava kako se učinkovita modulacija afekta postiže njegovom bifurkacijom, razdvajanjem emocionalnog i fenomenološkog doživljaja od kognitivne ili kritičke interpretacije. Time što se "afektivni doživljaj" prikazuje kao subjektivan (privatan), odvaja ga se od političkog (javnog) i ideološkog procesa proizvodnje racionaliziranih narativa nacionalizma i njihovih pratećih strategija vojne i vanjske politike. Dok je u Massumijevu primjeru kolorističkog sustava antiterorističkog uzbunjivanja, kakav primjenjuje američko Ministarstvo domovinske sigurnosti, strah "afektivna činjenica" pomoći koje se proizvodi narativ nužnosti "rata protiv terora", u slučaju kanadskih projekata vojne komemoracije tugovanje postaje afektivnom činjenicom pomoći koje se grade i održavaju narativi humanitarnog militarizma.²⁰

21 Pojam "Zapada" problematičan je na više načina, uključujući (1) njegovu povjesnu (i pristranu) funkciju onoga koji definira "kulturu" i "zapadnu civilizaciju" za razliku od "orienta" i "neciviliziranog drugoga"; i (2) način na koji čini nevidljivim i homogenizira višestruko identitetu unutar i širom "Zapada". Svojom upotrebotom termina ne želim zanijekati tu problematiku. Umjesto toga, usredotočujući se na način na koji je dominantna (i dominirajuća) kultura konstruirala predodžbe o smrti i žalovanju, namjeravam istražiti način na koji su (i razlog zbog kojega su) određene prakse tugovanja postale normalne, dok su "druge" marginalizirane ili su sasvim nestale.

22 Svojom politički učinkovitom uporabom "majčinstva" kao simbola otpora protiv brutalne državne represije Majke s Plaza de Mayo utjecale su na mnoge kasnije skupine i pokrete koji su koristili strateški esencijalističke ideje "majke" ili "žene" kako bi se suprotstavile nasilju, militarizmu i ratu. Neki od tih pokreta su CoMadres, Odbor majki i rođakinja političkih zatvorenika, nestalih i ubijenih u Salvadoru; pokret za nuklearno zamrzavanje u Velikoj Britaniji i SAD-u; Fronta majki u Šri Lanki i Ženski pokret za mir u bivšoj Jugoslaviji (Bouvard, 1994). Jedna od skupina koje su najduže potrajale i imale najširi domet, a Majke su im bile ključno nadahnute, zove se Women in Black.

Rad feminističkih znanstvenica Nadije C. Seremetakis, Gail Holst-Warhaft i Jenny Hockey rasvjetljuje dugu i rodno obojenu povijest u pozadini afektivne bifurkacije žalovanja na javnu i privatnu domenu diljem suvremenog Zapada.²¹ One primjećuju da žene nisu bile samo primarni posrednici obreda žalovanja u zajednici kroz povijest, u većini predindustrijskih zapadnih društava, nego i da je ženska tužaljka služila kao "nadahnjujuća poetika periferije", prostora kroz koji je "događaj smrti" davao ženama mogućnost da komentiraju društveni svijet i utječu na nj (Seremetakis 1991, 1). Profesionalne narikače izvodile su i vodile strukturirane i kolektivizirane improvizacije koje su uključivale elemente zvuka, poezije i afektivne izvedbe kako bi se kanalizrale snažne emocije povezane sa smrću i pomoglo ožalošćenima da podijele svoju preveliku i često "neartikuliranu žalost" (2000, 4).

Međutim, Hockeyjeva ističe kako su diljem suvremenog Zapada, iako kulturne reprezentacije žalovanja (slike i narativi) obično povezuju emociонаlni izraz žalosti sa ženama, ustvari muškarci bili uže povezani s događajem smrti kroz njegovu naraciju i profesionalno posredovanje. Ta rodna obojenost bifurkacije žalovanja na privatno i javno, afektivno i kognitivno, očita je u medijskim izvješćima o kanadskim ratnim žrtvama u Afganistanu, gdje se uglavnom citiraju muški (vojni i državni) glasnogovornici te oni stoga oblikuju javni narativ kojim se proizvodi značenje, a koji okružuje pokojnike i okolnosti njihove smrti, dok medijske slike emocionalnih izraza gubitka koje u afektivnom smislu podupiru te narative najčešće prikazuju žene – supruge, majke ili "djevojke" poginulih vojnika.

Zabране zajedničkih obreda žalovanja na Zapadu započele su već u 6. stoljeću p.n.e., kada su Solonovi zakoni u grčkim gradovima-državama ograničili praksu "žalovanja za mrtvima" za one koji su s njima bili blisko povezani (Holst-Warhaft 2000, 34). Holst-Warhaftova smatra da se zbog usredotočenosti na žalost i gubitak žensko tugovanje kosilo sa sposobnošću države da nadzire stajališta o "vrijednosti smrti za zajednicu ili državu, otežavajući time vlastima regrutaciju poslušne vojske" (1992, 3) te napominje da su se narativi povezani sa smrću promijenili kada se država snažnije posvetila zakonodavstvu vezanom uz obrede žalovanja, pri čemu se naglasak pomaknuo s gubitka ili tugovanja na eulogiju ili veličanje pokojnika. To je veličanje, osobito u slučaju poginulih u borbi, postalo javnim licem smrti, dok su emocije povezane sa žalošću i gubitkom gurnute u sve izoliraniju i privatiziranu sferu uže obitelji.

Holst-Warhaftova je proširila svoju povjesnu analizu ženskog žalovanja na istraživanje uporaba javnog tugovanja i praksi žalovanja u 20. stoljeću kao sredstva otpora zajednice, ukazujući na trajnu važnost kontrole nad javnim i afektivnim iskazivanjem žalosti. Osobito nadahnjujući primjer korištenja zajedničkog tugovanja kao oruđa otpora protiv militarizma su Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, čije je hrabro i ustrajno iskazivanje žalosti (i gnjeva) uspješno dovelo u pitanje kontrolu argentinske vojne hunte nad narativima povezanim s njihovim voljenima koji su nestali. Tjednim prosvjedima na trgu preko puta argentinske predsjedničke palače u vrijeme represivne vojne diktature majke s Plaza de Mayo prekinule su "percepticid" koji su provodili država i mediji te učinkovito upotrijebile svoju žalost kao sredstvo za (pre) oblikovanje javnog diskursa i razvoj nacionalnog i međunarodnog otpora protiv nasilne diktature hunte.²²

Kada sam se 2009. godine vratila u Kanadu nakon što sam gotovo dvadeset godina živjela u SAD-u, i kada sam čula za komemoracije na Autocesti heroja, isprva sam bila veoma ganuta. Činile su se tako osvježavajućom promjenom naspram politike cenzure kakvu je provodila

Bushova vlada. Naivno sam zamišljala da ti "narodni" izrazi javnog žalovanja za piginulim kanadskim vojnim osobljem nalikuju na otpor kakav su pružile Las Madres te da su usmjereni protiv militarizma i rata u Afganistanu.

Međutim, kada sam vidjela sveprisutnu medijsku pozornost i namjerno preuvečavanje komemoracije kanadskih ratnih žrtava, upala mi je u oči specifičnost militariziranog narativa. Gdje su glasovi majki, očeva, djece, ljubavnica, prijatelja i građana koji se ne slažu s kanadskim vojnim narativom o sretnim ratnicima koji su nesobično žrtvovali svoje živote u činu prosvjećene vojne intervencije? Gdje su naši izrazi žalosti i gnjeva? Gdje je priznanje afganistanskih žrtava? Gdje je naša suvremena periferalna poetika žalovanja, koja bi svojim povezivanjem afektivnog izraza s "kritičkom interpretacijom" bila sposobna promjeniti militarizirane i medijski poticane nacionalističke narative herojskog ratništva?

Zabilješka na blogu: Impact Afghanistan War, 6. siječnja 2011.

Jučer, dok sam padala u Yorku, na obzoru se pojavilo ambulantno vozilo. Kretalo se pješačkom stazom prema meni. Dok sam padala - devedeset dva, devedeset tri, devedeset četiri - nekoliko mi je pitanja prošlo kroz glavu. Hoću li završiti prije nego što dođu do mene? Hoće li me, smiju li me zaustaviti? Tko ih je pozvao??

Kada sam pala devedeset šesti put, ambulantno vozilo zaustavilo se pred mnom i uz moj štand s razglednicama i ispisanim zastavom. Bolničar je spustio prozor - devedeset sedam - promotrio razglednice i zastavu - devedeset osam - pogledao u mene - devedeset devet - podigao prozor i ambulantno vozilo je produžilo.

Nakon odlaska vozila pogodio me iznenadan i sirov nalet emocija. Poželjela sam vrisiónuti. Baciti se na zemlju.

Plakati i vrištati u gnjevu: Upomoć! Upomoć! Upomoć!

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Beyond Heroism and Towards Shared Vulnerability:

Re-imagining Canada's Affective Deployment of Mourning in Response to Afghan War Deaths

Helene Vosters

Journal: Impact Afghanistan War, February 5, 2011

Stand. Fall. Stand. Fall. Stand. Fall. The impact of body with ground. The surprising accommodation of surfaces. The season's first snow was soft and embracing, but now, as winter wears on the ground has taken on the topography of a moonscape. Falling is the easy part – the curious architecture of body and limbs. It's standing, rising, that's difficult. Stand. Fall. Breathe. Traffic, birdsong, distant or passing voices, circling hawk, tree limbs, plane slicing sky, snow. Falling. The ground becomes a between-space where I experience both the vastness of my distance from, and a closeness to, all those who have fallen, who are falling, in Afghanistan. Distance, because I am acutely aware of the inadequacy of my gesture. I fall of my own accord. I have not been struck down. I am not injured. I can rise. Do rise. But it is precisely this awareness of distance that connects me. Each fall becomes an embodied meditation on the unequal distribution of vulnerability in our geopolitical landscape. With each fall I recognize – it "could" be me, it isn't me, and, the reasons it's not.


01 The operation's original title, Operation Ultimate Justice, was objected to by Islamic clerics on the grounds that "ultimate justice can only be dispensed by Allah" (Brown, Derek. September 27, 2001 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/sep/27/afghanistan.terrorism5>).

02 Canada. Department of National Defence (DND), News Room NR 02.001, January 7, 2002. Available from <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=oo&id=351>.

03 Toronto Star, November 24, 2010. Available from <http://www.thestar.com/special/article/897222--have-your-say-on-canada-s-afghan-mission>. The Harper government argued that a new Parliamentary vote was not required to extend the mission since the Canadian troops will stay on in Afghanistan in a training, not a combat, capacity.

04 Canada. DND, "Fallen Canadians" August 8, 2011 <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/fallen-disparus/index-eng.asp>.

05 U.S. Department of Defense, News Transcript, Public Affairs, "Enduring Freedom Operational Update" October 30, 2001 <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2232>. Though highly debated (and erratically practiced) the no body count policy has been reiterated by U.S. military and Pentagon spokes people throughout its decade-long war in Afghanistan. In 2006, then Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld explained that the policy is a reversal of the U.S. practices during the Vietnam War: "If you'll recall the Vietnam War, they had body counts that went on day after day after day The implication of that was that you were winning if the body count went up and losing if the body count went down." Time U.S. June 2, 2009 <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1902274,00.html#ixzz1WETDevB4>.



In October 7, 2001 the U.S. (accompanied by British forces) launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), its War in Afghanistan.⁰¹ Though no Canadian military personnel participated in this initial invasion, then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, in an act of discursive engagement, immediately announced Canada's commitment to contribute military forces to an international "campaign on

terror" and, in February 2002, the Canadian military deployed its first 750 ground troops to Afghanistan.⁰² In November of 2010, nine years after the start of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Steven Harper's Conservative government announced its decision to extend (beyond the 2011 deadline mandated by parliament) Canada's military presence in Afghanistan until 2014.⁰³

Since the onset of the post-9/11 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan 157 Canadian military personnel have died or been killed.⁰⁴ While each of these deaths have been memorialized in the Canadian media and through official repatriation ceremonies as well as and through popular "Highway of Heroes" memorials, there are no exact numbers for Afghans who have been killed or died as a result of war-related causes during this time. This lack of an accurate accounting of Afghan war deaths is, in large measure, a result of the U.S.'s no-body count policy as communicated in the first month of the war by U.S. military spokesperson, Rear Adm. John D. Stufflebeam: "[A]s a military institution, we don't keep body counts, or at least we're not keeping body counts. Maybe in past wars it was done. But we're not doing that."⁰⁵ The lack of accounting is also a reflection of what Judith Butler calls a "differential distribution of grievability across populations" wherein Western lives are deemed grievable while the lives of non-Western "Others" remain outside of the realm of grievability (2009, 24).

With the return of Canada's first Afghanistan War combat fatalities in spring 2002, Canadians began to "spontaneously" gather along the 172-kilometre repatriation route between the military base in Trenton, Ontario and Toronto's coroner's office.⁰⁶ Crowds gathered onto Ontario's Highway 401's roadsides and freeway overpasses and waited, sometimes for hours, in heat, rain, and freezing cold, to pay tribute to the passing motorcade bearing the bodies of Canadian soldiers. Since its inception, the "Highway of Heroes" memorial phenomena has garnered positive media attention across Canada (as well as in the U.S.),⁰⁷ has led to the official renaming of sections of the repatriation route to the "Highway of Heroes" (2007) and "Route of Heroes" (2010), and has inspired a host of songs and you-tube video tributes.⁰⁸

Like many a Canadian identity tale, the Highway of Heroes has become a story of how different Canadians are from our neighbors to the south. Set in contrast to the U.S., where the G. W. Bush administration prohibited the media from broadcasting images of the coffins of U.S. military personnel killed in Afghanistan and Iraq, Canada's public "grassroots" display of mourning for our military dead has added to the already prolific arsenal of evidence of Canada's altruistic national superiority.⁰⁹ A closer look, however, at the Highway of Heroes memorial phenomena troubles this narrative.

This paper combines a phenomenological, theoretical and historical inquiry into the role of embodied and affective expressions of mourning in constructing narratives of death related to militarism and war by juxtaposing a critical analysis of the Highway of Heroes memorial phenomena with an auto-ethnographic reflection of a daily public memorial ritual that employs a

06 Tentative schedules (based on expected time of air transport arrivals to the CFB at Trenton) for the repatriation ceremonies, are announced through both mainstream media and social media outlets.

07 An example of U.S. news coverage is the November 11, 2008 (Remembrance Day in Canada, Veterans Day in the U.S.) prime time MSNBC feature news story, "A hard road: The Highway of Heroes" <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/> vp/27651384#27651384.

08 Canadian rock band *The Trews* (with Gordie Johnson) wrote and produced a hit single in 2010 with the chorus: *Carry me home down The Highway of Heroes / People above with their flags flying low. / Carry me softly, down The Highway of Heroes. / True Patriot Love, / There was never more.*

09 Prime Minister Steven Harper's failed 2006 attempt to emulate the Bush administration's prohibition only added to the story of difference by demonstrating Canadian's superior capacity to resist government censure.

10 The "America: Open for Business" campaign originated in San Francisco and was quickly adopted by cities nation wide. San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, September 2, 2011, http://www.sfvirtualshop.com/mayor_brown.htm.

poetics of shared vulnerability and seeks to serve as an agent for community discourse and mobilization in response to militarism and war. Drawing on contemporary theories of mourning in a geopolitical context (Butler 2009, 2006, 2003; Taylor 2004) and of the state's modulation of affect towards the militarization of civilian psychology (Orr 2006, 2004; Massumi 2010, 2005) as well as on feminist scholarship analyzing women's historical role as the primary mediators of public mourning in the West and the underlying ideological and structural forces that contributed to the regulation, control and constraint of their socially situated mourning practices (Holst-Warhaft 2000, 1992; Seremetakis 1991; Hockey 2001, 1997) this paper will interrogate how the Highway of Heroes phenomena – though often framed as a grassroots movement – reflects and reinforces the agenda of state sponsored military memory projects through a militarized poetics of mourning.

Blog entry: Impact Afghanistan War, July 14, 2010

There is an odd relief in committing myself to a process of experiencing impact. It makes me aware of how much of life is dedicated to its avoidance or mitigation. In the early post-9/11 days when many "Americans" were deeply affected by the attack on the twin-towers I remember how quickly the state entered to manage the emotional response. Community constructed altars throughout New York City were dismantled. Collective grief was systematically re-directed into nationalistic and patriotic fervor and, within weeks, a nation-wide ad campaign was launched: "America: Open for Business" – with its accompanying image of the American flag as a shopping bag.¹⁰

On July 1 (Canada Day), 2010, in response to Canada's popular, public and "differential" expressions of grief related to Afghan war casualties, I began Impact Afghanistan War, a memorial project in which I fall 100 times a day in a public space for one year – each fall in recognition of an Afghani death. *Impact* is an embodied investigation of the space between "Us" and "Other," between individual and social grief, between personal ritual and public protest, and between art and politics. It is a sustained inquiry into the significance of the affective and publicly situated body in the performance and production of social empathy and into the role of public mourning practices in the construction of narratives of death related to militarism and war.

In *Frames of War* (2010) Judith Butler argues that the selective "framing" or "carving up [of] experience [is] essential to the conduct of war" (26). Butler extends Althusser's notion of the multiple modalities of materiality, suggesting that "frames of war" operate not merely as precursors to, and commentary on, war but as "material instrumentalities of violence" (xiii). Popular support of military actions is often predicated on the framing of "enemy" populations such that they are cast outside of what is considered the normal realm of "human" values into an otherness that is consequently outside of the range of our compassion and empathy (2003, 22). At its most overt this "derealization" is evident in the demonization of "the enemy" which provides governments, armies and individual soldiers with the justification to wage war. However, Butler also argues that derealization functions on a broader social scale by placing entire populations outside of

¹¹ Similarly, in her analysis of the role of spectacle in Argentina's "Dirty War," Diana Taylor argues that the media's rendering of some things as visible and others as invisible (or disappeared) helped to produce a "percepticide" wherein the general population blinded themselves to atrocities they bore witness to daily during the military dictatorship (1997).

the range of our collective grief thereby facilitating a large-scale empathetic detachment from the results of our nation's military actions. A primary mechanism through which this derealization operates in the social sphere is through the "differential allocation of grief" wherein "grievable humans" are allotted institutionally supported venues for "celebrated public grieving" while there is a corresponding "prohibition on the public grieving of other's lives" (25):

[T]he frame is always throwing something away, always keeping something out, always de-realizing and de-legitimizing alternative versions of reality, discarded negatives of the official version. . . . In this sense the frame seeks to institute an interdiction on mourning: there is no destruction, and there is no loss. Even as the frames are actively engaged in redoubling the destruction of war, they are only polishing the surface of a melancholia whose rage must be contained, and often cannot (2010, xiii).¹¹

Blog entry: Impact Afghanistan War, November 11 (Remembrance Day), 2010

As I fell in Queen's Park today a soldier stood at attention about 50 meters in front of me. After each fall, I rose and we stood facing one another.

One hundred times.

He was too far away for me to make out his face but he looked young. Young and fragile.

After I completed my falls I stayed to witness the 21-gun salute: The soldiers at attention. The order to fire passed down a chain of command. The cannon's explosive roar. The smoke.

Twenty-one times.

Replete with symbols of nationalism, the Highway of Heroes memorials, like the Remembrance Day Ceremony I attended, are part of a larger Canadian military cultural memory project that is produced not through a simple top down propaganda mechanism, but rather, through a complex network of organizational and institutional stakeholders that have become adept at using popular media (Fremeth 2010, 53). More than simply compilations of particular historical narratives, military memory projects have their own poetics constructed of signs, symbols and gestures. At the Highway of Heroes memorials flags abound. They're draped over freeway overpasses, flown on fire-engine ladders, held aloft by veterans, waved and held abreast by civilians. As the motorcade bearing the bodies of the dead, their families and their military escort pass, uniformed personnel – military, police, fire and rescue workers – stand at attention and salute. Un-uniformed citizens mimic the militaristic gestures. Some salute. Others choose the more "civilian" but equally patriotic and nationalist display of placing hand over heart. Grief, as affective fuel, generates a communal and public pledge to nation, a pledge whose performance extends far beyond the temporal and corporeal boundaries of the memorial event through its representation and re-representation in both mainstream and "grassroots" social media.

Citizen participation in militarized memorials is largely one of a ritualized enactment of silence. The physical props – the flag, the cannon, the poppy,¹² the yellow ribbon – signify not only remembrance and the

12 The poppy, a symbol of Remembrance throughout the Commonwealth nations (and to a lesser degree in the U.S.) since shortly after WWI, has a particularly poignant meaning for Canadians. World War I Canadian Medical Officer, John McCrae's poem to commemorate the huge loss of soldier's lives during the First World War opens with the words "In Flanders fields the poppies blow." Canadians suffered especially heavy losses in WWI – out of a population of 7.5 million, close to 70,000 died on the battlefield and another 140,000 were wounded (Royal Canadian Legion, "Teachers Guide" August 29, 2011 [online] http://www.legion.ca/_PDF/Teachers/T_GUIDE_E.pdf). For generations, the memorization and recitation of "In Flanders Fields" has been standard fare in Canadian schools. Today, curriculum about Canadian military history, the meaning of the poppy other military commemoration ceremonies, as well as suggested lessons and activities are disseminated through "Teachers Guides" produced by both the Royal Canadian Legion and Veterans Affairs Canada.

13 In *Panic Diaries: A Genealogy of Panic Disorder* (2006) and "The Militarization of Inner Space" (2004) Jackie Orr traces the history of contemporary U.S. government's manipulation insecurity and terror as a means of militarizing the civilian psychology and calling into being the "civilian soldier." Likewise, in "Fear (The Spectrum Said)" (2005) and "The Future Birth of the Affective Fact: The Political Ontology of Threat" (2010) Brian Massumi argues that the modulation of fear through its production as an "affective fact" has become an increasingly pervasive and instrumentalized political tactic in post-9/11 US.

14 CBC News/World, March 27, 2011 <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/03/27/afghanistan-soldier.html>.

15 CBC News/World, April 11, 2010 <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/04/11/afghanistan-canadian.html>.

honouring of the dead, but also, the message that this is not the time or place to debate foreign policy, to voice dissent or to question the geopolitical conditions that resulted in the loss of the military personnel being mourned (McCready 2010). Whereas the military has its own internal set of rituals and practices designed to transform recruits into battle-ready warriors, military memory projects act as a way of creating a kind of "civilian soldier": We stand at attention. We adhere to the rules of engagement – even if only temporally.¹³ Through participation in the Highway of Heroes popular repatriation memorials, or Remembrance Day ceremonies, through the wearing of poppies (or our silence in the face of their prolific seasonal blossoming on jacket and coat lapels) we are temporarily interpellated as "civilian soldiers" (Orr 2004, 452).

While civilian participants of the Highway of Heroes memorials perform their ritualized enactment of patriotic silence, it is military and state officials who shape the narratives that attribute meaning to the deaths:

"The relentless commitment of Cpl. Scherrer and other brave Canadians in Afghanistan is a source of pride to all Canadians." (Prime Minister Steven Harper on the death of Corporal Yannick Scherrer).¹⁴

"Our Canadian Forces members... face an enemy that will go to any length to try to undermine any progress made. The courage demonstrated by Pte. Todd speaks volumes to his dedication to our country and to this mission" (Defence Minister Peter MacKay on the death of Private Tyler William Todd).¹⁵

"The bravery and remarkable commitment of Canadians like Sapper Collier are bringing safety and stability to the people of Afghanistan . . . Every day, their dedication and work protect our interests and values here at home and around the world. Sapper Collier's sacrifice will not be forgotten (Prime Minister Steven Harper on the death of Sapper Brian Collier)."¹⁶

The Highway of Heroes spectacular and highly mediated public memorials, together with these unproblematised narratives of heroism and benevolent militarism, and the absence of any recognition of Afghani causalities provide a "frame" through which Canadians, as citizens, apprehend (and participate in) the War in Afghanistan. What is inside the frame – Canada's heroic and willingly self-sacrificing military dead – is made visible while what is outside of the frame – Afghani dead and any culpability on the part of the Canadian military (and the Canadian public) in their deaths – is left unseen and therefore rendered inapprehensible. Through our acquiescence to the unspoken rules of engagement, rules that determine who and how we should mourn – silently and with an unquestioning patriotic pride – we ritually enlist.

As a framing mechanism, the Highway of Heroes memorials with their militarized poetics serve several interrelated functions: They are a mechanism through which expressions of loss for Canadian military casualties are affectively linked with, and channeled into, nationalist narratives of heroism. By extension, through "the affirm[ation] and exalt[ation of] certain preferred national subjects: the masculinized, normative and morally unimpeachable young men (and to a lesser extent, women) whose sacrifice is not only the salvation of the national character,

¹⁶ CBC News/World, July 20, 2010
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/07/20/afghanistan-cdn-soldier-killed.html>.

¹⁷ While McCready is referring to the migration of the U.S.'s popular Yellow Ribbon Campaign to Canada as a reflection of a larger trend towards the increased militarization of Canadian culture, throughout his essay he extends his argument to other aspects of Canada's military memory project including the Highway of Heroes memorials and Remembrance Day ceremonies.

¹⁸ Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his role in the "creation of a 'Blue Helmet' force to follow through with the settlement of the Suez Canal" (Coulon and Liégeois, 2010: v) and went on to serve as Canada's 14th Prime Minister, from 1963 to 1968.

¹⁹ The discourse of Canada's military's engagement in Afghanistan as an act of humanitarianism is disseminated through official communications by the Canadian Government and the Department of National Defence (DND): The Government of Canada's Website outlining "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan" lists as Canada's four priorities, "(1) investing in the future of Afghan children and youth through development programming in education and health; (2) advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, through the provision of up to 950 CF trainers, support personnel, and approximately 45 Canadian civilian police to help train Afghan National Security Forces; (3) promoting regional diplomacy; and (4) helping deliver humanitarian assistance" (<http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/index.aspx?lang=eng>).

but retrospectively has become its foundation and guarantor" they silence public debate and opposition to the war (McCready 2010, 34).¹⁷ And finally, through the provision of an institutionally supported venue for the "celebrated public grieving" of those – Canadian military personal – who are rendered "grievable humans" they produce a corresponding "prohibition on the public grieving of others' [Afghani] lives" (Butler 2006, 37).

Butler suggests that a more "egalitarian mourning" that insists on the grievability of all lives, a mourning that is based on the recognition that vulnerability is a primary (and shared) condition of life, could facilitate "an ethics of non-violence and a politics of a more radical redistribution of humanizing effects" (Butler 2003, 9). Writing in the context of the U.S. she argues, however, that such mourning would destroy national self-perception and require that "the notion of the world itself as a sovereign entitlement of the United States must be given up, lost, and mourned, as narcissistic and grandiose fantasies must be lost and mourned" (2006, 40).

Extending Butler's analysis north of the border, one can imagine that if Canadians were to adopt a more egalitarian approach to grieving Afghan war deaths the collective identity we would have to give up and mourn is the (perhaps less narcissistic but equally grandiose) notion of ourselves as benevolent global peacekeepers, an identity historically and institutionally grounded the leadership role played by Canada's (then) Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, in the 1956 founding the first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in response to the crises in the Suez Canal.¹⁸ Emergent Canadian Studies and Defense and Foreign Affairs scholars concur, however, that Canada's contemporary military agenda bears little resemblance to its historical peacekeeping mandate (Berland and Fitzpatrick, 2010; Fremeth, 2010; Coulon and Liégeois, 2010). Whereas Pearson helped shape prerequisites for early UN peacekeeping operations which included such conditions as a "cease-fire agreement; consent of the parties; impartiality of the Force; use of force strictly limited to self-defense; and executive responsibility of the Security General" (Coulon and Liégeois, 3), today, "Canadian governments have preferred to commit Canada to military interventions outside the UN structure, and in the particular case of Afghanistan, in a counter-insurgency mission" (50).

Fremeth (2010) notes that corresponding to Canada's shift away from its self-defined military role as "peacemakers," to its current combat role in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, there has also been a more generalized and pervasive trend towards the militarization of Canadian culture. Fremeth suggests that a major contributing factor in facilitating this shift has been the significant increase in institutional and fiscal support for the expansion of Canadian military memory projects over the past decade. Through the simultaneous triggering and channeling of affect associated with the grief related to Canada's past and present military casualties into narratives of heroism, sacrifice and benevolent military intervention, these expanded military memory projects mask Canada's participation in "an imperial war of aggression, retribution and resource control" by "furnishing Canada with a sense of national innocence" (McCready 2010, 39).¹⁹

Brian Massumi (2005) explains that the effective modulation of affect is achieved through its bifurcation, the splitting off of the emotional and phenomenological experience from cognitive or critical interpretation. Through the rendering of "affective experience" as subjective (private) it becomes separated from the political (public) and ideological process of producing rationalized narratives of nationalism with their accompanying

²⁰ Also see Jackie Orr (2006, 2004) for an analysis of U.S. state and military's manipulation of fear as a mechanism for the interpellation of the "citizen soldier."

²¹ The notion of "the West" is problematic in many ways including (1) its historical (and biased) function as the signifier of "culture" and "western civilization" as positioned against the "Orient" and the "uncivilized other" and, (2) its invisibilization and homogenization of the plurality of identity within and throughout "the West." My use of the term is not intended to deny these problematics. Rather, by focusing on how the dominant (and dominating) culture has constructed notions of death and mourning, my intent is to examine how (and why) certain practices of mourning have come to be normalized while "others" have become marginalized or altogether disappeared.

military and foreign policy agendas. Whereas, in Massumi's example of the U.S. Homeland Security's color-coded terror alert system, fear is the "affective fact" through which the narrative for the necessity of a "war on terror" is produced, in the case of Canada's memorial memory projects, grief becomes the affective fact through which narratives of humanitarian militarism are manufactured and maintained.²⁰

The work of feminist scholars Nadia C. Seremetakis, Gail Holst-Warhaft and Jenny Hockey illuminate the long and gendered history that underpins the affective bifurcation of grief into public and private domains throughout the contemporary West.²¹ They note that not only were women historically the primary mediators of community-based mourning rituals in most Western pre-industrial communities, but also, that women's lament operated as "an empowering poetics of the periphery" a space through which the "event of death" provided women with an opportunity to comment on and influence their social world (Seremetakis 1991, 1). Skilled lamenters performed and conducted structured and collectivized improvisations that incorporated elements of sound, poetry and affective performance to channel the powerful emotions associated with death and to assist the bereaved in communicating their overwhelming and often "inarticulate grief" (Holst-Warhaft 2000, 4).

Hockey notes that throughout the contemporary West, however, while cultural representations of grief (images and narratives) commonly associate grief's emotional expression with women, it is men who are more closely associated with the event of death through its narration and professional mediation. This gendering of the private/public, affective/cognitive bifurcation of mourning is evident in the media reports of Canadian military casualties in Afghanistan where it is predominantly male (military and state) spokespersons who are quoted, and therefore, who shape the public meaning-making narrative surrounding the deceased and the circumstances of their death, while the media images of emotional expressions of loss that affectively bolster these narratives are most often of those women – the wives, mothers or "girlfriends" of deceased soldiers.

Interdicts against community mourning rituals in the West began as early as the sixth century B.C.E. when laws introduced by Solon in the city-states of Greece restricted the practice of "lamenting the dead" to those directly related to the deceased (Holst-Warhaft 2000, 34). Holst-Warhaft suggests that because of its focus on grief and loss women's lament interfered with the state's ability to control attitudes about the "value of death for the community or state [thus] making it difficult for authorities to recruit an obedient army" (1992, 3) and notes that as the state became increasingly involved in legislating mourning rituals the narratives associated with death also changed, with the emphasis moving away from loss or mourning and towards eulogy or the praise of the dead. Praise, especially in cases of death incurred in battle, became death's public face while the emotions associated with grief and loss became relegated to the increasingly isolated and privatized sphere of the nuclear family.

Holst-Warhaft extends her historical analysis of women's lament to an examination of twentieth-century uses of public mourning and lament practices as a tool for community resistance, demonstrating the ongoing significance of control over the public and affective performance of mourning. An especially inspiring example of the deployment of community grief as tool of resistance to militarism is that of Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, whose courageous and persistent public performance of grief (and

22 Through their politically effective utilization of "Motherhood" as a symbol of resistance to brutal state repression, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo have influenced numerous subsequent groups and movements who have employed strategically essentialist notions of "mother" or "woman" to challenge violence, militarism and war. Some of these movements include CoMadres, the Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners, Disappeared, and Assassinated in El Salvador; the nuclear freeze movement in Britain and the U.S.; the Sri Lankan Mother's front and the former Yugoslavia's Women's Peace Movement (Bouvard, 1994). One of the most long-lasting and far-reaching groups that identify the Mothers as a key inspiration is Women in Black.

rage) successfully challenged the Argentinean military junta's control over narratives related to their disappeared loved ones. Through their weekly protests in the plaza across from Argentina's Presidential Palace during the repressive military dictatorship, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo disrupted the state and media produced "percepticide" and effectively used their grief as a vehicle to (re)frame public discourse and generate national and international resistance to the junta's violent dictatorship.²²

When I returned to Canada in 2009, after living for almost twenty years in the U.S., and heard about the Highway of Heroes memorials I was initially very moved. They seemed such a refreshing change from the Bush administration's policy of censure. Naively, I imagined these "grassroots" displays of public mourning for Canada's repatriated military personnel to be Las Madres-like acts of resistance to militarism and opposition to the war in Afghanistan. As I bore witness to the pervasive media attention and aggrandized memorialization of Canada's military casualties, I was struck, however, by the singularity of the militarized narrative: Where are the voices of the mothers, fathers, children, lovers, friends and citizens who dissent from the Canadian military's narrative of the happy warriors who selflessly sacrifice their lives in acts of enlightened military intervention? Where are our expressions of grief and outrage? Where is the recognition of the Afghani dead? Where is our contemporary peripheral poetics of lament, which through its incorporation of affective expression with "critical interpretation" has the capacity to challenge militarized and media-endorsed nationalistic narratives of heroic warrior-ship?

Blog entry: Impact Afghanistan War, January 6, 2011

Yesterday, while falling at York an ambulance appeared on the horizon. It was traveling on a footpath and heading my way. As I fell - ninety-two, ninety-three, ninety-four - several questions went through my mind: Will I finish before they reach me? Will they, can they, stop me? Who called them??

By ninety-six the ambulance pulled up in front of me and alongside my stand with its postcards and inscribed-upon flag. A paramedic rolled down his window - ninety-seven - looked at the cards and the flag - ninety-eight - looked at me - ninety-nine - rolled up his window and the ambulance drove on.

In the ambulance's wake I was struck by a sudden and raw surge of emotion. I wanted to cry out. To hurl myself to the ground. To weep, and scream with outrage: Emergency! Emergency! Emergency!

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Dear ----,

I am worried about your embedded bout of disavowal. The submerged magenta hidden under your blue. I can't see a difference between the shore, spilled iodine, and fissures in a sinking craft. What I'm asking for is a fish border, a fence equal to her scattered breath. You would sound so good beside my name.*

Love,

* George Kalamaras & Eric Baus, *Births Incurred/your recently collected saliva* (2003).



Dear ----,

When the superstructure obstructs the development of the economic base,
political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are we going against
materialism when we say this? No.*

Love,

* Mao Tse-Tung, *On Contradiction* (1937).

Hod unatrag:

koreografske slike, zaborav i utopija sadašnjosti*

Ric Allsopp

S engleskoga prevela Monika Bregović

Uvod

Snamjerom da se pozabavim s poetikom, mehanizmima i tehnologijama zaborava unutar same izvedbe te njihovom ulogom u njezinu razumijevanju i recepciji, okupio sam ideje koje bi se mogle upotrijebiti u promišljanju onoga što je u pitanju u činu izvedbe – osobito ako je taj čin proizvoden primarno tjelesnim sredstvima u obliku koreografije i plesa. Želio bih raspraviti o "koreografskim slikama", pri čemu ne mislim na koreografske slike u normativnom smislu, u obliku sistematičnih i koherentnih obrazaca plesnih fraza unutar vremenski zadano estetskog objekta izvedbe, već na koreografske slike u obliku integralnog i nerazdvojivog odnosa između pokreta i zapisa – između nestalog ili zaboravljenog i preostalog, te njihovih uzajamnih modifikacija: zaboravljeni oblikovanje, negativan prostor preostalog; koreografska slika u smislu emocionalne, a ne reprezentacijske dinamike.

Ovaj rad polazi od prepostavke da su mehanizmi zaborava sastavni dio koreografske koncepcije odnosa između pokreta i sjećanja te sastavni dio izvedbe kao sredstva utjelovljenja slika i doživljavanja igre prisjećanja i zaborava koji čine iskustvo umjetničkog djela. Za pristup aspektima suvremene izvedbene prakse i njezinu odnosu s koreografijama fizičkih i afektivnih slijepih pjega služim se Benjaminovom anticipacijom "utopije u srcu sadašnjosti" i njegovom idejom o materijalnosti povijesti.^①

Fizička slijepa pjega koja se protežeiza naših leđa područje je koje se tijekom hoda unatrag zaboravlja i s kojim se ujedno (paradoksalno) suočavamo. Hod unatrag metaforička je i doslovna interakcija s beskonačnim prostorom iza naših leđa i zaboravom kao sredstvom oblikovanja i preoblikovanja

* Ovaj je rad prvi put izložen na konferenciji PSH7 'Camillo 2.0' na panelu 'tehnologije zaborava' u Utrechtu (svibanj 2011.); u srpnju 2011. izložen je kao ilustrirano predavanje za MA SODA pri HZT, University of the Arts, Berlin.

① Vidi Walter Benjamin, 1940/1999; Stéphane Mosés, 2009: 108; Freddie Rokem, 2010: 141-176

našeg viđenja svijeta. Tijelo je pokretni proprioceptivni mehanizam koji neprestano mijenja našu percepciju i interakciju sa svijetom te kao takvo utjelovljuje kontinuiranu transformaciju odnosa tehnologije, sjećanja i iskustva.

Rad uspostavlja provizorne poveznice između Benjaminove tvrdnje da je "slika ono u čemu se prošlo u bljesku sastavlja u konstelaciju sa sadašnjim" (*Passagenwerk*); koncepta slike pjesnika Charlesa Olsona prema kojem je slika cenzura ili praznina između ritma i spoznaje, prostora i djelovanja, značenja i tvari; "akcije" kao transformacije materijala i misli kao što ih zamišlja Joseph Beuys; analize čarobnih radnji i njihove srodnosti s umjetnošću i sjećanjem koju predlaže Carolyn Nakamura.^{o2}

Yes. No. A bit. Not Really.

Predložio bih analizu novijeg koreografskog djela *Yes. No. A bit. Not Really* (2010.) glazbenika Borisa Haufa, režiserke Lucy Cash i koreografkinje Christine Ciupke, izvedenog u listopadu 2010., u berlinskom Sophiensaele. Zanimljivo je što je Benjaminova tvrdnja da je "svako sada vrijeme određene prepoznatljivosti" ili trenutka prepoznavanja (Rokem, 1999: 144) vidljiva u izvedbi paralelno s idejom da je slika sadašnjosti oblik zaborava i rekonstrukcije: da hodamo ili se "suočavamo" istovremeno prema naprijed i nazad, da prošlost prizivamo ali i preoblukujemo dok ona istovremeno preoblikuje nas, i da takve moguće transformacije (i njihove doslovne i afektivne posljedice) operiraju ne samo na razini umjetničkog djela (estetike) već i na razini svakodnevnice. Odnos između formalnih estetskih aspekata djela i svakodnevnih pokreta koje priziva i kojima se istovremeno koristi također dočaravaju osjećaj beskočnog toka pokreta koji proizvodi emocionalan i gotovo opipljiv osjećaj prostora s jedne strane, a percepciju formalnih i čitljivih ritmičnih oblika koji uokviruju i ograničuju djelo s druge.

Djelo *Yes. No. A bit. Not Really*. (2010.) opisuje se kao "kolaborativna kompozicija koja uspostavlja veze između ritma, slike, zvuka i pokreta u intimnom prostoru za malobrojnu publiku"; sam naziv već možda nagovještava neke svakodnevne odgovore na zaboravljena pitanja. Programska knjižica podučava čitatelja umjetnosti izabiranja sjedećeg mjesta:

Izaberite svoje mjesto na polaroidima izloženim u predvorju. Svaka fotografija ima broj koji označuje broj sjedala. Izaberite fotografiju koja vam privuče pažnju i pronađite odgovarajuće sjedalo u Hochzeitssaal.

Spustio sam se do predvorja na prvom katu i na zidu ugledao približno pedeset polaroida urbane svakodnevnice. Izabrao sam broj 320 – polaroid stola sa svjetiljkom i oznakom "tiho" te neprepoznatljivom osobom koja sjedi s druge strane. Zaboravio sam zašto me baš ta slika privukla. Polaroidi označuju, podjednako oblikom i teksturom kao i sadržajem, neposrednost svakodnevnice. Daju dodatni osjećaj izmjerenosti između sadašnjeg mesta i vremena i njima bliskog mesta i vremena koji su uvučeni u izvedbu i koji informiraju ili pak uznenimiruju gledatelja. Zatim smo pozvani smo na kat u Hochzeitssaal, u više-manje četverokutni prostor (oko 10 x 10 metara) okružen numeriranim stolcima s ulazom na svakom uglu. Pod je žut. Slijedi opis same izvedbe po sjećanju, čin sjećanja kroz pisanje koje utjelovljuje asocijacije, očekivanja a ujedno i početak zaborava.

^{o2} Vidi Walter Benjamin, 1999: N3,1, pp. 462-463 citirano u Rokem, 2010: 144--145; Charles Olson, 1970; Gregory Ulmer, 1985: 225-264; Nakamura, 2006: 18-45.

Tri izvođača polako se kreću unatrag oko vanjskog ruba/ publike. Tri izvođača leže na podu – prijelaz sa hoda na puzanje i ležanje. Pravokutni pokrivač. Par tenisica – svaka ispod jednog ugla pokrivača. Hod unatrag uz vanjski i unutarnji rub prostora. Sad malo po dijagonalni. Osvrtanje unatrag. Pogled prema gore, pogled u stranu – povremeno međusobno gledanje. Enigmatični osmijesi. Tko su ovi likovi? Nema okljevanja. Samo glatki prijelazi u smjerovima – naprijed i nazad; nazad i naprijed; od vertikale prema horizontali; od horizontale prema vertikalni. Ritmovi hodanja tihim koracima. Formalna konstrukcija kazališta sjećanja – ali bez sadržaja? Polaroidi na zidu izbljedjeli iz sjećanja. Sva tri izvođača leže na boku – spavaju pa se okrenu; spavaju pa se okrenu. Pod pokrivačem, povlače pokrivač, preklapaju pokrivač. Ponavljanje harmonične sekvene – meditativno i uspavljajuće – sjećanje samo. Pokret je linearan i uglat. Krivulje se pojavljuju samo kod ležanja. Pogled prema publici. Trenuci prepoznavanja preobražavaju se (poput glazbene pratrne) u osjećaj da ničega nema, likovi nastanjuju drugi prostor i vrijeme, druge povjesne trenutke. "Utopija sadašnjosti" – trenutak "prijelaza" od jednog do drugog, inverzija, trajno vraćanje u kontekst.

Heidegger je tehnologiju shvaćao činom razotkrivanja (1993: 307-342). Što tehnologija zaborava koja se razvija kroz izvedbu i tri tijela razotkiva i kako? Što točno preostaje? Možda preostaje upravo trenutak same emocije, trajna, blaga fluktuacija sjećanja i zaborava, koja mapira pokrete i otkrivenja svakodnevnog iskustva. Želio bih locirati upamćene fragmente izvedbe – fragmente preostale nakon procesa zaborava, a koje sam upravo na niz različitih načina prizvao ili ponovo sastavio: kroz dvije preostale jasne slike – hod unatrag i pokrivač – koje izranjuju u odnosu na tijelo u pokretu, odnosno u obliku koreografskih slika; i iz raznih perspektiva razmotriti kako te dvije slike "preostaju" nakon procesa zaborava.

Prva slika je "hod unatrag", obrat i retrogradni pokret kao formalna kompozicijska strategija i sredstvo izmjehštanja i ometanja pozornosti i očekivanja. To je promišljeni pokret; pokret koji se opire okretanju. Kretanje ili hod unatrag ipak nije ulični i svakodnevni pokret. Hod unatrag "isključuje" okret, obrtanje oko osi, frontalnost koja dominira u svakodnevnom kretanju. Radi se o izrazito svetom, ritualnom i estetskom pokretu.

Druga slika uključuje pokrivač kao prostor koji je pokretan, preklopljiv i koji omata; toplina, vrelina, sigurnost, granica i pokrov, trenutak iz kojeg pokret izvire i u kojem uz bezbroj asocijacija završava. Teksturirani prostor koji je u interakciji sa površinom okruženom posjednutim gledateljima ili ljudima koji hodaju unatrag, i modificira je.

Obje slike uključuju i obuhvaćaju tijela u pokretu u obliku dvostrukog zapisa akcije i objekta; tijela koja povezuju i isprepliću akciju i objekt, transformiraju i bivaju transformirana pokrivačem kao prenosivim prostorom, pokretnom granicom; hodom unatrag u slijepu pjegu. Kako preživljava ono što preostaje?

Slike

Walter Benjamin je primijetio da se "povijest razlama u slike, a ne priče".⁰³ U "The Gift of Past", Emily Jacir i Susan Bucks-Morss komentiraju poznati Benjaminov "naslov" za Kleeovu sliku *Angelus Novus* (1920.) i primjećuju da

prolazna prisutnost materijalnog svijeta i ljudske sreće ostavlja za sobom metafizičku nesigurnost koja afirmira prolaznost jer nam se

samo kroz nju ukazuje istina. Njegova je slika osjetljiva na vrijeme. (2011: 34)

Isto se možda može reći i za koreografsko djelo, nepostojanu prirodu "prolaznog" pokreta. Ples, prolaznost tijela koje se kreće i hoda ostavljaju slabi trag svoje prisutnosti. Stvaraju svoje slike (ono što preživljava/preostaje/preobražava) "u pokretu, prolazno". Slika – "zadržana" ili rezidualna slika koja se proizvodi s publikom i za nju definirana je zaboravom kojim se, s vremenom, "višak" odbacuje ili pak zadržava. Sjećamo se samo ključne slike bez okolnih pojedinosti. Djelo se postupno rastvara u svoje zadržane slike – primjerice, ritam hoda unatrag, otkrivanje pokrivača.

Pokret tijela koje pokazuje, zapisuje, slika ili prinosi žrtvu svojom sposobnošću okretanja dočarava tropičku radnju koja priziva i sjećanje i zaborav (vraća aspekte koji su izgubljeni, zaboravljeni, odbačeni, zanemareni) i na trenutak vraća u život (u Benjaminovu smislu konstelacije koja oblikuje sliku) uvjete koji sadrže sliku. To "mjesto" ili marker okretanja ili vraćanja operira kao temeljni princip u Olsonovoј projektivnoj poetici u kojoj *topos* (mjesto) / *typos* (otisak) / *tropos* (radnja) čine pokret i dinamiku fizičkog procesa iz kojeg slika proizlazi. U ranoj projektivnoj pjesmi *ABCs* (2) (1949.) оформљује se slika dinamike između mjesta i njegova prepoznavanja –

one sd:

of rhythm is image
of image is knowing
of knowing there is
a construct

Ta dinamika konstituira tehnologiju "toposa", kao sustava "mjesta" u kazalištu sjećanja, u kojemu slika kontinuirano djeluje dvosmjerno: natrag prema ritmu/uzroku i naprijed prema znanju/spoznaji, mjestu "invencije" koje se u običajnoj tradiciji povezuje sa "kretanjem po polju", lociranjem slika i ideja te pronalaskom njihovih živih poveznica; djelovanje "kompozicije prema polju", kao što Olson predlaže, u kojoj je forma tek produžetak sadržaja: slike razmještene tako da se "ništa ne događa osim samog mjesta".

To dinamično polje podsjeća na Benjaminovu "Denkbild" ili "mentalnu sliku" koja "izvodi misao putem slike koja je prigušeno i tiho završila" (Rokem, 2010: 172). Primjer istoga jest njegov naslov za Kleeovu sliku na kojoj rajska oluja otpuhne bespomoćnog Andžela povijesti natrag u budućnost, pri čemu se neprestano redefinira mjesto iz kojeg pokret proizlazi dok se Andžeo "sprema odmaknuti od onoga u što gleda". Koreografija nam, s druge strane, nudi drugačiji oblik "mentalne slike" – u ovom slučaju možda "Bewegungsbild" ili "Tanzbild" – odnosno pokret u obliku "koreografske slike". Olson u *Syllabary for a Dancer* (1952.) napominje da je "(p)les i objekt i akcija". Istovremeno objekt i akcija⁰⁴, preklapanje dvosmjernog pokreta misli i tijela koji proizvode osjetilnu ili reprezentacijsku "koreografsku sliku".

Naknadni efekti

Drugi pristup onome što preostaje jest putem "naknadnih efekata". U ovom slučaju zadržana slika tijela (onoga što preostaje) rastvara se i postaje vidljiva u obliku "koreografske slike, kako je provizorno nazivam"; no ne u trenutku njezine proizvodnje, već nakon prolaska vremena koje konstituira zaborav.

Gregory Ulmer u raspravi o "Akcijama" Josepha Beuysa primjećuje da Beuysovi objekti "proizvode referencijalni učinak, iako ni na što ne referiraju". Drugim riječima, referencijalnost omogućuje primatelj koji je u odnosu na podražaj, sam proizvodi iz sebe". (Ulmer, 1985: 251) Težište djela premješta se s pitanja "tko govori" na pitanje "tko prima" – odnosno, na sposobnost primatelja ili gledatelja da čita djelo kao sliku – u ovom slučaju sliku tijela koja hodaju unatrag. Ulmer primjećuje da su Beuysovi objekti-akcije

zamišljeni da djeluju putem naknadnog efekta, radeći tako s "vremenom razumijevanja" [...] [M]orate iskusiti Beuysova djela nakon dostatnog vremenskog odmaka, oblikovanog sjećanjem" (1985: 252)

Predlažem da se ideja "naknadnog efekta" upotrijebi i za razumijevanje i obrazloženje koreografske slike – osobito kad se proizvodi bez referenta – kinetikom samog tijela. Ulmer tvrdi da su Beuysovi objekti

istovremeno ono što jesu (njihove osobine motiviraju koncept koji im se pridaje) i stimulacija generalnog procesa sjećanja i imaginacije. Na primarnoj razini, objekt ne prenosi "poruku" već pokreće gledatelja – ostavši otvoren u svojoj referencijalnosti, objekt priziva asocijativna sjećanja motivirana ne osobinama objekta već primateljem: tema djela poput *Fat Corner* [...] nije imanentna materijalu i nije joj moguće pristupiti interpretativnim sredstvima već prizivanjem asocijativnog sjećanja gledatelja. (1985: 251)

To asocijativno sjećanje (na razini angažmana pojedinca sa procesom slike) vezano je uz učinak zaborava, povratak koreografskih slika koje djelo poput *Yes. No. A bit. Not Really.* proizvodi, naknadni efekt koji djeluje uz pomoć "vremena razumijevanja" koje je definirano kao "dostatna" distanca. Prisjećanje u Benjaminovu smislu označuje ne samo evokaciju trenutaka iz prošlosti već i njihovu transformaciju. "Modificirajući" učinak prisjećanja jest instrument retroaktivnog učinka sadašnjosti na prošlost; zahvaljujući prisjećanju povjesno vrijeme više ne izgleda nepovratno". (Mosés, 2009: 121) Ono podsjeća na Olsonovu prostornu sliku povijesti kao polja a ne kronologije.

Možda je moguće i sam protok vremena zamisliti kao "slijepu pjegu"; vrijeme potrebno za zaborav sporednih pojedinosti slike i "upamćivanje" – doslovno sastavljanje slike kao konstelacije "sadašnjosti" i asocijacija okupljenih oko same slike – ili za oblikovanje slike nakon "dostatnog vremena". "Vrijeme" se ne smatra ritmom već sastavnicom mehanizma koji je, prema Olsonovoj projektivnoj poetici, nužan za pretvaranje slike u saznanje i zatim konstrukt. Ne radi se o brzini komodifikacije – instantnoj referencijalnoj ili ugađajućoj kvaliteti slike – već naknadnom učinku koji nas ujedno dirne i uznemiruje. Pisac Peter Handke je u odnosu na Beuysov rad primjetio da "naknadni efekt transformiranih objekata koji nadopunjavaju polje asocijacija [koje gledatelj unosi u djelo] ostavlja veoma snažan dojam" (citirano u Ulmer, 1985: 252). "Intenzitet" slike jest njezina sposobnost da za pojedinca te naknadne efekte održava u napetosti.

Također je zanimljivo promotriti Beuysovo shvaćanje "akcije" prema kojem je akcija "samo još jedna riječ za prirodu pokreta [...] Upisao sam karakter akcije u svoj rad: kako bih pronašao početke pokreta u svijetu" (Ulmer, 1985: 255); gdje počinje pokret; kako sam pokret oblikuje naše odnose s kontekstom koji određujemo i koji određuje nas. Pokret zapisa i zapis

pokreta razotkrivenog unutar koreografske slike povezuje materijal i misao ne demonstracijom već utjelovljenjem ideje. Beuysovi "objekti-akcije" u obliku dvostrukog zapisa paralelni su s koreografskim slikama Yes. No. A bit. Not Really. na temelju dvostrukog zapisa tijela koje propituje materijale hoda i njegova izmještanja u svrhu razotkrivanja "vlastitih" osobina.

Čarobne radnje

Naposljetu možemo napomenuti i kako koreografskom tijelu i nereferencijalnim slikama koje stvara možemo pristupiti kao čarobnim radnjama ili ih i same promatrati kao čarobne radnje: radnje koja se uvijek pokreću iznova i ostaju nedovršene (kao i samo tijelo) jer uvijek nadilaze granice reprezentacije.

Kao što sam pokušao dokazati, tijelo u izvedbi može se i iz Beuysove i Olsonove perspektive promatrati kao "objekt-akcija". U *The General Theory of Magic* antropolog Marcel Mauss (1902) tvrdi da je "čarolija i izvođenje radnje i mišljenje".⁶⁵ Praktično djelovanje čarolije jest paralela, protuteža i korespondencija poetici – činu stvaranja – koji je od osobitog interesa u svakoj diskusiji o stvaranju suvremene izvedbene prakse. Analiza čarobnih praksi koju nudi Carolyn Nakamura sredstvo je uz pomoć kojeg se koreografska slika te Beuysovo shvaćanje pokretnog nereferencijalnog tijela kao "objekt-akcije" mogu promatrati iz druge perspektive (Nakamura, 2005). Podsjeća donekle i na Irit Rogoff i njezin koncept "odvraćanja pogleda" koje ona shvaća radikalnim sredstvom gledanja: utoliko što se koreografska slika udaljuje od normativnih percepcija tijela kao reprezentacije kojom se na što ukazuje ili pak zamjenjuje.⁶⁶

U raspravi o čarobnom u odnosu na predmete koji pružaju zaštitu – predmete koji imaju moći odvraćanja zlih utjecaja ili nesreće (od grčkog – "okrenuti se, okrenuti se od nekoga/nečega") – Nakamura tvrdi da konvencionalne arheološke interpretacije orientirane na objašnjenje i smisao "ne dohvaćaju najsnažnije aspekte drevne magije, upravo ono što magiju čini magičnom" (2005: 21). Njezin pristup, barem prema mojem mišljenju, ima poveznice s izvedbom koja (namjerno ili ne) stoji izvan ili na marginama normativnih percepcija tijela u pokretu – "koreografskom slikom" kakvu opisujem u ovom radu – u nereferencijalnim aspektima tijela u pokretu tijekom izvedbi, poput onih koje nudi Yes. No. A bit. Not Really. Nakamura primjećuje da je u takvim okolnostima

[p]otrebno prizvati čaroliju uperenu izravno u smisao i tvar te uronjenu u sjenovite procese materijalizirajućeg iskustva, uvjerenja i vrijednosti"
[...] Potrebno je uzeti u obzir logiku a ne estetiku čarolije kojom se ostvaruje smisao (Gosden, 2001). Time se aktivira radikalna materijalnost koja ne samo da određuje zajedničku konstituciju subjekata i objekata, već i stvara uvjete za takve diskurzivne prakse." (2005: 21)

Ako razmišljamo o koreografskim slikama unutar okvira koje sam pokušao izložiti, "njihova privlačnost leži u nemogućnosti njihova dovršenja, potpunog ili savršenog otkrivanja; ljudski odnosi uvijek je pokreću i daju joj poticaj". (2005: 23) Na taj način koreografska slika uvijek "nadilazi vlastiti opis" i razotkriva "ekstra-semantičku funkciju čarobnog objekta". Nakamura upućuje na srodnost čarolije, umjetnosti i sjećanja:

65 Citirano u Nakamura, 2006: 21.

66 Vidi Irit Rogoff, 2005: 117-134.

Na taj način, čarobni objekt ne samo da reprezentira. On prezentira. Ta prezentacija, koja ne reprezentira ili izmišlja već dohvaća (Deleuze 2003:48), priziva silu koja nadilazi ukupnost složenih odnosa i ideja koji je proizvode” [...] Transakcije između čovjeka i stvari slijede ekonomiju sadašnjosti u smislu da ne teže pomirenju suprotnosti već očuvanju razdvojenosti.” (2005: 23-4)

Da zaključim, “koreografska slika” koja proizlazi iz kinetike samog tijela (ili je unutar nje sadržana) – čin kretanja bez referenta – nosi sa sobom punoču (ali ne i dovršenost) prisutnosti tijela. Ne “što” već “kako”. Ako vrijedi Bahtinova izjava da “biti znači komunicirati” te da tijek takve razmjene podrazumijeva osjetilnu intimnost vanjskog svijeta i nas samih, tada “biti znači biti za drugog i kroz druge za nas same”.

“[Č]uđenje je ključno načinu razumijevanja koji “dohvaća ono što u nama i drugima prethodi razumu i nadilazi razum”. (Pettigrew 1999:66)
 Tjelesni osjet u ovom je slučaju ključan jer poznaje više od onog što izražavaju riječi. Čarobni “trik” leži u dohvaćanju nepoznatog dezorganizacijom svih osjeta; kao rezultat, deregulira odnose koje rigorozno reguliraju normativni kulturni oblici. Estetsko iskustvo magije teži ponovnom uspostavljanju povezanosti između ljudi, stvari i mjesta u njihovu neodvojivom jedinstvu, jedinstvu koje biva prikriveno “uobičajenim načinima percepcije”. (Harrison 1993: 180). Čarolija tako teži perceptivnim pokretima koji neprestano oblikuju smisao umjesto da mu teže. (2005: 25-26)

Ono što smatramo kontinuitetom (polazeći od Benjaminove ideje o umrtvjujućem kontinuitetu povijesti koja se opire transformaciji) kontinuirano prekida čin zaborava – taj trenutni ili postupni gubitak koji stvara ključni lom za ponovo stvaranje svijeta i proizvodnju “utopije u srcu sadašnjosti”.

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Walking Backwards:

Choreographic Images, Forgetting and the Utopia of the Present*

Ric Allsopp

Introduction

In an attempt to engage with the poetics, mechanisms and technologies of forgetting within performance, and how they help us to understand the event and reception of performance, I want to bring together some ideas that might allow us to rethink what is at stake in the event of performance itself – especially where that event is produced primarily through bodily means in forms of choreography or dance. I want to discuss ‘choreographic images’ not in a normative sense as the systematic and coherent patterning of movement phrases in a time-based aesthetic object of performance; but as an integral and inseparable relationship between movement and inscription – between what disappears or is forgotten, and what remains, and how each of these terms modifies the other: the forgotten forming, as it were, the negative space of what remains; the choreographic image as an emotional rather than representational dynamic.

This paper assumes that mechanisms of forgetting are integral to a choreographic conception of the relation between movement and memory, and of performance as a means of embodying images and experiencing the play of recollection and forgetting that constitute our experience of the art work. It considers Walter Benjamin’s anticipation of ‘a utopia in the heart of present’ and his conception of the materiality of history, as a means of engaging with aspects of contemporary performance practice and its relation to the choreographies of physical and affective blind spots.⁰¹

The physical blind-spot that extends behind our backs is an area both forgotten and confronted (paradoxically) through actions of walking backwards. Walking backwards is both a metaphorical and literal engagement with the endless space behind our backs and the necessity of

* This paper was first given at PSH7 ‘Camillo 2.0’ as part of a panel on ‘technologies of forgetting’ in Utrecht (May 2011); and subsequently as a illustrated lecture for MA SODA at HZT, University of the Arts Berlin in July 2011.

01 See Walter Benjamin, 1940 / 1999; Stéphane Mosés, 2009: 108; Freddie Rokem, 2010: 141-176

forgetting as a means of shaping and reshaping our perspective on the world. The body is a moving proprioceptive technology that is continually altering our perception of, and our engagement with, the world and as such is an embodiment of a continually transforming relation between technology, memory and experience.

The paper makes some tentative connections between Benjamin's perception that 'image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation' (*Passagenwerk*); the poet Charles Olson's idea of image as that which turns in the caesura or gap between rhythm and knowing, between place and action, between meaning and matter; Joseph Beuys' 'actions' as transformations of material and thought; and Carolyn Nakamura's analysis of magical operations and their kinship to art and memory.^{o2}

Yes. No. A bit. Not Really.

I would like to suggest a reading of a recent choreographic work *Yes. No. A bit. Not Really* (2010) by the musician Boris Hauf, the film-maker Lucy Cash and choreographer Christina Ciupke, that was shown at Sophiensaele in Berlin last October (2010). On seeing the work in performance, I was intrigued by the way that Walter Benjamin's idea that 'each now is the time of a particular recognizability' or moment of recognition (Rokem, 1999: 144), was visible in the work in parallel with the idea that the image of the present moment is also both a form of forgetting and reconstructing: that we walk, or 'face', backwards and forwards at the same time, that we do not simply evoke the past but transform it as it in turn transforms us, and that such potential transformations (and their actual and affective consequences) operate not only at the level of the art work (aesthetics), but also at the level of the everyday. The relationship between the formal aesthetic aspects of the work and the everyday movements that it both invokes and utilises also suggests a feeling, on the one hand, of endless flows of movement that produce an emotional and almost tangible sense of space; and, on the other, a perception of formal and legible rhythmic shapes that frame and contain the work.

Yes. No. A bit. Not Really. (2010) is described as 'a collaborative composition that proposes connections between rhythm, image, sound and movement in an intimate setting for a small audience'; and its title perhaps already suggests some everyday answers to forgotten questions. The programme notes instruct the reader on the art of choosing a seat:

To choose your seat we invite you to view the polaroids in the foyer. Each photograph has a number below, which is the number of a seat. Please select a number from below a photograph that draws your attention and find the corresponding seat number amongst the chairs in the Hochzeitssaal.

I walk up to the foyer on the first floor and see approximately 50 polaroids of the urban everyday displayed on the wall. I choose number 320 – a polaroid shot across a table top with a lamp, a sign saying 'silence' and an indistinct figure seated on the other side of the table. I forget now why I was attracted to this particular image. The polaroid images signify, as much through shape and texture as through their contents, the immediacy of the everyday. They give an additional sense of a displacement between 'here and now' and a

^{o2} See Walter Benjamin, 1999: N3.1, pp. 462–463 quoted in Rokem, 2010: 144–145; Charles Olson, 1970; Gregory Ulmer, 1985: 225–264; Nakamura, 2006: 18–45.

closely parallel 'here and now' that is taken into the performance and that informs or disturbs the seated spectator. We are called up stairs to the Hochzeitssaal where we find a more or less square space (about 10 x 10 meters) bordered by chairs (each numbered) with an entrance at each corner. The floor is yellow. What follows now is what I remember of the performance itself, an act of remembering through writing that incorporates associations, anticipations, and always already a process of forgetting.

Three performers walk backwards slowly around the outside of the perimeter/ audience. Three performers lying on floor – the transitions from walking to crawling to lying. A rectangular blanket. A pair of trainers – individually placed under the corner of the blanket. Walking backwards around outer and inner perimeters of the space. Some diagonals. Looking backwards. Looking upwards, looking sideways – occasionally looking at each other. Enigmatic smiles. Who are these figures? There is nothing hesitant here. Only smooth transitions in direction – forwards and backwards; backwards and forwards; from the vertical to the horizontal; from the horizontal to the vertical. The rhythms of walking in silent movement. The formal construction of a memory theatre – but without content? The polaroids on the wall vaguely remembered. All three performers lying on the floor on their sides – sleeping, then turning; sleeping then turning. Under the blanket, pulling the blanket, folding the blanket. A repeating harmonic sequence – meditative and soporific – itself a memory. The movement is linear and angular. There are few curves except when lying on the floor. Looking across at the audience. Moments of recognition transform (like the sound score) into the feeling that nothing is there, the figures inhabit a different space-time, different historical moments. The 'utopia of the present' – a moment of 'crossing' from here to there, a chiasmus, a constant moving into context.

Heidegger understood technology as an act of revealing (1993: 307-342). What is it that the technology of forgetting that unfolds through this performance, that the three moving bodies reveal and how? What is it that remains? Perhaps what remains is precisely the movement of emotion itself, the constant, small-scale fluctuations of remembering and forgetting, that map the movements and revelations of our everyday experience. I would like to locate the remembered fragments of this performance – those fragments that have remained through the process of forgetting that I have just evoked or yet again re-assembled, in a number of ways: through what remains as two resolved images – walking backwards, and the blanket – that emerge in relation to the moving body, in other words as choreographic images; and to discuss in a number of ways how these two images 'remain' through the processes of forgetting.

The first image then is 'walking backwards', reversal and retrograde movement as a formal compositional strategy and as a means of displacing and disrupting attention and expectation. It is a considered movement; a movement that resists turning. Yet to move or walk backwards is not a pedestrian or everyday movement. It 'excludes' the turn, the rotation around an axis, the frontality that predominates in our everyday movement. It is more or less exclusively a sacred, ritual or aesthetic move.

The second image is the blanket as a portable, foldable, enfolding space; as warmth, as heat, as security, as boundary and cover, as a point from which movement is both initiated and terminates with its myriad associations. As a textured ground that interacts and modifies the planar space marked by a boundary of seated spectators, or backward moving walkers.

Both images involve and enfold moving bodies as themselves a double-inscription of action and object; bodies that relate and entangle action and object, transforming and being transformed through the blanket as a portable space, a moving boundary; through walking backwards into the blind spot. How does what remains persist?

Images

Walter Benjamin observed that '[h]istory breaks down into images, not into stories'.⁰³ In 'The Gift of the Past', Emily Jacir & Susan Bucks-Morss observe, in relation to Walter Benjamin's famous 'caption' for Klee's painting *Angelus Novus* (1920), that

the passing presence of the material world and of human happiness in it leaves us with the metaphysical necessity of affirming transitoriness because only in passing is the truth available to us. Its image is time-sensitive. (2011: 34)

The same case can perhaps be made for choreographic work, for the transitory nature of movement 'in passing'. The dance, the moving, stepping body in passing may leave little trace of its presence. It creates its images (that which persists/ remains/ transforms) 'in movement, in passing'. Its image – the 'holding' or residual image that is produced for, with, by the spectator becomes more defined through the process of forgetting as over time it sheds its excess, or perhaps leaves only its 'excess'. We remember only the essential image and not the surrounding details. Gradually the work resolves into its holding images – for instance the rhythm of walking backwards, the unfolding of the blanket.

The movement of the body that gestures, inscribes, or paints, or sacrifices invokes through its ability to turn: the tropic action that invokes both memory and forgetting (returning those aspects that have been lost, forgotten, shed, disregarded) and brings to life for an instant of recognition (in Benjamin's sense of the constellation that forms the image) the conditions that hold the image. This 'place' or marker of turning or returning operates too as a basic principle in Olson's projective poetics where *topos* (place) / *typos* (registration) / *tropos* (action) form the movement and dynamic of a physical process from which image moves outwards. In his early positional poem *ABCs* (2) (1949) image is formed of a dynamic between place and its recognition –

one sd:

of rhythm is image
of image is knowing
of knowing there is
a construct

This dynamic constitutes the technology of the 'topos', as a 'place' system in a memory theatre, where image works continually in two directions: back to rhythm/ causation and forward to knowing/ recognition, a place of 'invention' which in the commonplace tradition was associated with 'movement about a field', locating images and ideas and finding their living connections; the work, as Olson proposed, of 'composition by field' in which

⁰³ Quoted in Jacir & Bucks-Morss, 2011: 26

form was never more than an extension of content: a disposition of images where ‘nothing takes place but the place itself’.

This dynamic field has a resonance with Benjamin’s ‘Denkbild’ or ‘thought-image’ that ‘performs a thought through an image that has come to a muted, silenced standstill’ (Rokem, 2010: 172). This is exemplified in his caption for Klee’s painting in which the Angel of History is irresistibly blown backwards into the future by a storm from paradise, constantly redefining that place from which movement proceeds as he ‘seems about to move away from something he stares at.’ Choreography, rather, leaves us with another mode of ‘thought-image’ – perhaps here a ‘Bewegungsbild’ or ‘Tanzbild’ – that is in movement as ‘choreographic image’. Olson suggests as much in *Syllabary for a Dancer* (1952) where ‘[d]ance is an object and an action. It is simultaneously an object and an action’^{o4} it is the intertwining of the bi-directional movements of thought and of body that produce a ‘choreographic image’ whether that is sensuous or representational.

After-effects

The second way of considering what remains is as ‘after-effect’. Here the idea is that the holding image of the body (that which remains) resolves itself and becomes perceptible as what I am tentatively calling the ‘choreographic image’; yet not at the moment of its production, but through the passage of time that constitutes a process of forgetting.

In his discussion of Joseph Beuys’ ‘Actions’ Gregory Ulmer notes that in Beuys’ case, the objects that he uses ‘produce the effect of reference, but without referring to anything. Or rather, the reference is now supplied by the recipient, who in response to the stimulus, produces it out of himself’. (Ulmer, 1985: 251) The attention of the work shifts from the question of ‘who speaks’ to the issue of ‘who receives’ – that is, how we as participants or spectators are able to read the work as image – in this case bodies walking backwards; the displacement of a blanket. Ulmer notes that Beuys’ object-actions are

expressly intended to function by means of an after-effect, working thus directly with ‘the time of understanding’ [...] [O]ne has to experience Beuys’ works from the proper distance in time, as integrated by the operation of memory’ (1985: 252)

I am suggesting here that this idea of the ‘after-effect’ can also be used to understand or account for the choreographic image – especially where this is produced without reference – through the kinetic of the body itself. Ulmer affirms that Beuys’ objects are

both what they are (their qualities motivate the concept attached to them) and stimulation for the general processes of memory and imagination. At the primary level, the object does not ‘transfer a message’ but moves the spectator – remaining open in its reference, the object evokes associated memories that are motivated less by the qualities of the object than by the subject of reception: the theme of a work like *Fat Corner* [...] is not immanent in the material and is not accessible by means of interpretation but only through its appeal to the observer’s associative memory. (1985: 251)

This associative memory (at the level of individual engagement with the process of the image) is linked to the effect of forgetting, the return of the choreographic images that a work such as *Yes. No. A Bit. Not Really* produces, the after-effect working with the ‘time of understanding’ defined as a ‘sufficient’ distance. We can note also that remembrance in Benjamin’s terms aims not simply to evoke a moment from the past, but aims to transform it. The ‘modifying’ effect of remembrance – ‘it is the instrument of the retroactive effect of the present on the past; because of it historical time no longer appears irreversible’ (Mosés, 2009: 121) This echoes Olson’s spatial image of history as a field rather than as a chronology.

Perhaps also we can imagine here the passing of time as itself a ‘blind spot’; the time it takes to forget the non-essential details of the image and to ‘re-member’ – literally to piece together the image as a constellation of ‘now’ and the associations gathered around the image itself – or for the image to form itself over ‘sufficient time’. ‘Time’ here considered not as rhythm but as a part of the necessary mechanism that Olson’s projective poetics suggest of how image leads to knowing and from thence to a construct. This is not the speed of commodification – the instant referential or gratifying image – but the after-effect of something that both moves us and disturbs us. The writer Peter Handke experienced in relation to Beuys’ work that ‘[w]hat hits home is the after-effect of the transformed objects which complete the field of association [that the spectator brings to the work]’ (quoted in Ulmer, 1985: 252). The ‘intensity’ of image is then its capacity to hold for the individual these after-effects in tension.

It is also interesting to note Beuys’ own view of ‘action’ as consisting ‘in and for itself another word for the nature of movement [...] I ground the action character in my work: to find the beginning of movement in the world’ (Ulmer, 1985: 255); where does movement begin; how does movement itself shape our relations to the contexts that we define and which define us. The movement of inscription and the inscription of movement that is revealed inside the choreographic image joins together material and thought in ways that do not demonstrate ideas, but embody ideas. Beuys’ ‘object-action’ as a double inscription is paralleled in the choreographic images of *Yes. No. A Bit. Not Really* through the double inscription of the body which interrogates in turn the materials of walking and its displacements in order to discover their ‘own’ properties.

Magical Operations

Finally we can consider that the choreographic body and the non-referential images that it creates might be considered as or in terms of a magical operation: an operation that is set in motion and that (like the body itself) is never complete in so far as it always exceeds the limits of its own representations.

As I have tried to suggest, the body in performance can be considered in both Beuys’ and Olson’s sense as an object-action. In *The General Theory of Magic* the anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1902) affirmed that ‘magic is as much a way of doing as a way of thinking’.⁰⁵ The practical operations of magic provide a parallel, counterpoint and correspondence to poetics – the act of making – that is perhaps of particular interest to any discussion of how contemporary performance practice may be factured. Carolyn Nakamura’s analysis of magical operations provides a means of considering

05 Quoted in Nakamura, 2006: 21.

from another position the choreographic image, and the Beuysian sense of the moving non-referential body as an 'object-action' (Nakamura, 2005). It also has some resonance with Irit Rogoff's notion of 'looking away' as a radical means of spectatorship: in so far as the choreographic image constitutes a turning away from normative perceptions of the body as a representation that points elsewhere, or that stands in for something else.⁰⁶

In her discussion of magical sense in relation to apotropaic objects – objects having the power to avert evil influences or bad luck (from Greek 'to turn away or from') – Nakamura argues that conventional interpretations in archeology that are oriented towards explanation and meaning, 'fail to get at the most compelling aspects of ancient magic, exactly that which makes it magical' (2005: 21). Her approach has, in my view at least, a resonance for performance work that (intentionally or otherwise) stands outside of, or on the margins of normative perceptions of the body in movement – the 'choreographic image' as I figure it here – to the non-referential aspects of the moving body in performance, such as the work offered in *Yes. No. A Bit. Not Really*. Nakamura notes that, in such circumstances

[w]hat is required is an evocation of magic that aims directly at the caesura between meaning and matter and delves into the shadowy processes of materializing experience, belief and value' [...] We should consider then, not a logic but an aesthetics of magical practice, as a particular way of making sense (Gosden, 2001). And this way of doing engages a radical materiality that not only enacts the mutual constitution of subjects and objects, but provides the condition for such discursive practices.' (2005: 21)

Thinking of choreographic images in the terms I have tried to set up here the 'allure of the thing lies in the way in which it can never be completed, never be fully or perfectly discovered; and it is always set in motion, propelled by human relations'. (2005: 23) In this way the choreographic image always 'exceeds its own narration' and reveals the 'extra-semantic function of the magical object'. Nakamura points to the kinship between the processes of magic, of art and of memory:

In this way, the magical object does not merely represent. It presents. This presentation, as not reproducing or inventing but a capturing (Deleuze 2003:48) conjures a force that exceeds the totality of the complex relations and ideas that produce it.' [...] These human-thing transactions trace an economy of the present in the sense that they do not seek a reconciliation of opposites, but rather a preserving of disjunction.' (2005: 23-4)

To conclude, the 'choreographic 'image' that emerges from (or that is held within) the kinetics of the body itself – the act of movement without reference – carries with it the fullness (but not the completion) of the presence of the body. Not 'what it is' but 'how it is'. If, as Mikhail Bakhtin asserted '[t]o be means to communicate' and that the movement of such an exchange presumes a sensuous intimacy between the outside world and ourselves, then 'to be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself.'

⁰⁶ See Irit Rogoff, 2005: 117-134.

'[W]onder is central to a mode of understanding that is 'capable of grasping what, in ourselves and in others precedes and exceeds reason'. (Pettigrew 1999:66) Bodily sense is key here, since it can know something more than words express. The 'trick' of magic then, lies in attaining the unknown by disorganising all the senses; in effect, it acts to deregulate relationships that are rigorously regulated by normative cultural forms. The aesthetic experience of magic seeks the recovery of correspondences between people, things and places in their undifferentiated unity, a unity that becomes obscured through "habitual modes of perception". (Harrison 1993: 180). In this way magic aims at the perceptual movements that continually render meaning rather than at meaning itself. (2005: 25-26)

What we see as a continuity (taking Benjamin's point about the deadening continuity of a history that resists transformation) is continually disrupted through the act of forgetting – that momentary or gradual loss that provides the decisive break that creates the world anew and produces a 'utopia in the heart of the present'.

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Dear ----,

A banal yet crucial discussion among four workers and a student in an ill-lit room must momentarily be enlarged to the dimensions of Communism and thus be both what it is and what it will have been as a moment in the local construction of the True. Through the enlargement of the symbol, it must become visible that 'just ideas' come from this practically invisible practice. The five-person meeting in an out-of-the-way suburb must be eternal in the very expression of its precariousness.*

Love,

* Alain Badiou, "The Idea of Communism," *The Idea of Communism* (2010).



Dear ----,

The deeper the revolution, the more completely the distinction between mine and yours disappears. The more perfect the love.


Love,

O sramotnoj povijesti amatera

Nicholas Ridout

S engleskoga prevela Marina Miladinov

Prvi dio: Atena



va pripovijest započinje u Ateni. To je Atena u kojoj je politička moć zemljoposjedničke aristokracije bila na zalasku nakon Periklove smrti 429. godine p. n. e. Međutim, teoretičari politike čija se misao temeljila na vrijednostima te zemljoposjedničke klase, i koja je te vrijednosti razradila, naposljetu su se izborili za to da njihova verzija događaja bude ona koja je doprila do nas s najsnažnijim odjekom.

To znači da je najpoznatiji prikaz tog trenutka atenske političke povijesti priča koju su ispričali filozofi aristokratskog podrijetla, odani tom društvenom sloju, priča u kojoj su demagozi demokracije bili ti čije su sebične i vulgarne političke makinacije dovele do propadanja veličine kakva je Atena dotada bila. Dakako, institucije klasičnog obrazovanja – od helenofilskog njemačkog prosvjetiteljstva do imperijalnih odgojnih temelja britanskog sustava javnog školstva – pozlatile su ljiljan tog dominantnog narativa. Trebalo je donekle razmrsiti ideološke struje u djelima pripovjedača – možemo ih nazvati filozofima ako želimo – Sokrata, Platona i Aristotela. Ali kao što su Ellen Meiksins Wood i Neal Wood pokazali u svojoj društvenopolitičkoj analizi aristokratske misli i djela tih autora, tu se ustvari radilo o društvenoj podjeli rada.⁰¹ Pitanje o tome tko bi trebao vladati svodilo se na odluke ili preferencije vezane uz odnos rada i moći, na razliku između amatera i profesionalaca.

Da pređemo na stvar: društvena, ekonomski i politička moć u atenskoj je demokraciji iskliznula iz ruku aristokracije i dospjela pod kontrolu profesionalnih klasa, a trgovci i obrtnici, koji su činili znatan dio gradskog stanovništva, počeli su donositi vlastite političke odluke. U pripovijesti koju nam prenose Sokrat, Platon i Aristotel u politiku su se mijesali jedino oni građani koji su bili dovoljno bogati te su imali za to dovoljno slobodnog vremena. Drugim riječima, politika je bila stvar dokonih amatera, a ne tog novog naraštaja pridošlih profesionalaca. Wood i Wood prate ustrajnost te klasne preferencije od Sokrata preko Platona do djela Platonova učenika Aristotela: "Stoga je znanje, koje je bilo tako temeljna vrlina prema krajnje

⁰¹ Ellen Meiksins Wood i Neal Wood, *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.).

intelektualističkom Sokratovu gledištu, bilo izvan domaćaja mnogih. Ako znanje koje je neophodno za vrlinu ovisi o dokolici i neprestanom istraživanju i samopreispitivanju, ono ostaje sasvim izvan domaćaja običnog čovjeka; i to ne samo zato što mu nedostaje slobodnog vremena, nego i u osnovnjem smislu, zato što je tijelom i duhom vezan za svijet materijalnih nužnosti potrebom da zarađuje za život, dok znanje podrazumijeva oslobođenost od svijeta pojavnosti i potreba.^{o2}

Taj prikaz vrline nalazi svoj puni politički izraz u Platonovim stanjima duše. Tako on u *Državi*, na primjer, predlaže da obrazovni program za Čuvare države bude rezerviran za one koji su "rješeni svih ostalih zanimanja... da čuvaju slobodu svoje države"^{o3} Kako primjećuju Wood i Wood, termin koji Platon ovdje koristi za "slobodu" je "eleutheria", koji ima dodatnu konotaciju "gospodstva".^{o4} Taj obrazovni program, dakle, ovisi o društvenoj podjeli rada, ali ne naprosto između različitih oblika rada (fizičkog naspram intelektualnog), nego između onih koji teško rade i onih koji su toga oslobođeni, odnosno onih koji se međusobno razlikuju u igri koja je najuže povezana s britanskim sustavom javnog školstva, a to je kriket, kao "Gospoda" i "Igrači". Wood i Wood ističu kako je stoga "teško izbjegći zaključak da je bitan preduvjet za postojanje vrle filozofske manjine bila osigurana egzistencija klase čiji život nije ovisio o fizičkom radu ili o trgovini, a koja je mogla zapovijedati radom drugih kako bi zadovoljila svoje potrebe i želje."^{o5} Aristotel nastavlja tu koncepciju odnosa klase i vlasti u svojoj *Politici*, gdje "u svome nepotpunom opisu idealnog polisa – koji podsjeća na Magneziju iz Platonovih *Zakona* – predlaže isključenje obrtnika, trgovaca, zemljoradnika i svih nadničara iz građanstva s objasnjnjem da je život u takvom zanimanju "neplemenit i suprotan kreposti".^{o6}

No ta je formulacija ponešto paradoksalna, budući da je ono što je amater ustvari imao za ponuditi, kao rezultat svoje slobode od zarađivanja za život kao profesionalac, ustvari bio profesionalizam. Budući da je imao vremena kao aristokratski gospodin, amater se mogao u potpunosti posvetiti političkom životu. Mogao je čitati, pisati, misliti i promišljati pitanja moralne i političke filozofije. Mogao je, ustvari, postati profesionalnim političarom. No sada se dogodilo to da su se i pravi amateri odlučili uključiti u politiku. Ljudi koji nisu imali vremena – a možda ni sklonosti, ali vrijeme je bilo od presudne važnosti – za izučavanje političke teorije sada su postali aktivnim građanima u demokraciji, a njihova stajališta i vrijednosti počela su dominirati politikom.^{o7} Stoga se sada politikom bave ljudi koji naprsto ne znaju što čine. U prethodnom razdoblju činjenica da ne znaju što čine ili o čemu govore sprečavala bi ih u tome da išta čine ili govore. Njihov strah od sramote imao bi moći da ograniči njihovu slobodu govora. U sadašnjoj situaciji oni se, međutim, pretvaraju da znaju.

Prema tome, postoje dvije vrste amatera. Jedni imaju vremena pa mogu naučiti kako postati profesionalnim političarima. Drugi moraju raditi te se stoga moraju pretvarati da su profesionalni političari. Postoji rizik, i to je možda ono čega se Platon najviše boji, da će te dvije vrste amatera postati nerazlučive i da će to dovesti do sustava vlasti u kojemu će moći biti u rukama onih koji su usavršili umijeće pretvaranja da se bave politikom. Do vladavine glumaca, takoreći. Martina Sheena ili Ronalda Reagana. O čemu se ustvari radilo, pitam se, u sveopćem preziru koji su mnogi visoko obrazovani krugovi gajili prema predsjedniku-glumcu? Je li odviše nategnuto pretpostaviti da tu vidimo tragove stare Platonove predrasude? Da se radilo o političaru čije zvanje ga je učinilo jedinstveno nekvalificiranim za vlast? I da je samim time što je bio glumac nužno morao zauvijek ostati amater u domeni političkoga?

^{o2} Wood i Wood, str. 105.

^{o3} Platon, *Država* 395 b-c. Hrv. prijevod: Platon, *Država*, prev. Martin Kuzmić (Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić, 2009.).

^{o4} Wood i Wood, str. 204, bilj. 31.

^{o5} Wood and Wood, p. 153.

^{o6} Aristotel, *Politika* 1328b, navod iz: Wood i Wood, str. 222. Hrv. prijevod: Aristotel, *Politika*, prev. Tomislav Ladan (Zagreb: Globus i Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1988.)

^{o7} Usp. Wood i Wood, str. 41-64, o širenju aktivnog građanstva.

Mislilac koji je preuzeo na sebe zadatku reorganiziranja našeg razumjevanja atenske demokracije za potrebe političke filozofije je Jacques Rancière, i stoga bih želio ukratko uvesti u raspravu njegovu inverziju Platonove pozicije o tome tko bi trebao vladati. Za Rancièrea su jedine osobe koje su doista kvalificirane za vladanje one koje nemaju za to nikakvih kvalifikacija. Izrazimo li to ponešto drugačijim riječima, jedina kvalifikacija za vladanje upravo je nedostatak kvalifikacije za vladanje. To je ono što on ponekad naziva "skandalom" demokracije.⁰⁸ Pa tko bi onda u tom skandaloznom i radikalnom scenariju mogao biti kvalificiran po svojoj nekvalificiranosti? Ili, da postavimo jednostavnije pitanje, tko bi doista mogao tvrditi kako nema baš nikakvih kvalifikacija za vladanje? To je razlog zbog kojega, pretpostavljam, Rancière raspravlja o ideji da bi se radikalna demokracija trebala zasnivati na sustavu lutrije. Ono što želi postići tim paradoksalnim manevrom jest otkriti postojanje onoga što ponekad naziva "ulogom onih koji nemaju nikakve uloge".⁰⁹ To bi bio onaj dio bilo kojeg političkog tijela, društva ili zajednice koji nema nikakvog udjela niti igra ikakvu ulogu u svojoj vladi. Jedna od glavnih značajki onih koji ne igraju nikakvu ulogu je ta da su oni naprosto nevidljivi i nečujni. Čak i ako ili kada nešto učine, to nitko ne primijeti. Posljedice njihova djelovanja pripisuju se nečemu ili nekomu drugom. To je rezultat onoga što Rancière naziva raspodjelom ili ponekad razdvajanjem osjetilnoga: to je sustav duboko usaćenih sposobnosti da vidimo, čujemo i osjećamo koje neke stvari ili ljudi čine dostupnima našem razumu i osjećajima, dok druge nasilno i nužno isključuje. To je razlog zbog kojega, kako ja smatram, a ne znam smatra li tako i Rancière, proletarijat više ne može igrati ulogu onih koji ne igraju nikakvu ulogu. Činjenica da ih se tako može imenovati i prepoznati kao subjekte povijesti i aktere u revolucionarnoj promjerni momentalno ih diskvalificira, takoreći, od toga da igraju ulogu onih koji ne igraju nikakvu ulogu. Oni već imaju svoju ulogu.

Postoje amateri, koji jedini imaju dovoljno slobodnog vremena da postanu profesionalnim političarima. Postoje profesionalci, čije je vrijeme zauzeto radom te nemaju slobodnog vremena koje bi im trebalo za natjecanje s amaterima, stoga se moraju pretvarati da znaju što čine i o čemu govore, kao što to čine glumci. Ti profesionalci stoga postaju nekom vrstom amaterskih političara. No možda postoji i treća skupina ljudi, koji su skriveni negdje među drugima i koji će dospjeti na vlast samo ako ih nasumično izaberu, jer to je jedino po čemu odgovaraju radikalnoj demokratskoj pretpostavci da ne bi trebali vladati na osnovi toga što posjeduju bilo kakve kvalifikacije. Mogli bismo reći da se u Ateni najvažniji dio onih koji nisu igrali nikakvu ulogu vjerojatno sastojao od znatne skupine ne-građana: robova. Oni nisu igrali nikakvu ulogu u javnom životu grada, budući da su bili ograničeni na sferu rada. A budući da nisu sudjelovali u politici, Platon se nije protivio tome da vrše čitav niz mimetičkih funkcija – da se bave glazbom ili kazališnom izvedbom – koje je smatrao štetnima po moralni karakter svakoga tko je, kao građanin, bio određen za sudjelovanje u vladavini gradom-državom. Stoga bismo mogli reći da na tom stupnju rob počinje izgledati ne samo kao kandidat za igranje uloge onih koji ne igraju nikakvu ulogu (time što ne igra nikakvu ulogu u političkom životu), nego također kao igrac čija ga diskvalificiranost upravo kvalificira za igranje uloge, u svojstvu glumca, drugih koji pripadaju onima koji igraju neku ulogu – oni su likovi na pozornici koji predstavljaju građanima likove kojima su pridruženi kako bi formulirali njihove moralne i političke sudove: protagonisti komedije i tragedije. Barem bismo mogli reći da glumac, prema tjeskobnom Platonovu pogledu na odnos kazališta i politike, zauzima položaj strukturalne sličnosti s položajem roba,

⁰⁸ Vidi, na primjer: Jacques Rancière, *Hated of Democracy*, prev. Steve Corcoran (London i New York: Verso, 2006.).

⁰⁹ Rancière opsežno raspravlja o tom konceptu u svojim političkim i estetskim djelima, na primjer u: *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, prev. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.) i *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*, prev. Gabriel Rockhill (London: Continuum, 2004.).

položaj u kojem su obojica sposobni obavljati prljavi posao koji dopušta profesionalnim amaterima aristokracije da se dalje bave svojom politikom. Rad robova je, dakako, preduvjet za ne-rad politike.

Drugi dio: Mansfield Park

Robovi ne igraju nikakvu ulogu u romanu *Mansfield Park* Jane Austen.¹⁰ Oni su naglašeno odsutni, ali strukturalno nužni. U međuvremenu je uloga koju ne igraju preduvjet, kako se čini, za igranje uloga koje su pridružene dokonim mladim aristokratima čiji životi i ljubavi sačinjavaju temu romana. Poznato je da je Edward Said primijetio kako ekonomija Mansfield Parka, engleskog seoskog imanja gdje se događa veći dio radnje, ovisi o prihodima s plantaža šećerne trske u Antigui, gdje se radna snaga sastoji od robova.¹¹ Štoviše, upravo dok se glava domaćinstva, gospodin Bertram, bavi ondje svojim poslovnim interesima, njegova djeca i njihovi prijatelji odluče se zabaviti tako što će uprizoriti predstavu. Saidova argumentacija uglavnom se tiče relativne šutnje romana po pitanju ropstva, koja se očituje u obilju detalja kojima se artikulira jedan projekt "kućanskog boljštika" – onaj koji se odvija u Mansfield Parku – u usporedbi sa šturošću opisa prividno paralelnog projekta ponovne uspostave reda u Antigui. Iako Said povezuje te restauracije u svojoj analizi načina na koji se gospodin Bertram neočekivano brzo vrti u Mansfield Park i time uzrokuje nagli prekid amaterske produkcije Kotzebueovih *Ljubavnih zavjeta* u verziji Elizabeth Inchbald, on ne razrađuje vezu koju ovdje želim istaknuti, naime onu između amaterskih glumaca i robova koji su predmet tih povezanih restauracija. Kazalište se raspušta zato što su njegovi glumci prisiljeni, pod pritiskom moralnog autoriteta zemljoposjedničke aristokracije (u kojoj se pretpostavlja da sudjeluju), priznati da njihova gluma ugrožava njihovu sposobnost da budu ta aristokracija, prijeteći da će ih svesti na onu vrstu ljudi koja nema kontrole nad vlastitim mislima i osjećajima. Činjenica da je taj prekid uzrokovan povratkom robovlasnika na scenu djeluje kao poziv na promišljanje o glumcima i robovima kao komplementarnim likovima u ulozi onih koji ne igraju nikakvu ulogu: robovi na plantaži strukturalni su preduvjet za amatersku glumu koja mlade aristokrate pretvara u robe vlastitih osjećaja neprikladne seksualne žudnje jednih prema drugima. Čini se kao da je pokušaj izvedbe *Ljubavnih zavjeta* u Mansfield Parku dopustio da na pozornicu imanja stupi upravo ono ropstvo o kojemu roman inače tako poznato i napadno šuti.

Roman Jane Austen objavljen je u vrijeme kada je pokret za ukidanje ropstva bio već u punom jeku u Britanskom Carstvu. David Brion Davies je u opsežnom povijesnom istraživanju abolicionističkog pokreta prepoznao, uz iskreno moralno i vjersko protivljenje ropstvu, duboku strukturalnu kompatibilnost abolicionizma i logike industrijskog kapitalizma.¹² Kako je objasnio Marx, rad u industrijskom kapitalizmu treba biti "slobodan": radnika/ radnicu treba osloboditi obveza u kojemu njegovo ili njezino vrijeme već prisvaja, na primjer, neki feudalni gospodar, kako bi bio/bila na raspolaganju i također pod obvezom da svoj rad plasira na tržištu.¹³ Kako bi funkcionirao ekonomski sustav zasnovan na nadničarskom radu slobodnih radnika, nužno je da se sam rad shvaća kao nešto što bi čovjek želio činiti i u što stupa slobodno, dobrovoljno i bez prisile. Štoviše, kako se razvija industrijski kapitalizam, rad mora postati nešto što radnik shvaća kao moralno dobro, pa čak i nešto – ali to je možda karakteristično za kasnije faze kapitalizma i njegov postindustrijski razvoj – u čemu bi radnik trebao uživati. Ropstvo,

¹⁰ Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park* (London: Penguin, 2003.).

¹¹ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994.).

¹² David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution* (Oxford i New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.).

¹³ Karl Marx, *Capital, Volume One*, prev. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1990.) (šesto poglavje o kupoprodaji radne snage, str. 270-280).

prema tome, predstavlja problem za kapitalizam, budući da nudi prilično neosporive dokaze o tome da je rad nešto što radnik ne želi činiti. Rob radi pod prisilom, pod prijetnjom nasilja. Ako se ljudi mora siliti na rad bićevima i lancima, kako će se bilo koga moći uvjeriti u to da radi dobrovoljno, za nadnicu? Ideologija rada u kapitalizmu zahtijeva ukidanje ropstva. Bolje rečeno, zahtijeva da se ono učini nevidljivim, kako ne bi obeshrabrivalo druge da preuzmu ulogu rada za nadnicu. No u romanu Jane Austin u glavnom se ne spominje ni nadničarski rad (iako se njegov svijet nazire u prizorima gdje se njegova junakinja Fanny Price vraća svome prvotnom domu, u vidljivo nedokono kućanstvo svojih roditelja u Portsmouth). Umjesto toga, možda bismo rad amaterskih glumaca u romanu mogli smatrati izvedbom ideoškog rada u ime ideje o dobrovoljnem radu o kojem ovisi kapitalistički nadničarski rad. Slika ljudi koji "rade" iz ljubavi daleko je bolja reklama za rad od slike karipskih robova gospodina Bertrama. Ako se amatersko kazalište mora obustaviti, navodno u interesu doličnosti aristokratske klase, onda ono djeluje kao ambivalentna praksa – s jedne strane korisna kao model slobodnog nadničarskog rada, ali opasna zbog toga što istodobno dopušta ulaz sablasti neslobodnog, ropskog rada.

Treći dio: Mile End

Mile End je mjesto gdje radim, na Odsjeku dramskih umjetnosti pri londonskom Queen Mary University. Ulazeći u zgradu u kojoj je smješten Odsjek dramskih umjetnosti, prolazim kroz predvorje u kojemu su ponekad izložene fotografije koje u meni pobuđuju strašnu nelagodu i koje me, kada ih pogledam i dopustim si pomisao da bi me netko drugi mogao vidjeti kako ih promatram, ili me na bilo koji način s njima povezati, natjeraju da se zacrvenim i hitro zamaknem za ugao, u svoj ured, gdje se mogu pretvarati da se to uopće nije dogodilo. Te fotografije pojave se svaki put kada Queen Mary Players postave neku predstavu. Queen Mary Players nemaju nikakve veze s Odsjekom dramskih umjetnosti. Odsjek dramskih umjetnosti je ozbiljan akademski odsjek, baš kao i drugi odsjeci u toj zgradi, čiji zaposlenici također vide te fotografije: profesori književnosti, povjesničari i politolozi. Queen Mary Players su amaterska kazališna družina, koju je, čini mi se, osnovao neki postariji profesor povijesti i koja postavi jednu ili dvije produkcije godišnje, drame poput *Mnogo buke nizašto* ili *Škola skandala*. U njoj sudjeluje mješovito osoblje, ali uglavnom studenti, uključujući, moram priznati, i više studenata s Odsjeka dramskih umjetnosti, koji se time takoreći bave u slobodno vrijeme. Vjerojatno bi ovdje trebalo razjasniti da mi ne nudimo glumački program, kao ni drugi sveučilišni odsjeci dramskih umjetnosti u Velikoj Britaniji, niti obrazujemo studente za profesionalne glumačke uloge. Itekako se trudimo pokazati svim budućim studentima da mi nismo konzervatorij, iako nekih 40% našeg preddiplomskog dramskog programa uključuje poduku kazališnih umjetnosti i glume putem prakse. Treba napomenuti i da sam odsjek nema kazališnog repertoara niti postavlja dramske produkcije. I to je tipično za sveučilišne odsjeke u Velikoj Britaniji. Naš nastavni program i naša poduka barem su djelomično organizirani tako da suzbiju svaki mogući dojam kako pripremamo svoje studente za posao profesionalnih glumaca.

Otuda moja akutna nelagoda i sram koji osjetim kada dva puta godišnje u samo srce našeg odsjeka provali ta amaterska dramska družina sa svojim fotografijama dvadesetogodišnjaka odjevenih u tajice i beretke, kose prekrivene talkom kako bi djelovala sijedo i svom tom prokletom glumom.

Tada shvatim dvije stvari. Prva je sljedeća: amaterska dramska družina i amaterski glumac duboko su usađeni u ideju kazališne struke. Nigdje izvan opere, ali i to je zaseban svijet, previše užasan, a da bih ovdje o njemu raspravljao, nisam susreo takvu odanost protokolima i terminologiji, ideologiji zvanja i mitologiji ili praznovjerjima Struke. Na tim fotografijama vidim moćnu fetišizaciju onoga što znači biti profesionalac, snimke kulture strastvenog oponašanja. Studenti koji su upisani u sveučilišni program dramskih umjetnosti, koji nastoji zadržati čim je moguće veći odmak od struke u onom smislu u kojem je ovdje zamišljala mašta amatera, kao i od posljedica tog amaterskog oponašanja, posvećuju jednu večer za drugom, dok bi mogli pisati eseje o gađenju u djelu Reze Abdoha, lešini građanskog hobija iz predgrađa koja se još jedva mrda. I sada ću vam reći što me toliko zabrinjava u vezi moga srama. Svojom afektivnom reakcijom na fotografije koje svjedoče o tom pothvatu ustvari izražavam svoj duboki prezir prema jednom činu ljubavi. Prema amaterskom radu.

Druga stvar koju uviđam je ta da u takvom amaterskom radu svjedočim činu otpora. Ako ne svjesnog, a ono barem strukturalnog. Jer što mi radimo na sveučilišnom odsjeku dramskih umjetnosti ako ne podučavamo studente kako da postanu profesionalni kazališni djelatnici? Dakako, mi to na neki način činimo, ali ne za kazalište kakvo se zamišlja u produkciji *Mnogo buke* nizoštak kakvu postavljaju Queen Mary Players. No ono što također činimo je to da ih pripremamo za njihovu stvarnu budućnost. Sa svakom godinom koja prolazi sastavljamo sve specifičniji popis ishoda učenja koji se očekuju od naših kolegija o kontrakulturama, seksualnosti ili eksperimentalnoj izvedbenoj praksi, u kojima opisujemo prenosive vještine – sav onaj team-building, komunikaciju, prilagodljivost – za koje će naši studenti morati dokazati da ih posjeduju kako bi zarađivali za život u svijetu neoliberalnog kapitalizma. Organiziramo radioničke sekcije u kojima im pomažemo da razrade svoj životopis i navodimo ih da povezuju one ishode učenja koje smo im obećali i sve ono za što sada mogu tvrditi da su kvalificirani, kako ne bi bilo nikakve opasnosti da zapadnu u ulogu onih koji ne igraju nikakvu ulogu. Stoga se vraćam na svoju raniju, samo dijelom frivilnu tvrdnju. Ako je glumac za Platona osoba koja ne zna ništa o onome što se pretvara da radi, dok je za Diderota glumac osoba koja ne zna raditi ništa posebno, ali se upravo iz tog razloga može pretvarati da je bilo što, a za Rancièrea su pak samo oni koji ne posjeduju nikakve kvalifikacije kvalificirani za vlast, što bismo trebali misliti o amaterskom glumcu kao liku osobe koja čak nije kvalificirana niti da se pretvara kako je kvalificirana za bilo kakav posao?¹⁴ Stoga je možda moj sram, koji osjećam dok hodam predvorjem svoga radnog mjesta, mjesta gdje radim kao potpuno kvalificirani profesionalac, posljedica trenutnog uvida, ispod talka i stigmatizacije, u ulogu onih koji ne igraju nikakvu ulogu. Queen Mary Players na trenutak su uzrokovali prekid u raspodjeli osjetilnoga, prekid koji u liku amatera, zaboravljenog lika roba – jer naposljetku, u neoliberalnom kapitalizmu nema robova – na trenutak zabljesne u vidokrugu.

¹⁴ Usp. Denis de Diderot, "The Paradox of the Actor", u: *Selected Writings on Art and Literature*, ur. i prev. s uvodom Geoffrey Bremner (London: Penguin, 1994.); o daljnjem razvoju ideje glumca kao ničega, vidi: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "Diderot: Paradox and Mimesis", u: *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*, ur. Christopher Fynsk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.).

On the Shameful History of the Amateur

Nicholas Ridout

Part One: Athens

his history begins in Athens. This is an Athens in which the political power of the land-owning aristocracy is on the wane, after the death of Pericles in 429 BCE. All the same the political theorists whose thought built upon and elaborated the values of this land-owning class have managed, in the end, to make sure that their version of things would be the one that reached us with the strongest reverberation. This means that the most

familiar account of this moment in Athenian political history is the story told by the philosophers of aristocratic background and allegiances, the story in which it was the demagogues of the democracy whose self-interested and vulgar politicking ushered in the decline from the greatness that was. Of course the institutions of classical education – from the philhellenism of the German enlightenment to the imperial training ground of the British public school system – have gilded the lily of this dominant narrative. And it's taken a little unravelling, the ideological current in the work of the storytellers – we can call them philosophers if we like – Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. But, as Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood show in their socio-political analysis of their aristocratic thought and writing, it turns out to be a matter of the social division of labour.⁰¹ The question of who should govern comes down to decisions or preferences about the relationship between work and power, about a distinction between amateurs and professionals.

To get to the point, social, economic and political power in the Athenian democracy has slipped from aristocratic hands into the grasp of the professional classes, and the traders and artisans who are swelling the population of the city are starting to take political decisions for themselves. In the story told by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, it was only those citizens wealthy enough and therefore with enough time on their hands, who had any business concerning themselves with politics. Or, to put it another way, politics was a matter for gentleman amateurs, rather than for this new breed of arriviste professionals. Wood and Wood track the persistence of this class preference from Socrates, through Plato to the work of Plato's student,

⁰¹ Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood, *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.)

Aristotle: 'The knowledge so basic to virtue in Socrates's highly intellectual view, therefore, is beyond the attainment of the many. If the knowledge necessary for virtue depends upon leisure and constant enquiry and self-examination, it is quite outside the resources of the common man; and not only because he lacks leisure time, but because in a more fundamental sense he is bound in body and spirit to the world of material necessity by the need to earn his livelihood, while knowledge implies liberation from the world of appearances and necessity.'⁰²

This account of virtue finds its full political expression in Plato's speculative states. In *The Republic*, for example, Plato proposes that the educational programme for the Guardians of the state should be reserved for those 'set free from all manual crafts to be the artificers of their country's freedom'.⁰³ As Wood and Wood note, the term used here by Plato for 'freedom' is 'eleutheria', which carries the additional connotation of 'gentlemanliness'.⁰⁴ This educational programme depends, then, upon a social division of labour, not simply between different modes of labour (manual or intellectual) but between those who labour and those who do not, between those who were distinguished from one another in the game most closely associated with the British public school system, cricket, as 'Gentlemen' and 'Players'. 'It is difficult, then', write Wood and Wood, 'to avoid the conclusion that the essential condition for the existence of the virtuous and philosophic few is the ensured existence of a class of men whose livelihood does not depend on their own labour or trade and who can command the labour of others to supply their needs and wants'.⁰⁵ Aristotle carries forward this conception of the relationship between class and government in his own *Politics*, where, 'in his incomplete description of the ideally best *polis* – reminiscent of Plato's Magnesia of the Laws – Aristotle proposes the exclusion of artisans, shopkeepers, farm labourers, and all wage-earners from citizenship on the grounds that such occupations are "ignoble and inimical to goodness".'⁰⁶

But there's a paradox in this formulation, since what the amateur really had to offer, as a result of his freedom from having to earn his living as a professional, was actually professionalism. With time on his hands the aristocratic gentleman amateur could devote himself completely to the life of politics. He could read, write, think, ponder moral and political philosophy. He could, in fact, become a professional politician. But what has happened now is that real amateurs have taken it into their heads to play at politics. People who don't have the time – nor even perhaps the inclination, but it's the time that matters – to study political theory, have become active citizens in the democracy and their attitudes and values are taking over politics.⁰⁷ So now politics is being done by people who simply don't know what they are doing. Back in the day the fact that they didn't know what they were doing nor what they were talking about would inhibit them from doing or saying anything. Their fear of shame would work powerfully to constrain their freedom of speech. Now what they do is to pretend that they know.

There are two categories of amateur, then. One has time on his hands, and can learn to be a professional politician. The other has work on his hands, and therefore has to pretend to be a professional politician. There is a risk, and this is perhaps what Plato fears the most, that the two will become indistinguishable from one another; that this will lead to a system of government in which power rests with those who have perfected the art of pretending to do politics. Government by actors, that is. By Martin Sheen. Or Ronald Reagan. What was at stake, I wonder, in the widespread contempt in which the acting president was held in many highly educated circles? Is it too

⁰² Wood and Wood, p. 105.

⁰³ Plato, *Republic* 395 b – c

⁰⁴ Wood and Wood, p. 204, fn. 31.

⁰⁵ Wood and Wood, p. 153.

⁰⁶ Aristotle, *Politics* 1328b, cited in Wood and Wood, p. 222.

⁰⁷ See Wood and Wood, pp. 41 – 64, for an account of the expansion of active citizenship.

much to suggest that a trace of the old Platonic prejudice was in play here? That this was a politician whose profession made him uniquely ill-qualified to rule? That by virtue of being an actor he could only ever be an amateur in the realm of the political?

Someone who has taken on the task of reorganising our understanding of Athenian democracy for the purposes of political philosophy is Jacques Rancière, and I want just briefly to put into play his inversion of the Platonic position on who it is who ought to govern. For Rancière, the only people who are actually qualified to govern are those with no qualification to do so. Or, to put it slightly differently, the only qualification for governing is to have no qualification to govern. This is what he sometimes calls the ‘scandal’ of democracy.⁰⁸ In this scandalous and radical scenario, who, then, might qualify by being unqualified? Or, to ask perhaps an easier question, who might sincerely be able to claim to have no qualifications to govern whatsoever? This, I suspect, is why Rancière discusses the idea that a radical democracy would be based on a lottery system. What Rancière is interested in doing, by way of this paradoxical manoeuvre, is to reveal the existence of what he sometimes calls ‘the part of those who have no part’.⁰⁹ That is, that part of any political body, society or community that neither possesses any part of it nor plays any part in its government. One of the key characteristics of the part of those who have no part is that they simply aren’t seen or heard. Even if and when they do things, no one notices. The effects of their actions are attributed to something or someone else. This is an effect of what Rancière calls the distribution, or sometimes, the partition of the sensible: that is the system of deeply embodied capacities to see, hear and feel which in making some things and people available to our sense and sensibility, forcibly and necessarily excludes others. That is why, I think, and I don’t know if Rancière thinks this, the part of those who have no part can no longer be taken by the proletariat. That they can be so named, identified as the subject of history, the agent of revolutionary change, immediately disqualifies them, as it were, from being of the part of those who have no part. They already have a part.

There are the amateurs who are the only ones with enough free time to become professional politicians. There are the professional people whose time is taken up with work and who don’t have the free time they need to compete with the amateurs, so instead have to pretend to know what they are doing and talking about, like actors do. These professionals therefore become a kind of amateur politician. But there is maybe also a third group of people, hidden somewhere among these others, who only get to govern if selected at random, the only means by which they meet the radical democratic stipulation that they should not govern on the basis of possessing any qualification to do so. In Athens, we might say that the most important part of those who had no part will have been played by a significant group of non-citizens: slaves. They play no part in the public life of the city; they are confined to the realm of work. And because they don’t take part in politics, Plato will make no objection to their performing a range of mimetic functions – playing music, performing in the theatre – which he considers deleterious to the moral character of anyone destined, as a citizen, to play a role in the government of the city. So the slave, one might say, at this stage, begins to look like, not just a candidate for playing the part of the part who have no part (in that he or she plays no part in political life) but also a player whose disqualification precisely qualifies them for playing the part, as an actor, of others who are of the part who do have a part – the stage figures who represent for the citizens the figures upon whom they are enjoined to

⁰⁸ See, for example, Jacques Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*, translated by Steve Corcoran (London and New York: Verso, 2006.)

⁰⁹ This concept is widely discussed in Rancière’s political and aesthetic writing, including, for example, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, translated by Julie Rose, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999, and *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*, translated by Gabriel Rockhill (London: Continuum, 2004.)

formulate their moral and political judgements: the characters of comedy and tragedy. At least we may say that the actor, in the anxious Platonic view of the relationship between theatre and politics, occupies a position of structural similarity to that of the slave, a position in which they are able to perform the dirty work that allows the professional amateurs of the aristocracy to get on with their politics. The work of slaves is of course a precondition for the non-work of politics.

Part Two: Mansfield Park

Slaves play no part in Jane Austen's novel, *Mansfield Park*.¹⁰ They are markedly absent but structurally necessary. Meanwhile the part they don't play seems to be a precondition for the playing of parts enjoyed by the leisured young aristocrats whose lives and loves constitute the subject of the novel. Edward Said famously noted that the economy of *Mansfield Park*, the English country estate where most of the action of the novel takes place, depends upon income from sugar plantations in Antigua where the labour forces is composed of slaves.¹¹ Indeed, it is while the head of the household, Mr Bertram, is in the Caribbean, attending to his business interests there, that his children and their friends decide to entertain themselves by putting on a play. Said's argument largely concerns the novel's relative silence on the question of slavery, manifested in the wealth of detail with which one project of 'domestic improvement' is articulated – that which takes place at *Mansfield Park* – when compared with the brevity with which an apparently parallel project of restoring order, in Antigua, is treated. While Said links these restorations in his analysis of the way that Mr Bertram's unexpectedly early return to *Mansfield Park* forces the hasty abandonment of their amateur production of Elizabeth Inchbald's version of Kotzbu's *Lover's Vows*, he does not develop the connection I want to make here, between the amateur players and the slaves who are the subjects of these related restorations. The theatre is suspended because its actors are forced, under the pressure of the moral authority of the landowning aristocracy (in which they are supposed to be participants) to recognise that their acting threatens their capacity to be that aristocracy, that it threatens to reduce them to the kind of people who have no control over their own thoughts and feelings. That this interruption is occasioned by the return of the slave-owner to the scene looks like an invitation to think about actors and slaves as complementary figures of the part who have no part: the slaves on the plantation are the structural precondition for the amateur acting that makes the young aristocrats slaves to their own feelings of inappropriate sexual desire for one another. It is as though the attempt to perform *Lover's Vows* at *Mansfield Park* allows onto the stage of the estate the very slavery on which the novel is otherwise so famously and obtrusively silent.

Austen's novel was published at a time when the movement for the abolition of slavery in the British Empire was well under way. David Brion Davies, in a wide-ranging historical investigation of the abolitionist movement, has identified, alongside sincere moral and religious objections to slavery, a deep structural compatibility between abolitionism and the logic of industrial capitalism.¹² Industrial capitalism requires, as Marx explains, that labour should be 'free': the worker must be free from obligations in which his or her time is already claimed by, say, a feudal landlord, and therefore both available and obliged to take his or her labour into the marketplace.¹³ In order for an economic system based upon the waged labour of free workers, it is

¹⁰ Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park* (London: Penguin, 2003.)

¹¹ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994.)

¹² David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.)

essential that work itself be understood as something that one would wish to do, into which one may enter freely, voluntarily, without coercion. Indeed, as industrial capitalism develops work must become something which the worker understands as a moral good, and even – and this is perhaps characteristic of later phases in this capitalism and its post-industrial developments – something that the worker should even enjoy. Slavery poses a problem for capitalism, then, in that it offers a fairly incontrovertible demonstration that work is something the worker doesn't want to do. The slave works under compulsion, under the threat of violence. If people must be forced to work by whips and chains how will it be possible to convince anyone to work of their own free will, for wages. The ideology of work under capitalism demands that slavery be abolished. Or rather, it demands that it be made invisible, lest it discourage the others from taking up the part of wage labour. But in Austen's novel, wage labour is also largely absent (although we get glimpses of its world in the scenes where the heroine, Fanny Price, is returned to her original home, in the decidedly unlesured household of her parents in Portsmouth). Instead, we might perhaps see the work of the amateur actors in the novel as performing ideological labour on behalf of the idea of voluntary labour upon which capitalist wage labour depends. The image of people 'working' for the love of it is a far better advertisement for work than the image of Mr Bertram's Caribbean slaves. If the amateur theatre must be stopped, apparently in the interests of aristocratic class propriety, then it figures as an ambivalent practice – useful on the one hand for modelling free wage labour, but dangerous because of the way that it simultaneously re-admits the spectre of unfree slave labour.

Part Three: Mile End

Mile End is where I work, at the Department of Drama at Queen Mary University of London. When I walk into the building in which the Drama Department is located, I pass through a foyer in which there are sometimes photographs on display which cause me acute discomfort, and which, when I am looking at them and when I allow myself to entertain the thought that someone else might see me looking at them, or associate me with them in any way, bring blood rushing to my face and send me swiftly around the corner and into my office where I can pretend that it never happened. These photographs appear whenever the Queen Mary Players are presenting a play. The Queen Mary Players have nothing to do with the Drama Department. The Drama Department is a serious academic department, just like the other ones in this building and whose employees also see these photographs: the literature professors, the historians, the political theorists. The Queen Mary Players is an amateur dramatic society, founded, I believe, by a senior professor of history, and which puts on one or two productions a year, of plays like *Much Ado About Nothing* or the *The School for Scandal*. A mixture of staff, but mainly students, take part, including, I have to say, a number of students from the Drama Department, in their leisure time, as it were. It's probably worth clarifying here that, like all university drama departments in the UK, we don't offer an acting program and we are not training students for professional roles as actors. We are at great pains to make sure that all prospective students understand that we are not a conservatoire, even though about forty percent of our undergraduate drama programme involves the teaching of theatre and performance by means of practice. Nor, by the

¹³ Karl Marx, *Capital, Volume One*, translated by Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1990) (Chapter Six: The Sale and Purchase of Labour Power, pp. 270 – 280).

way, does the department itself run a theatre season or mount productions of plays. This, too, is typical of university departments in the UK. Our curriculum and our teaching is, at least in part, organised to interrupt any possible sense that we are preparing our students for work as professional actors.

Hence my acute discomfort, my shame, at the twice-yearly eruption of the amateur dramatic society in our midst, with their photographs of twenty-somethings dressed up in britches and bonnets, with their talcum-powder grey hair and all that bloody acting. I realise two things. The first is this. The amateur dramatic society and the amateur actor are deeply invested in the idea of the theatre profession. Nowhere, outside the opera house, but that's another world, too horrible to contemplate here, have I witnessed such devotion to protocols and terminology, to the ideology of craft and to the mythology and the superstitions of The Profession. In these photographs then, what I see is a powerful fetishisation of what it is to be professional, snapshots of a culture of passionate emulation. Students enrolled on a university drama programme, one which wants to distance itself as far as it possibly can from both the profession, as it is imagined here in the imagination of the amateur, and from the effects of this amateur emulation, devote evening after evening, when they could be writing essays about abjection in the work of Reza Abdoh, to the barely twitching corpse of a suburban bourgeois pastime. And now I'll tell you what I think is so worrying about my shame. In my affective response to the photographs that give evidence of this enterprise, I am expressing my profound contempt for an act of love. For the work of amateurs.

And the second thing I realise, is, that in this work of amateurs, I am witnessing an act of resistance. If not conscious, at least structural. For what are we doing, in the university drama department, if we are not training our students to be professionals in the theatre? Well, of course we are, in a sense, but not that theatre, not the theatre imagined in the Queen Mary Players' production of *Much Ado About Nothing*. But what we are also doing is training them for their real future. With every passing year we write ever more specific learning outcomes for our courses on counter-cultures, sexuality, experimental performance practice, in which we outline the transferable skills – all the team-building, communications, collaboration, adaptability – that our students will need to demonstrate they possess to make their living in a world of neoliberal capitalism. We organise workshop sessions to help them develop their curricula vitae, and guide them in making connections between those learning outcomes we said we would deliver and the things they can now claim to be qualified to do, lest there be any risk of their falling into the part of those who have no part. Hence I return to my earlier, only partly frivolous proposition. If the actor is for Plato the person who knows nothing about what it is he is pretending to do, and for Diderot the actor is the person who can do nothing in particular but can, for that very reason, pretend to be everything, and for Rancière it is only those who possess no qualifications who are qualified to rule, what are we to make of the amateur actor as the figure for the person who is not even qualified to pretend to be qualified to do anything.¹⁴ Perhaps my shame, then, as I walk through the foyer of my workplace, the place where I work as a fully qualified professional, comes from a fleeting glimpse, from under the talcum powder and the stigmata, of the part who have no part. The Queen Mary Players have momentarily performed a disruption in the distribution of the sensible, a disruption which, in the figure of the amateur, the forgotten figure of the slave – for there are no slaves in neoliberal capitalism, after all – momentarily flashes into view.

¹⁴ See Denis de Diderot, 'The Paradox of the Actor', in *Selected Writings on Art and Literature*, edited, translated and with an introduction by Geoffrey Bremner (London: Penguin, 1994), and for a further development of the idea of the actor as nothing, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 'Diderot: Paradox and Mimesis', in *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*, edited by Christopher Fynsk, Stanford (Stanford University Press, 1998).




Dear ----,

It is this continuity and intensity that makes our correspondence a veritable laboratory preparing and experimenting with a common oeuvre. People who talk about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life, without understanding what is subversive about love and what is positive in the refusal of constraints, such people have a corpse in their mouth.* If you follow the road north to me, you'll pass the mountaintops where teenage girls shoot hail from the sky with old artillery guns. They live like gods, you'll see, protecting their village's crops. Our route is the most barren and already eaten by fires that never cease burning.** When I was 4 and you were not yet born, we joined the anticolonial struggle which we understood immediately to mean anticapitalist. This is what the Austro-Hungarian Empire looks like now. See. Do you understand that when I say I love you, I mean: communism, honey, lavender, RED, gun, immanence.

Love,

* Raoul Vaneigem, *The Revolution of Everyday Life* (1967).

** Alexis Orgera, *Dear Friends, The Birds Were Wonderful!* (2009).



Dear ----,

The inscription of negativity in the subject, usually in the form of a constitutive finitude is taken as a sign of what allows the subject to always escape or evade capitalist capture. We have a symmetrical affirmation and ontologization of resistance to high affirmationism, simply recast in different terms. The deflationary concept of the subject, however, leaves mysterious the process by which the failure of the subject will be converted into active and successful resistance. Negativity is a practice, not a principle, a destruction of existing positivities.*


Love,

* Benjamin Noys, *The Persistence of the Negative* (2010).

Proizvodnja relacija kao umjetnički medij

O umjetničkoj praksi Andreje Kulunčić

Vesna Vuković



ovor o suvremenoj umjetnosti u prvom je redu govor o izložbenoj praksi, a ovaj govor podrazumijeva svojevrsni poremečaj u tradicionalnoj podjeli rada unutar sustava umjetnosti, u kojem je umjetnik stvarao, kustos birao i izlagao, a gledatelj promatrao i kontemplirao. To da više nema "ontološke" razlike između stvaranja i izlaganja umjetnosti, to nam je, već od Duchampa, jasno, i to, između ostaloga, za posljedicu ima i zamagljivanje uloge dvaju od tri funkcije, a to je umjetnik i kustos. Ostaje vidjeti što je događa s onom trećom, funkcijom gledatelja koji je najprije prevlašću poetike otvorenih formi, a kasnije kroz praksu tzv. institucionalne kritike, izvučen iz udobne pozicije "nevinog" promatrača i uključen u samu proizvodnju.

Nicolas Bourriaud je u knjizi *Relacijska estetika* iz 1998. ponudio čitanje umjetničkih praksi 1990-ih koje je potakla informacijska kultura. Bourriaud svoje uvelike temelji na recepcijskoj teoriji i kritičkim praksama orijentiranim na sferu recepcije, dakle na onome što se obično nazova 'drugim valom' institucionalne kritike, odnosno onim umjetničkim praksama orijentiranim ne toliko na umjetnički aparat, tj. muzejsko-galerijski sustav zajedno s njegovim ekonomskim i političkim kontekstom, već na društvenu mrežu umjetnosti, na širi ideološki kontekst, ili, Bourriaudovim riječima, na "čitav skup ljudskih odnosa i njihov društveni kontekst". Pritom "treba da naučimo kako da bolje živimo u postojećem svetu, umesto da, puni predrasuda o istorijskoj evoluciji, gradimo novi. Drugim rečima, umjetničko delo ne treba da kreira neku zamišljenu ili utopijsku stvarnost, već da ustanovljava vidove postojanja i modele delovanja u okviru već postojeće realnosti, nezavisno od merila koje umetnik bira."⁶¹ Dakle, umjetnik se uključuje u već postojeći svjetski tok (u 1990-ima to su prostori koje su 'kolonizirali' masovni mediji i kultura spektakla), u vladajuće proizvodne uvjete, a upravo relacijske prakse, tvrdi Bourriaud, bolje pristaju suvremenim društveno-ekonomskim prilikama. Naime, u vrijeme dominacije tercijarnog sektora, industrije usluga, umjetnici, kao postopolitički proizvođači, postaju pružatelji kulturnih usluga, a što je teza koju razrađuje u svojoj sljedećoj knjizi *Postprodukcija*.

61 Nikolas Burio, *Relaciona estetika*,
Centar za savremenu umetnost
– Beograd, Beograd, 2002., str. 4.

Okreningo se sad umjetničkoj praksi Andreje Kulunčić. Njen se rad obično svrstava u kategoriju tzv. 'društveno angažirane umjetnosti'. Obrađujući 'vruće' društvene teme umjetnica u samo središte svoga interesa stavlja istraživanje kao umjetnički proces te suradnju u kolektivnom procesu kao radnu proceduru, pri čemu se suradnja zbiva istodobno na dva kolosjeka: s jedne strane publika u njenim radovima često ima aktivnu ulogu sukreatora, s druge strane Andreja Kulunčić umjetničke vještine redovito nadopunjuje komplementarnim vještinama iz drugih područja (od filozofije i sociologije preko biologije sve do dizajna i marketinga). Ove dvije rečenice, koje su parafraza umjetničine biografije, a pri čemu je ovdje žanr biografija rastegnut do krajnjih rubova, a vjerojatno i dosta preko njih (u svakom slučaju, ostaje zanimljivo primjetiti da Andreja Kulunčić u svojoj službenoj biografiji ne navodi osobne podatke, poput mjesta rođenja, školovanje, ne niže izložbene uspjehe, već 'suho' iznosi svoju umjetničku poziciju. Njena je biografija zapravo umjetnički statement), najavljuju problematiku kojom će se u ovom tekstu pozabaviti.

Najprije će razmotriti ono što nazivamo "relacijskom" praksom – a što obuhvaća društveno angažiranu umjetnost, umjetnost zajednice (*community art*), dijalošku umjetnost, participativnu umjetnost, intervencionističku umjetnost... – kao prevladavajućim formatom od 1990-ih naovamo, čitajući Bourriauda unakrsno s pisanjem londonske kritičarke Claire Bishop koja je identificirala ključna mesta 'manjkavosti', 'slabosti' diskursa koji okružuje relacijske prakse, a koji bi se mogao oslikati kao premještanje mesta kritike u etički registar. Nadalje, ponudit ću ponovno čitanje teksta predavanja Waltera Benjamina "Umjetnik kao proizvođač", kao mogući smjer razmišljanja o suvremenim umjetničkim praksama i njihovom emancipatorskom potencijalu. Sve ovo će kao analitičku rešetku primijeniti na analizu radova Andreje Kulunčić. U završnom će koraku, umjesto zaključka, na primjerima multidisciplinarnih suradnji u umjetničkoj praksi Andreje Kulunčić i uz pomoć Virnove teze o "virtuoznosti" otvoriti pitanje o funkciji umjetnika u suvremenim proizvodnim odnosima.

I.

Nicolas Bourriaud u pokušaju kategorizacije umjetničkih praksi 1990-ih uvodi termin "relacijska umjetnost" i definira je kao "skup umjetničkih praksi koje kao svoje teorijsko i praktično polazište uzimaju cjelinu, svukupnost ljudskih odnosa i njihov društveni kontekst, radije negoli neovisni i privatni prostor"^{o2}. Osnovni problem koji Bourriauda zaokuplja jest kako pristupiti suvremenim umjetničkim praksama, procesualnim i otvorenim formi, pa će za svoju relacijsku estetiku reći da "ne predstavlja teoriju umjetnosti, već teoriju forme"^{o3}. Forma suvremenog umjetničkog djela prelazi njegov materijalni oblik, više se ne radi o prostoru koji treba obići pogledom, već o trajanju u koje gledatelj uključuje daleko više od pukog fizičkog prisustva, svoje stavove, svoja iskustva, a takva djela se procjenjuju prema međuljudskim odnosima koje predstavljaju, proizvode ili potiču. Glavna kritika upućena Bourriaudovom pokušaju identifikacije tendencija u suvremenoj umjetnosti tvrdi kako on krči put komodifikaciji ne-objektne umjetnosti jer u umjetničko tržište uključuje i umjetničke procese i događaje, što je u osnovi direktni odgovor na zamjenu ekonomije dobara ekonomijom usluga. Brian Holmes taj izazov relacijske estetike objašnjava time kako je "bilo potrebno pronaći upotrebnu vrijednost komercijalne slike kao odgovor na situacionističku kritiku suvremenog

o2 Nikolas Burio, *Relaciona estetika*, Centar za savremenu umetnost – Beograd, Beograd, 2002., str. 54.

o3 Nikolas Burio, *Relaciona estetika*, Centar za savremenu umetnost – Beograd, Beograd, 2002., str. 8.

otuđenja koje provode mediji. Iznad pasivnosti spektakla postojalo bi društvo aktivnih 'statista' u kojem bi svatko stvarao mrežu odnosa pomoću simboličkih materijala dostupnih preko kulturne industrije. Uloga umjetnika bila bi proizvesti modele slobodnog i "interaktivnog" ponašanja unutar trgovačkog i medijskog društva."⁰⁴

Londonska kritičarka Claire Bishop se u tekstu "Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics" posebno obara na Bourriaudov ključni kriterij, "kriterij ko-egzistencije", po kojemu sama forma čini relacijska djela demokratskim jer se upravo posredstvom forme pred gledateljem otvaraju pitanja koja ne prepostavljaju nikakvu apriornu stvarnost, i primjećuje da takva pitanja, teoretski, gledatelj može postavljati nalazeći se pred bilo kojim umjetničkim djelom. Otvorenost kao novu paradigmu u umjetnosti razradio je Umberto Eco u *Otvorenom djelu* (1962.), govoreći upravo o onim o umjetničkim djelima koja su otvorena u svojoj 'opipljivosti', pojavnosti, dakle, formi, a ne tek u metaforičkom smislu. Bourriaud ipak svoj veliki uzor iskrivljeno aplicira. Naime, Eco je utro put pitanjima recepcije, dok ih Bourriaud nanovo vraća umjetničkoj racionalnosti. Pitanje participacije danas, kada je ga koristi i business da bi poboljšao efikasnost, kada je ona prisutna u mass-medijima (*reality show*), sve više postaje neodjeljivo od pitanja političkog opredjeljenja. Bishop tvrdi kako ne postoji privilegirani medij za umjetničko djelo i kako sama činjenica da je djelo participativno, ili suradničko, ili pak interaktivno, ne određuje njegov značaj. Ono što je presudno, a što relacijska estetika uporno ignorira, jest kakve to odnose suvremena umjetnost proizvodi, za koga i zašto?

Radovi Andreje Kulunčić definitivno ulaze u kategoriju "relacijske umjetnosti" jer funkcioniraju kao mjesta susreta, jer uspostavljaju odnos "bliskosti" s gledateljem, jer uključuje "trajanje". Pogledajmo kakve odnose proizvode, za koga i zašto.

Rad *1 franak = 1 glas* iz 2008., koji umjetnica naziva političkom umjetničkom intervencijom, "alatom za nelegalne osobe", bavi se položajem ilegaliziranih⁰⁵ imigranata u Švicarskoj. Rad funkcioniра kroz tri formata; prvi je medijska kampanja (letci, novinski oglasi, *billboard* na glavnom gradskom kolodvoru u Zürichu) kojom se poziva švicarske *Sans-Papiers* da doniraju jedan franak u svrhu obnove švicarskog parlamenta, drugi internetska stranica na kojoj se može pratiti stanje donacija i treći realizacija donacije – 'stvarne' (novčane) donacije od strane ne-postojećih ljudi. Ovi na simboličkoj razini nevidljivi i nepostojeći ljudi 'održavaju' švicarsko društvo odozdo, čiste, čuvaju djecu i starije ljude, poslužuju... i na svakodnevnoj su razini itekako vidljivi, mada opet ne mogu izići na ulicu govoreći "Mi bismo svoja prava". Umjetnica odlučnom gestom davanja vidljivosti ovom nevidljivom sloju od 300 000 ljudi, na prvi pogled pomirljivom gestom 'donacije' švicarskom parlamentu, u prvi plan iznosi kritiku njihova položaja u švicarskom društvu, to da su isključeni, svedeni na muk, povučeni iz javnosti. Utoliko se metafora u naslovu *1 franak = 1 glas* ne odnosi samo na pravo glasa na parlamentarnim izborima, već i na glas u javnosti. Rancièreovskim rječnikom, rječnikom radikalne univerzalne jednakosti koja kao temeljnu pretpostavku demokracije vidi jednakost jednog bića darom govora s bilo kojim drugim bićem, može se reći kako spomenuta jednakost ovdje više nije apstraktna, već postaje vidljiva ne samo na javnoj sceni, već i u fizičkom prostoru (plakati, letci, *billboard* kao instalacija). Zahtjev koji iznova preslaguje stvari jer nije ni na čemu utemeljen osim na ovoj jednakosti po pravima kakva ima bilo koja druga skupina. Da se vratim pitanjima koja smo postavili uvodno u ovoj analizi: odgovorili smo 'za koga' i 'zašto' se u analiziranom umjetničkom radu odnosi proizvode, ostaje

⁰⁴ Brian Holmes: *Promišljanje muzeja. Umjetnost u zrcalu političke ekonomije*, u: *Hijerogliji budućnosti, Što, kako i za koga/ WHW i arkzin.communications, Zagreb, 2002.*, str. 74.

⁰⁵ Koristim termin "ilegalizirani imigranti" jer umjetnica inzistira na njemu.

nam da odgovorimo i 'kakvi' se to odnosi proizvode. Kriterij za prosudbu društveno angažirane umjetnosti odnosi se na njen odnos prema društvenoj promjeni. Za koga i zašto u ovom je radu jasno, ali ono što ga čini estetski zanimljivim, pri čemu će prigrlići Rancièrevu definiciju umjetnosti kao "sposobnosti da se misli proturječnost", jest izvjesna kontradikcija koja se proizvodi kroz 'kako'. Participacija ilegaliziranih imigranata u radu ipak ostaje nevidljiva jer umjetnica ne izlaže slike uključenih ljudi, nego – paradoksalno – zadržavajući svoju autorsku poziciju – ona ostaje ta koja im 'daje' glas, kroz čiji rad progovaraju. Takav izbor da reprezentira, etičkim kriterijima mjerena, ne odgovara najbolje politici inkluzije, već kritizira s jedne strane položaj ilegaliziranih imigranata u društvu i ambivalentnost umjetnosti u odnosu na društvenu promjenu.

Jedan od najranijih radova Andreje Kulunčić, barem u kategoriji onih koji prisvajaju formu reklamne kampanje, a što je taktika koju umjetnica u svom radu vrlo često primjenjuje (*Austrians Only, Bosnians out, Teenage Pregnancy...), Nama – 1908 zaposlenih, 15 robnih kuća* (2000.), predstavlja i svojevrsnu prijelomnu točku, ne u njenoj umjetničkoj praksi koliko god određujući za njen budući smjer, već prije svega u polju lokalne umjetničke produkcije. Njegova je pionirska uloga u tome što tranziciju problematizira iz ekonomske perspektive, nakon godina bavljenja nacionalizmima i kulturnim identitetima, što otvara prostor za raspravu o 'mutnim' pitanjima koja su u vezi s promjenom društvenog sustava, instalacije kapitalističkog poretku te posljedično ubrzane segregacije društva. Upravo odavde treba promatrati umjetničinu odluku da ne prikazuje slike bijede, da ne iznosi osobne priče i da, na svaki raspoloživi način, umakne potencijalnoj empatiji i spuštanju problematike sa strukturne razine na ravninu osobne nesreće. Nije nevažno reći da je pripremajući rad provela nekoliko mjeseci u razgovorima s radnicima/ama i sindikalista/icama i da je za to vrijeme prikupila poprilično osobnih priča. 'Hladni', ravnodušni dizajn plakata ničim to ne odaje, radnice, koje su našminkali i uredili stručnjaci vizažisti, na plakatima izgledaju upravo glamurozno. Ovaj raskorak između njihove osiromašene i obespravljene stvarnosti i ispeglane i našminkane reprezentacije na plakatu otvara kritičku distancu za percepciju njihovog položaja u široj društvenoj strukturi (sadržaj) i promatranje 'umjetničkog' medija (forma).

II.

Upravo ovom opozicijom, starom i sterilnom raspravom o odnosu forme i sadržaja, bavi se Walter Benjamin u tekstu predavanja iz 1934. pod nazivom "Autor kao proizvođač" stavljajući oba ova faktora u živo socijalno okruženje. Benjamin zamjenjuje staro materijalističko pitanje o odnosu umjetničkog djela prema društvenim odnosima proizvodnje svoga vremena pitanjem kako ono stoji u društvenim odnosima svoga vremena, čime cilja na funkciju koju djelo ima u umjetničkim odnosima proizvodnje, dakle na njegovu tehniku. Dugu raspravu o odnosu s jedne strane kvalitete i s druge strane političke tendencije umjetničkog djela Benjamin je premostio formulom koja rasvjetjava odnos ovih dvaju faktora: "Ispravna politička tendencija djela uključuje njegovu književnu kvalitetu jer uključuje njegovu književnu tendenciju"⁶. Ovu potonju nalazi u progresu ili regresu literarne tehnike, pri čemu su mu ključne reference Brechtov epski teatar i angažman Sergeja Tretjakova koji mu služi kao ilustracija onoga što naziva "operativni pisac". Portret autora kao proizvođača Benjamin derivira iz novina primjećujući da

o6 Walter Benjamin, "The Author as Producer", *New Left Review I/62*, 1970., str. 1

nas upravo novine tjeraju da preispitamo podjelu između autora i čitatelja. Ponovno čitanje Benjaminovog teksta otvara pitanje današnje estetike produkcije ili, da se zapitamo Benjaminovim rječnikom, koja je pozicija umjetničkog djela u proizvodnim odnosima našeg vremena? Međutim, odmah valja Benjaminov tekst smjestiti u njegovu historijsku realnost u vrijeme postoktobarske Rusije, u vrijeme kulturnih i umjetničkih eksperimenata, u vrijeme vrlo snažnog internacionalnog političkog pokreta, u vrijeme jake sovjetske države sa svojom društvenom organizacijom i institucijama. Dakle, kad danas postavljamo Benjaminovo pitanje na umu moramo imati sasvim izmijenjen historijski kontekst, a to je vrijeme globalizirane ekonomije, globalnog tržišta, vrijeme oslabljene države, vrijeme komercijalizacije umjetničke produkcije, vrijeme prekarizacije rada, pa tako i umjetničkog rada. Primijetiti da se ovakve, relacijske prakse, kakve su u suvremenoj umjetnosti (posebno u prevladavajućim formatima bijenala, trijenala, dokumenti, manifesti...) često instrumentalizirane u svrhu pomirenja i zakrivanja društvenih antagonizama, nije teško, ali nije ni produktivno. Utoliko bismo ovaj Benjaminov argument o važnosti pozicije umjetničkog djela u odnosima proizvodnje svoga vremena mogli ponovo učiniti smislenim tražeći nova pitanja čiji bi on odgovor mogao biti.

U radu *Artists from...*, izvedenom u formi plakatne akcije na *Manifesti 4* 2002. godine – 10 različitih plakata koji uz fotografije umjetnika, sudionika *Manifeste*, izlažu i sljedeće podatke: zemlja iz koje umjetnik dolazi, prosječna godišnja plaća u toj zemlji 2001. i plaća toga umjetnika u istoj godini – Andreja Kulunčić nas suočava s položajem umjetnika na tržištu rada. Međutim, za pretresanje gore otvorenih pitanja okrenut ću se novijem radu *O stanju nacije iz 2008. godine*. Rad se, najprije kao cjelogodišnje istraživanje i suradnja sa stručnjacima iz različitih područja, zatim kao medijska intervencija pa konačno kao izložba i niz radionica i javnih diskusija, bavio prisutnošću i konstrukcijom Drugog u *mainstream* medijima. Medijska intervencija sastojala se u lansiranju virus-vijesti, ni po čemu posebnih, osim po činjenici da su protagonisti pripadnici manjinskih skupina: homoseksualci, Kinezi, Romi... Sva dokumentacija izložena je u galeriji koja je za vrijeme trajanja izložbe funkcionalila kao sastajalište, mjesto produkcije (mini studio za snimanje intervjua), radionica i diskurzivni prostor. Ako se 'subverzivna' poruka i može plasirati u medijski prostor, a rad je pokazao da može, i tako 'zahvatiti' široku javnost, pitanje njegove recepcije, a koje je uslijed otvorenosti njegove forme ključno, ostaje problematično. Referentni okvir *mainstream* tiskovine previše toga zadaje. Tako se umjetnička intervencija koja je iskoračila iz galerije 'u svijet', vraća natrag u galeriju kao jedini joj raspoloživi prostor koji dozvoljava zastajanje, promišljanje i raspravu. Kako ovdje artikulirati pitanje angažmana, ili Benjaminovo pitanje pozicije umjetničkog rada u proizvodnim uvjetima njegovog vremena? Možda zaista, kako je u jednoj prilici ustvrdio ruski umjetnik i aktivist Dmitry Vilensky, danas nije vrijeme da se miješa umjetnost i informativnost. Nadalje, ekonomski aspekt, koji umjetnica gotovo uvijek naglašava, u ovom je radu nažalost izostao. Nažalost, jer je pitanje drugosti, ne samo rasno ili rodno, dakle identitarno, već uvijek ujedno i klasno pitanje. Mada sam naslov, "O stanju nacije", priziva govor političara, izvještaje vladajućih 'dušebrižnika', Andreja Kulunčić i ovdje, kao i u ostalim radovima, progovara o krizi zajednice. Paradoksalno, od pada komunizma i napuštanja ideje društva kao projekta, a koji se najčešće ilustrira performativom Margaret Thatcher "There is no such thing as society"^{o7}, svjedočimo porastu participacijskih praksi kao proces koji teče paralelno s procesom sniženja društvene participacije, pa tako služi kao

^{o7} Margaret Thatcher, u razgovoru za časopis *Women's Own*, 1987.

svojevrsna 'maska' tom procesu (privatizacija zdravstva, školstva, socijalne usluge...). Radovi Andreje Kulunčić, tvrdoglavu i uvijek iznova, postavljaju pitanje društva kao cjeline, u vremenu u kojem, da se poslužim riječima Borisa Budena, "iz iluzije o društvu bez klase padamo u realnost klase bez društva".

III.

Uvodno smo ustvrdili kako je podjela rada u umjetničkom sustavu duboko izmijenjena i da danas teško razdvajamo funkcije umjetnika, kustosa, a sve više i gledatelja. Ova se raspodjela, dakako, ne zaustavlja u umjetničkom polju, već se tiče proizvodnih odnosa uopće. Paolo Virno u knjizi "Gramatika mnoštva" govori o krizi podjele svekolikog ljudskog iskustva na rad, djelovanje i intelekt (podjelu na *poiesis*, *praxis*, *intelekt* uspostavio je Aristotel, a razradila Hannah Arendt). Danas su granice među ovim područjima olabavljene, u suvremenom svijetu imamo fuziju rada i politike koja se očituje u "izlaganju rada pogledu drugih", dakle rad je preuzeo obilježja političkog djelovanja: "... posfordistički rad, rad koji proizvodi višak vrijednosti, na sebe preuzima ono što su prema stoljetnoj tradiciji bila obilježja svega političkog djelovanja."^{o8} Ovo uključivanje javnog djelovanja u radni proces Virno objašnjava kategorijom *virtuoznosti*, kao "... *djelatnosti...* koja nalazi vlastito ispunjenje (ili vlastiti cilj) u samoj sebi, bez da se opredmeti u nekom trajnom djelu, bez da se odloži u "dovršeni proizvod" ili u neki objekt koji nadzivljuje izvedbu. S druge strane, *to je djelatnost koja traži prisutnost drugih*, koja postoji samo u prisutnosti publike."^{o9} S obzirom na nepostojanje "dovršenog proizvoda" te potrebu za prisutnošću drugih, svako je političko djelovanje virtouzno, no vrijedi i obrnuto: svaka je virtuoznost u sebi politička. Kako svako umjetničko djelo traži prisutnost drugih, ono je nužno političko djelovanje. Međutim, kako smo ranije ustvrdili, ne postoji privilegirani medij za umjetničko djelo, a sama činjenica da je djelo participativno, ili suradničko, ili pak interaktivno, ne određuje njegov politički značaj. Nadalje, recepcija umjetnosti, nekad *vita contemplativa*, danas kroz interakciju, suradnju, ko-kreaciju, poprima značajke rada i djelovanja.

Andreja Kulunčić u svojim radovima najčešće pribjegava suradnji u kolektivnom procesu, umjetničke vještine redovito nadopunjajući komplementarnim vještinama iz drugih područja (od filozofije i sociologije preko biologije sve do dizajna i marketinga). Ova metodologija, prisutna i u ostalim radovima, najbolje se manifestira u multidisciplinarnim suradničkim projektima, kakvi su *Distributivna pravda* i *Zatvorena zbilja – embrio*. Radi se o ranijim radovima, za koje se ovdje može utvrditi da su na neki način zadali pravac ili oblikovali njenu umjetničku poziciju, oba su većim dijelom izvedena u mediju interneta, oba projekta (sama ih umjetnica naziva projektima, a ne radovima) tematiziraju 'teške' teme: genetski inženjerинг, odnosno njegove etičke implikacije te distribuciju društvenih, zajedničkih dobara, uz sudjelovanje stručnjaka^{o10}. Pritom, umjetnica nadzire proces, komunicira sa suradnicima i omogućuje komunikaciju među tim raznorodnim disciplinama; njen se djelovanje s jedne strane iscrpljuje u komunikaciji, u organizaciji javnog prostora oko određene teme od društvenog značenja (u tome je smislu njeno djelovanje virtuozno i nalik djelovanju političara), a s druge strane njen se rad ostvaruje upravo kroz komunikaciju. Komunikacija je tako ujedno i središnja proizvodna aktivnost i proizvod sam. Ova se aktivnost u galerijskim postavu, a oba su rada višestruko i međunarodno izlagana, realizirala u formi instalacije, kao prikladnoj formi za ovaj dugotrajan i

o8 Paolo Virno, *Gramatika mnoštva*, Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2004., str. 44.

o9 Paolo Virno, *Gramatika mnoštva*, Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2004., str. 46.

o10 U radu *Embrio* to su: Andreja Kulunčić (vizualna umjetnica i voditeljica projekta), Trudy Lane (dizajnerica), Gabrijela Sabol (sociologinja), Matija Puzar (programer), Ivo Martinović (producent) kao autori te mr. sc. Lidija Vuković (molekularna biologinja), mr. sc. Tomislav Janović (filozof i koordinator znanstvenog dijela projekta), Romana Rozić (direktorica video dokumentacije) i Momo Kuzmanović (urednik kataloga); u radu *Distributivna pravda*: Andreja Kulunčić (vizualna umjetnica i voditeljica projekta), Tomislav Janović (filozof), Neven Petrović (filozof), Gabrijela Sabol (sociologinja), Ivo Martinović (foto & video), Matija Puzar (programer), Dejan Janković (dizajner) i Trudy Lane (dizajnerica).

kompliciran proces koji obuhvaća istraživanja, diskusije i analize. S druge strane, upravo se instalacija smatra ključnom formom koja je umjetnicima omogućila da demokratiziraju svoju umjetnost, tako što je dozvolila gledateljima da fizički stupe u prostor umjetničkog djela i tako ga, inače zatvorenog, otvore demokratskoj praksi, transformiraju posvećeni prostor umjetničkog rada u prostor javne diskusije, komunikacije, edukacije, umrežavanja. Međutim, kako je ustvrdio Boris Groys u eseju "Politike instalacije"¹¹, u analizama se uvijek iznova previđa važan čin koji prethodi otvaranju prostora instalacije zajednici posjetitelja, a to je simbolički čin privatizacije inače javnog prostora izložbe. Naime, prostor izložbe simbolički pripada javnosti, kojoj je kustos je dužan opravdati svoje izbore, i koja pri posjetu tradicionalnoj izložbi ostaje na svom teritoriju. Nasuprot tome, prostor umjetničke instalacije uvijek je simboličko vlasništvo umjetnika, koji, za razliku od kustosa, nije dužan javnosti opravdavati svoje izbore, a ulazeći u prostor instalacije posjetitelj stupa na tuđi teren i podvrgava se autoritarnoj vladavini umjetnika. Suvereni karakter instalacijske prakse tako razotkriva skrivenu dimenziju demokratskog poretka: nasilni čin njegovog uvođenja, kao i dubinski ambivalentan pojam slobode izbora.

Izazov koji стоји пред relacijskom umjetnošću јест "kako proizvesti modele slobodnog i "interaktivnog" ponašanja. Paolo Virno predlaže da se vratimo originalnom značenju pojma *res*, koji u latinskom osim stvari, označava i činjenicu, događaj, vidljivu reakciju, akciju. U tome bi svjetlu "reifikaciju" bila nastojanje da se nešto učini vidljivim, upadljivim u pojavnom svijetu. Tom pozitivno značenju reifikacije Virno kao negativni pol suprotstavlja pojam "otuđenja" koji označava oduzimanje, izvlaštenje. Reifikacija (činjenica da "život uma" postaje činjenica ili primjetna akcija) bi utoliko mogla biti, predlaže Virno, protuoružje u borbi protiv post-fordističkog otuđenja. "Svaka je suvremena komunikacija bojište između prikladne reifikacije i strašnog otuđenja".¹²

¹¹ Boris Groys: "Politics of Installation", u: *Going Public*, Sternberg Press, Berlin, 2010.

¹² Branden W. Joseph: *Interview with Paolo Virno, Grey Room 21*, Fall 2005. 33.

Production of relations as an art medium

On the art practices of Andreja Kulunčić

Vesna Vuković

Translated from Croatian by Ivana Ackie

The modern art discourse is primarily a discourse of exhibition practices, and that discourse implies a sort of disorder in the traditional division of labour within the artistic system; one where the artist creates, the curator selects and exhibits, and the spectator observes and contemplates. The fact that there is no "ontological" difference between creating and exhibiting art has been clear to us since Duchamp, and that results in, amongst other things, blurred roles of two of the three functions, those of the artist and the curator. It remains to be seen what happens with the third function; the one of spectator who was, first through dominance of poetics of the open form, and later through practice of the so-called institutional critique, extricated from the comfortable position of an "innocent" observer and who became involved in the production itself.

In his 1998 *Relational Aesthetics*, Nicolas Bourriaud offered a reading of artistic practices of the '90s inspired by information culture. Bourriaud based his insights largely on reception theory and the critical practices oriented toward the perception sphere, in other words, that which is usually referred to as the "second wave" of institutional critique; which is to say, those artistic practices oriented towards not so much the artistic apparatus, or the museum-gallery system together with its economic and political context, as towards the social network of art, the wider ideological context, or in Bourriaud's words, "the whole of human relations and their social context". In doing so, we should be "learning to inhabit the world in a better way, instead of trying to construct it based on a preconceived idea of historical evolution. In other words, the role of artworks is no longer to form imaginary and utopian realities, but to actually be ways of living and models of action within the existing real, whatever the scale chosen by the artist".^{o1} Thus, the artist gets involved in the already existing global trend (in the '90s, these were the spaces "colonised" by the mass media and the culture of spectacle) and the governing production conditions, and it is relational practices in particular, according to Bourriaud, that better fit the contemporary socio-economic circumstances. Namely, during the dominance of the tertiary sector or the service industry, artists, as post-political producers, become providers of cultural services, which is a thesis he elaborates on in his subsequent work, *Postproduction*.

^{o1} Nicolas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics* (Dijon: Les presses du réel, 2002) p. 13.

Let us now consider the artistic practices of Andreja Kulunčić. Her work is usually classified as the so-called "socially engaged art". By working on "hot" social topics, the artist focuses on research as an artistic process, and the cooperation in the collective process as a work procedure, whereby this cooperation happens simultaneously on two tracks: on the one hand there is the audience which often has the active role of a co-producer in her works, and on the other hand, Andreja Kulunčić regularly supplements the artistic skills with complementary skills from other areas (from philosophy and sociology, to biology, design and marketing). These two sentences, which are a paraphrase of the artist's biography, and here the biography genre should be considered only in the loosest sense, as this biography reaches and quite possibly crosses its boundaries (in any case, it is interesting to note how in her official biography Andreja Kulunčić doesn't mention any personal information, such as place of birth, education, she doesn't list her exhibition successes, but "dryly" discloses her artistic position; her biography is actually an artistic statement), announce the subject matter which I am going to tackle in this paper.

First, I will consider what we call "relational" practices – which include socially engaged art, community art, dialogic art, participatory art, interventionist art... – as the dominant format from the 1990s onwards, reading Bourriaud alongside the London critic Claire Bishop, who identified the key sites of 'deficiencies' or 'weaknesses' of the discourse surrounding relational practices, which could be painted as a transfer of the placement of critique into the ethical register. Furthermore, I will offer a renewed reading of the transcript of Walter Benjamin's lecture entitled "The Author as Producer", as a possible course of meditation on contemporary artistic practices and their emancipatory potential. I will apply all of this as an analytical grid for the analysis of Andreja Kulunčić's work. In the final step, instead of a conclusion, I will pose the question of the artist's function in contemporary industrial relations, using the examples of multidisciplinary collaborations in the artistic practices of Andreja Kulunčić and with the aid of Virno's thesis on "virtuosity".

I.

In an attempt to categorise the artistic practices of the 1990s, Nicolas Bourriaud introduces the term "relational art" and defines it as "a set of artistic practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of human relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private space"^{o2}. The main problem which preoccupies Bourriaud is how to approach the contemporary artistic practices, processual practices of open forms, and it is for that reason that he says his relational aesthetics "does not represent a theory of art, but a theory of form".^{o3} The form of a contemporary work of art surpasses its material form, it is no longer a space that needs to be taken in by our gaze, but a duration within which the spectator includes far more than a mere physical presence – their attitudes, their experiences – and that kind of work is evaluated according to human relations that it stands for, produces or encourages. The main critique of Bourriaud's attempt at identifying the tendencies in contemporary art claims that he forges the way for commodification of non-object art since he includes both artistic processes and events in the art market, which is in its basis a direct response to replacing the economy of goods with the economy of services. Brian Holmes explains this challenge of relational aesthetics through "there being a need to find a use value of the commercial image as a response to the Situationist critique of the

^{o2} Nicolas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics* (Dijon: Les presses du réel, 2002), p. 113.

^{o3} Nicolas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics*, (Dijon: Les presses du réel, 2002), p. 113.

contemporary alienation conducted by the media. Above the passivity of the spectacle there would exist a society of active 'extras' in which everyone included would create a network of relations with the aid of symbolic materials available through the culture industry. The role of the artist would be producing the models of free and 'interactive' behaviour within the commercial and media society."⁰⁴

The London critic Claire Bishop, in her "Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics", pounces upon Bourriaud's key criterion, the "criterion of co-existence", according to which the form itself makes relational works democratic since it is precisely through mediation of form before the spectator that the questions, which do not assume any sort of a priori reality, are posed, and she notes how, in theory, such questions could be posed by a spectator situated in front of any piece of art. Openness as a new paradigm was elaborated on by Umberto Eco in *The Open Work* (1962), discussing in particular the works of art open in their "tangibility", manifestation, hence, their form, and not only in the metaphorical sense. However, Bourriaud applies his great influence in a distorted manner. That is to say Eco forged the way for the matters of reception, whereas Bourriaud brings them back to the artistic rationality. The question of participation nowadays, when it is even used by business in order to improve its effectiveness, and when it is present in the mass media (*reality show*), is becoming increasingly inseparable from the question of political affiliation. Bishop argues that there is no privileged medium for a work of art and that the mere fact the work is participatory, collaborative, or interactive, does not determine its significance. What is crucial here, and what is being persistently ignored by relational aesthetics, is *what kind of relations are being produced by contemporary art, for whom and why*.

The works of Andreja Kulunčić most definitely fall within the category of "relational art" since they function as meeting places, because they establish a relationship of "closeness" with the spectator, because they include "duration". Let us have a look at what kind of relations they produce, for whom and why.

Her 2008 work entitled *1CHF = 1VOICE*, which the artist calls a political art intervention, "a tool for illegalised persons", is concerned with the position of illegalised⁰⁵ immigrants in Switzerland. The work functions through three formats: the first is a media campaign (flyers, newspaper ads, a billboard at the railway station in Zürich), which urges the Swiss *Sans-Papiers* to donate one franc for the renovation of the Swiss Parliament; the second is a website where it is possible to track the donation status; and the third is a realisation of the donation – a "real" (monetary) donation by nonexistent people. These, on the symbolic level, invisible people "maintain" Swiss society from the bottom, they clean, babysit, and nurse the elderly, they serve... and on the everyday level they are more than visible, although they still cannot very well take to the streets saying: "We demand our rights". With the decisive gesture of attaining visibility for this invisible class of 300,000 people, through a seemingly placating gesture of "donation" to the Swiss Parliament, the artist puts the critique of their position in Swiss society into the limelight: the fact that they are excluded, reduced to a hush, withdrawn from the public. To that extent, the metaphor in the title *1CHF = 1VOICE* does not only refer to the right to vote in the parliamentary election, but the public voice as well. To use Rancière's terms, the terms of radical universal equality which sees the equality of one being with the gift of speech to any other being as a fundamental assumption of democracy, we could say that the aforementioned equality is not merely abstract anymore, but becomes visible not only in the eyes of the public, but also in the physical space (posters, flyers, billboard as an installation). A claim which rearranges

04 Brian Holmes, *Reflecting Museums. Art in the mirror of Political Economy*, in: *Hieroglyphs of the Future* (Zagreb: What, How and for Whom/WHW and ARKzin communications, 2002), p. 74.

05 I am using the term "illegalised immigrants" because the artist insists on it.

things anew since it is not based on anything aside from this equality in accordance with the rights of any other group. To get back to the questions posed in the introduction of this analysis: we have the answers to "for whom" and "why" the relations are created in the analysed work of art, the remaining question is "what kind" of relations are being created. The criterion for evaluation of socially engaged art is related to its relationship to social change. For whom and why is clear in this work, but what makes it aesthetically interesting, and this is where I choose to embrace Rancière's definition of art as "the ability to think contradiction", is a certain contradiction which is created through "how". The participation of illegalised immigrants in the work still remains invisible since the artist does not exhibit pictures of the people involved, but – paradoxically retaining her authorial position – she remains the one to "give" them a voice, and through whose work they speak. That choice to represent, measured by ethical standards, does not correspond well with the politics of inclusion; on the one hand it criticises the position of illegalised immigrants within the society and on the other hand the ambivalence of art in relation to social change.

One of the earliest works of Andreja Kulunčić, at least in the category of those that take on the form of an advertising campaign, and which is a tactic the artist uses in her work rather often (*Austrians Only, Bosnians out, Teenage Pregnancy...), Nama – 1908 employees, 15 department stores* (2000), represents a kind of turning point, not for her artistic practices, no matter how defining for her future course, but above all for the field of local artistic production. Its pioneering role is contained in the fact that it problematises transition from an economic perspective, after years of having dealt with nationalisms and cultural identities, that it opens space for discussing the "grey areas" related to changes in the social system, installation of the capitalist order and the resulting rapid segregation of society. It is precisely from here that we should observe the artist's decision not to show pictures of abject poverty, not to disclose personal stories, and to, in every way possible, escape the potential empathy and lowering the level of the issue from the structural to the plane of personal misfortune. It is not irrelevant to mention how, in preparation for her work, she spent several months in discussions with the workers and unionists, and how she collected quite a number of personal stories during that period. The "cold" indifferent design of the posters does not betray the fact, and the female workers, who were made-up and spruced up by professional make-up artists, look positively glamorous in the pictures. This discrepancy between their impoverished and disempowered reality, and ironed and made-up presentation on the posters opens up a critical distance for the perception of their position in the wider social structure (content) and the observation of the "artistic" medium (form).

II.

It is precisely this opposition, the old and sterile debate on the relationship of form and content, that Walter Benjamin addresses in the text of his 1934 lecture entitled "The Author as Producer", setting both of these factors in a live social environment. Benjamin replaces the old materialistic question, of relation of a piece of art towards social relations of production of its time, with the question of its position *within* the social relations of its time, which aims for the function that a piece of art has within the artistic relations of production, i.e., its technique. The long discussion, of the relationship between quality on the one

hand and political tendencies of a piece of art on the other, was bridged by Benjamin with a formula that clarified the relationship between these two factors: "the correct political tendency of a work includes its literary quality because it includes its literary tendency"^{o6}. He finds the latter in the progress or regress of literary technique, where his key references are Brecht's epic theatre and Sergei Tretyakov's engagement which serves as an illustration of what he refers to as "the operating writer". Benjamin derives the portrait of the author as producer from the newspaper, noting how it is precisely the newspaper that forces us to question the division between the author and the reader. A renewed reading of Benjamin's text raises the question of today's aesthetics of production, or to borrow Benjamin's terms: what is the position of art in the production relations of *our times*? However, Benjamin's text should be immediately placed within its historical reality of Russia after the October Revolution, a time of cultural and artistic experimentation, a time of rather strong international political movement, a time of the powerful Soviet state with its social organisation and institutions. Therefore, when raising Benjamin's question today, we have to bear in mind an entirely altered historical context, and that is a time of globalised economy and the global marketplace, a time of weakened state, a time of commercialisation of artistic production, a time of precariousness of work, which includes artistic work. It is not difficult, nor is it productive, to notice how these kinds of relational practices in contemporary art (especially in the prevailing formats of biennale, triennale, documenta, manifest...) are often instrumentalised as a means of reconciliation and encryption of social antagonisms. To that extent, this argument of Benjamin's, about the importance of the position of a piece of art within the production relations of its time, could be made meaningful once more if we were to look for new questions it could answer.

In her work *Artist from...*, executed in the form of a poster campaign at *Manifesta 4* in 2002 – 10 different posters which, alongside photographs of artists, participants of *Manifesta 4*, displayed the following information: country of the artist's origin, average annual wage in the aforementioned country for the year 2001, and the artist's wages for the same year – Andreja Kulunčić confronts us with the position of an artist in the labour market. However, in order to get deeper into the aforementioned questions, I will turn to a more recent work from 2008, *On the State of the Nation*. The work, first as a year-long research and collaboration with experts from different fields, then as a media intervention, and finally as an exhibition and a series of workshops and public discussions, dealt with the presence and construction of the Other in mainstream media. The media intervention consisted in launching viral news, not extraordinary in any way, except for the fact that the protagonists were all members of minority groups: homosexuals, Chinese, Roma... The whole of the documentation was exhibited in a gallery that, for the duration of the exhibition, served as a meeting place, a place of production (mini interview-recording studio), as a workshop and a place of discourse. If a "subversive" message can be launched into media space, and this work has shown that possible, and so "spread" among the general public, the question of its reception, which is quite essential due to the openness of its form, remains problematic. The frame of reference of mainstream publications sets too many rules. Thus, the artistic intervention that stepped outside the gallery and "into the world", returns to the gallery which is the only place that allows for pause, reflection and discussion. How do we articulate the question of engagement here, or Benjamin's question of the position of artistic work in the production conditions of its time? Perhaps, indeed, as on one occasion Russian artist and

o6 Walter Benjamin, "The Author as Producer", *New Left Review* 1.62

activist Dmitry Vilensky put it, today is not the time to mix art and informativeness. Furthermore, the economic aspect, which is almost always emphasised by the artist, is unfortunately absent from this work. Unfortunately, because the question of Otherness is not just a question of race or gender, i.e. that of identity, but is always a class issue at the same time. Although the title *On the State of the Nation* invokes political vernacular and reports by the ruling “curators of souls”, Andreja Kulunčić here, as in her other works, speaks up about the crisis of community. Paradoxically, since the collapse of communism and the abandonment of the idea of society as a project, which is usually illustrated by Margaret Thatcher’s performative, “There is no such thing as society”,^{o7} we have been witnessing an increase in participatory practices as a process that runs parallel to the process of decreasing social participation, and thus serves as a kind of “mask” for that process (the privatisation of healthcare, education, social services...). The works of Andrea Kulunčić, stubbornly and over again, ask the question of society as a whole, at a time when, to borrow Boris Buden, “we fall from the illusion of a society with no classes into the reality of a class with no society”.

III.

By means of introduction, we have affirmed that the division of labour in the art system has been profoundly altered and that nowadays it is hard to separate the functions of artists, curators, and, increasingly, spectators. This distribution, however, does not stop in the field of art, but rather it has to do with the relations of production in general. In his *A Grammar of the Multitude*, Paolo Virno talks about the crisis of the division of human experience into labour, action and intellect (the division of *poiesis*, *praxis* and *intellect* was established by Aristotle and elaborated on by Hannah Arendt). Today, the boundaries between these areas are loosened, in the modern world we have a fusion of work and politics, which is reflected in “exhibiting the work to the gaze of others”, thus the work has taken on some traits of political action: “[...] post-Fordist labour, the productive labour of surplus, subordinate labour, brings into play the talents and the qualifications which, according to a secular tradition, had more to do with political action”^{o8}. These inclusions of the public in the work process Virno explains through the category of *virtuosity*, as “...an activity which finds its own fulfillment (that is, its own purpose) in itself, without objectifying itself into an end product, without settling into a ‘finished product’, or into an object which would survive the performance. Secondly, it is an activity which requires the presence of others, which exists only in the presence of an audience”^{o9}. Considering the lack of an “end product” and the need for the presence of others, every political action is a virtuoso-action, but the opposite is also true: all of virtuosity is in itself political. Seeing as every work of art requires the presence of others, it is necessarily a political action. However, as we have stated previously, there is no privileged medium for a work of art, and the fact that the work is participatory, or collaborative, or interactive, does not determine its political significance. Furthermore, the reception of art, once *vita contemplativa*, today through interaction, collaboration, co-creation, takes on the features of work and action.

In her works, Andreja Kulunčić generally resorts to cooperation in a collective process, regularly supplementing the artistic skills with complementary skills from other areas (from philosophy and sociology, to biology, design and marketing). This methodology, also present in her other

^{o7} Margaret Thatcher, in an interview for *Women's Own* magazine, 1987.

^{o8} Paolo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), p. 51.

^{o9} Paolo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), p. 52.

works, is best manifested in multidisciplinary collaborative projects, such as *Distributive Justice* and *Closed Reality – Embryo*. These are her earlier works, and it is possible to establish that in some way they have given direction or shape to her artistic position; both are mostly executed through the medium of the Internet, both projects (the artist herself calls them projects instead of works) portray “heavy” topics: genetic engineering and its ethical implications, and the distribution of social, common goods, with the participation of experts¹⁰. In doing so, the artist controls the process, communicates with her colleagues and facilitates communication between these disparate disciplines; on the one hand, her activity is exhausted in communication, in organisation of the public space around a specific topic of social significance (in this sense, her work is that of virtuosity, and is akin to the actions of politicians), on the other hand, her work is realised precisely through communication. In this way, communication is both the central manufacturing activity and the product itself. This activity was realised through gallery exhibitions (both projects were exhibited internationally and on multiple occasions), in the form of installation, as a form suitable for this lengthy and complicated process that involves research, discussion and analysis. On the other hand, it is precisely installation that is considered to be the key form which has allowed the artists to democratise their art, through permitting the spectators to physically enter the space of the work of art and, in doing so, open an otherwise closed space to democratic practices, transform the space devoted to the work of art into a space of public discussion, communication, education and networking.

However, as Boris Groys has argued in his essay entitled “Politics of Installation”¹¹, the analysis continuously overlooks an important act that precedes the opening of the installation space to the community of visitors, and that is a symbolic act of privatisation of an otherwise public exhibition space. That is to say, the exhibition space symbolically belongs to the public, to which the curator is obliged to justify his choices, and which remains on its territory during a visit to a traditional exhibition. In contrast, the space of art installation is always in symbolic ownership of the artist, who, unlike the curator, is not obliged to justify his choices to the public, and entering the installation space the visitor steps into someone else’s terrain and submits to the authoritarian rule of the artist. The sovereign character of the installation practices thus reveals a hidden dimension of the democratic order: the violent act of its introduction, and a deeply ambivalent concept of the freedom of choice.

The challenge facing relational art is how to produce models of “free” and “interactive” behaviour. Paolo Virno proposes a return to the original meaning of the Latin term *res*, which aside from signifying a thing, indicates a fact, an event, a visible reaction, or an action. In this light, “reification” would be an attempt at making something visible and conspicuous in the material world. To this positive meaning of reification Virno opposes, as a negative pole, the term “alienation”, which signifies privation, dispossession. To this extent, reification (the fact that “the life of the mind” becomes fact or perceivable action), as proposed by Virno, could be used as a weapon in the struggle against post-Fordist alienation. “All contemporary communication is a battleground between a suitable reification and a dreadful alienation”¹².

¹⁰ In her project *Embryo* these are: Andreja Kulunčić (visual artist and head of the project), Trudy Lane (designer), Gabrijela Sabol (sociologist), Matija Puzar (programmer), Ivo Martinović (producer) as authors and Lidija Vuković M. Sc. (molecular biologist), Tomislav Janović M. Sc. (philosopher and coordinator of the scientific part of the project), Romana Rozić (video documentation director) and Momo Kuzmanović (catalogue editor); In her project *Distributive Justice*: Andreja Kulunčić (visual artist and head of the project), Tomislav Janović (philosopher), Neven Petrović (philosopher), Gabrijela Sabol (sociologist), Ivo Martinović (photo & video), Matija Puzar (programmer), Dejan Janković (designer) and Trudy Lane (designer).

¹¹ Boris Groys, “Politics of Installation”, in: *Going Public* (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2010).

¹² Branden W. Joseph, “Interview with Paolo Virno”, *Grey Room* 21 (Fall 2005), 33.

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


Dear ----,

This is expressed in a very awkward way, unfortunately. What I would like to stress is that our main objective cannot be to act upon people's consciousness so as to change it. There is an illusion in propaganda, whether it is made by texts or by deeds. We do not 'convince' anyone. We can only express what is going on. We cannot create a movement in society. We can only act within a movement to which we ourselves belong. The unity of the totality to be altered is everywhere and nowhere, so don't worry all that much about centrality, just start here and now.* We are all in love.

Love,

* Gilles Dauve, *Letter on the Use of Violence* (1973).



Dear ----,

Consciousness of desire and the desire for consciousness together and indissolubly constitute that project which in its negative form has as its goal the abolition of classes and the direct possession by the workers of every aspect of their activity.* Build me a paper plane from butcher paper.

Love,

* Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* (1967).

Obustavljen rad izvjesnosti – jedna gledateljska preferenca uz predstavu *Work Every Day*

Tomislav Medak

U romanu Toma McCarthyja *Ostatak* neimenovani protagonist kruži oko kobnog događaja – pada neimenovanog predmeta koji mu se iz zraka sručio na glavu i ostavio ga bez uspomene na tu nesreću, ali s pozamašnim finansijskim obeštećenjem. Ono mu omogućuje da upregne ljude, predmete i zbivanja u megalomanski napor stvaranja okolnosti u kojima bi mogao iznova proživjeti specifično, ali neodredivo na hođenje prouzročeno tim događajem i prisjećajima iz ranijeg života. Nesreća prikrivena amnezijom tjera ga da kompulzivno inscenira prizore jedne zbilje sve dok organizirajuća načela doživljaja te nesreće i situacija ne poprime autonomiju i krenu generirati slijed događaja koji posve gubi vezu s inicijalnom traumom. Od rekonstrukcije jednog *déjà-vu-a* koji je započeo s pukotinom u zidu, nejasnim sjećanjima na jedan stan i miris jetrica iz susjednog stana poduhvat će eskalirati do pljačke banke i bijega avionom u nepoznato.

Traumatska kompulzija, koja je prema psihonalitičkoj ortodoksiji prinuđena ponavljati obrazac bolnog događaja i time ga potvrđivati kao izvjestan, kontingencije lišen i identitetski konstitutivan, ovdje dobiva fikcionalizirano razriješenje u ekonomskoj moći traumatiziranog pojedinca da mobilizira zbilju u cilju proizvodnje konačnog događaja koji više nije upregnut u neizbjježnu nužnost ponavljanja obrasca iz prošlosti, već biva oslobođen za apsolutnu kontingenčiju novonastajuće budućnosti. Štošta bi se moglo reći o fantazmatskom značaju temeljne fikcije McCarthyjevog romana – primjerice, da je ekomska moć ta koja omogućuje inscenacijsko mobiliziranje zbilje u cilju raskidanja uvjetovanosti prošlošću (bilo da to izlječenje od traume tumačimo kao zaborav

zaborava kroz konzumerizam, kao istinsku moć kapitala da proizvodi društvenu zbilju ili kao ideo-lošku matricu koja reproducira strukturu ekonomske dominacije). Za potrebe ovdje poslužit će, ipak, pripovijedni postupak postupnog ljuštenja racionalnosti djelovanja, suspenzije dovoljnog razloga (to je naime manevar uvjerenja u aleatornost ekonomske moći: bogatstvo može dopasti svakoga, kao predmet iz vedra neba) koja kako protagonista tako i čitatelja privodi konačnoj kontigenciji događanja – slijed rekonstrukcija i ponavljanja rezultira događajem koji ne slijedi iz početnog do- gađaja.

Postupna suspenzija dovoljnog razloga scen-skog zbivanja i tumačivosti specifičan je postupak predstave *Work Every Day* koreografkinje i autori-ce koncepta Marjane Krajač. Od početka kroz predstavu pratimo disparatnosti izražajnih aspe-kata: između posve različitih plesnih izričaja četiri izvođačice, između plesnog pokreta i koreografske organizacije plesnog materijala, između oblikova-nja pozornice, kostima, svjetla ili glazbe i strukture scenskog zbivanja, između parateksta i izvedbe itd. Premda prepoznajemo relativno jasnu struk-turu tijeka predstave, niti struktura ne uvjetuje procese i elemente unutar predstave, ona ostaje samo formalno zadanim protijekom. Svi materijal-ni procesi i elementi ustraju (ili prije odustaju, ali o tome za koji trenutak) na svojoj specifičnoj, među-sobno nesvodivoj izričajnosti. Predstava nepresta-no podriva podvrgavanje jednog elementa logici drugog, ne nastoji ih utemeljiti jedan u drugom, niti proizvesti njihovu strukturnu konzistenciju. Nekoherentnost i nekonzekventnost etablira kao dominantno organizirajuće načelo.

Teatar je proces apstrakcije, odmišljanja pri-sutnosti materijalnih nositelja komunikacijskog

procesa koje tvore teatarski aparat. Apstrahiranje prisustva materijalnih elemenata u teatarskom aparu – izvođača, scenografije, scenske tehnologije, izvedbenog prostora, zvukova... – preduvjet je uprisutnjenja odsutnih prizora. Historijsku avantgardu i postavangardu u teatru možemo sagledati kao povijest pokušaja da se dade scensko prvenstvo i da se dogodi igra te inače odmišljene prisutne materijalnosti teatarskog događaja.

Konvencionalno, međutim, teatarski događaj izvedbe diktira značenjsku strukturu i daje izražajnu konzistenciju procesima, akterima, infrastrukturom i relacijama koji je nose. Materijalna zbivanja na sceni – primjerice, premještanje scenografije, paljenje reflektora, igra na prosceniju ili obraćanje kroz četvrti zid – čitljiva su zajedno iz teatarskog događaja. Mogli bismo reći da teatarski događaj izvedbe nije ništa drugo do upravo proizvodnja te unutarnje povezanosti materijalnih zbivanja na sceni. Proces proizvodnje unutarnje povezanosti značenja i izražajne konzistencije determinira svaki od tih elemenata pojedinačno. Nadalje, uz objedinjujuće djelovanje izvedbe, unutar materijalne strukture pojedini elementi značenjski determiniraju druge izražajne elemente. Tako je klasična teatarska hijerarhija prepostavljala primat scenskog jedinstva događaja i primat dramskog teksta nad ostalim elementima. Brehtijanski epski teatar pak dokida takvu hijerarhiju izražajnih elemenata teatarskog aparata. I upravo tu logiku de-hijerarhizacije *Work Every Day* radikalizira izvlačeći materijalne procese, aktere, infrastrukture i relacije iz odnosa podređenosti proizvodnje značenjske strukture predstave. Taj postupak gradi se od već spomenute početne nesvodive različitosti plesnih izričaja, preko izostanka njihove koherentnosti s koreografskom organizacijom pokreta, do predza-

dnjeg čina komične koreografije u kojoj se autonomizira struktura gledateljeve pažnje i zadnjeg čina spuštanja cugova u kojem naposljetku i nevidljiva materijalna infrastruktura teatra dobiva autonomiju.

Predstava kojom dominiraju neodrađene geste, polovične izrađenosti i obustavljenia prorađivanja, u naslovu programatski postavlja problem rada. Razvijajući kroz tijek izvedbe mogućnosti povezanog poimanja rada i produktivnosti, *Work Every Day* ipak inzistira na kontingentnosti njihove povezivosti – kroz predstavu stalna je mogućnost da iz rada ne nastaje proizvod ili da proizvod ne nastaje iz rada. Kontingentnost tog odnosa – između rada predstave i proizvoda predstave – postupak je kojim *Work Every Day* zauzima suprotni pol od teatra potvrđivanja i pojašnjavanja da ono što je posrijedi u društvu doista jest potvrđivo u teatru. Teatar potvrđivanja i pojašnjavanja, koji eto u posljednje vrijeme na hrvatskim pozornicima proživljava svoju drugu mladost, nadasve u formi propagandnog kazališta, predmijeva da može izvjesno uprizoriti ono što gledatelj zna i što masmediji kolportiraju. Međutim, kontingenost materijalnih nositelja teatarskog događaja korumpira izvjesnosti znanja koje inscenira. Od izvjesnosti ostaje tek izvjesnost neizvjesnosti. Stoga je ovdje naprotiv riječ o teatru oduzimanju: ono s čim smo došli možda nije tako, ono s čim smo otišli možda nije tako. Teatar kojeg napuštamo uskraćeni za ono s čim smo došli, teatar koji nas osiromašuje namjesto da se upinje da nas obogati.

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Suspended Work of Certainty – A Spectator's Preference Regarding the Performance *Work Every Day*

Tomislav Medak

Translated from Croatian by Marina Miladinov

In Tom McCarthy's novel *The Remainder*, an unnamed character is involved in a fateful event – the fall of an unidentified object that fell on his head from the sky and left him without a memory of the accident, yet with a considerable financial compensation. This enables him to harness people, objects, and events in a megalomaniac effort of creating the circumstances in which he could relive the specific, yet indefinable disposition caused by the incident and by memories of his previous life. The accident concealed by amnesia forces him to compulsively enact the scenes from a reality until the organizing principles of reliving the event acquire autonomy and begin generating a series of events that lose all contact with the initial trauma. From the reconstruction of a *deja-vu* that began with a crack in the wall, vague memories of an apartment and the smell of fried liver from the neighbour's, the enterprise will escalate to a bank robbery and an airplane flight into the unknown.

Traumatic compulsion, which is according to psychoanalytical orthodoxy compelled to repeat the pattern of the painful incident, thus confirming it as certain, void of contingency, and constitutive in terms of identity, here reaches a fictionalized solution in the economic power of a traumatized individual to mobilize the reality with the aim of producing a final event that is no longer harnessed in the inescapable necessity of repeating the pattern from the past, but is instead liberated for the absolute contingency of the newly

emerging future. Many things could be said about the fantasmatic meaning of this basic fiction in McCarthy's novel – for example, that it is economic power that enables the staged mobilization of the reality in order to break with the conditioning of the past (be it by interpreting the cure of a trauma as forgetting to forget with the help of consumerism as the true power of capital to produce the social reality, or as an ideological matrix that reproduces the structure of economic domination). However, for our purposes we will use the narrative procedure of gradual peeling of the rationality of action, suspension of the sufficient rationale (which is the manoeuvre of belief in the aleatoriness of economic power: richness can befall anyone, like an object out of the blue) which brings both the protagonist and the reader to the final contingency of happening – the series of reconstructions and repeating results in an event that no longer emerges from the original one.

Gradual suspension of the sufficient cause of staged actions and interpretability is the specific procedure used in the performance *Work Every Day* by choreographer and conceptual author Marjana Krajač. From the beginning and throughout the performance we follow the dispareteness of various aspects of expression: between various dance expressions of the four performers, between dance movement and choreographic organization of the dance material, between shaping the stage, costumes, light or music, and the structure of stage action, between the proto-text

and performance, etc. Even though we recognize the relatively clear structure in the course of the show, that structure does not condition the processes and elements within the performance, remaining a merely formally given itinerary. All material processes and elements insist on (or rather desist from, but I will come back to that) their specific, mutually irreducible expressivity. The performance continuously undermines the subjection of one element to the logic of another, seeking neither to base them on one another nor to produce their structural consistency. The incoherence and inconsequentiality is established as the dominant principle of organization.

Theatre is a process of abstraction, of thinning away those material vehicles of the communication process that constitute the theatrical apparatus. Abstracting from the presence of material elements in the theatrical apparatus – the performers, the stage set, stage technology, performance space, sounds, etc. – is a precondition for presenting the absent scenes. The historical avant-garde and post-avant-garde can be viewed as a history of attempts at giving the stage primacy to and enable the play of that otherwise thought-away, yet present materiality of theatrical action.

Conventionally, however, the theatrical action of performance dictates the structure of meaning and gives the consistency of expression to processes, agents, infrastructures, and relations that carry it. The material events on stage – such as dislocating the stage set, turning on the spotlights, action on the proscenium, or addressing someone through the fourth wall – are to be read together from the theatrical action itself. We might say that the theatrical event of performance is nothing else than precisely the production of that inner coherence of material action on stage. The process of producing that inner coherence of meaning and the consistency of expression determines each and every one of these elements separately. Moreover, with the unifying effect of performance, certain elements within the material structure determine other expressive elements as to their meaning. The classical hierarchy of theatre presupposed the unity of action on stage and the primacy of the dramatic text over other elements. However, Brechtian epic theatre abolishes this hierarchy of expressive elements in the theatrical apparatus. It is precisely that logic of de-hie-

rarchization that is radicalized in *Work Every Day*, which extracts the material processes, agents, infrastructures, and relations from the relationship of subjection to the structure of meaning in the performance. The procedure evolves from the abovementioned irreducible diversity of dance expression to the absence of coherence with the choreographic organization of movement and further, to the penultimate act of comic choreography, which autonomizes the structure of attention of the spectator and the final act of lowering the ropes, in which the invisible material infrastructure of theatre eventually gains its autonomy.

Performance dominated by unfinished gestures, which seems only half-done and suspended in the process, programmatically thematizes work in its very title. Developing the possibilities of the related notions of work and productivity through performance, *Work Every Day* nevertheless insists on the contingency of their relatedness – throughout the show, there is a continuous possibility of work without creating a product or a product that does not result from work. The contingency of that relationship – between the work and the product of performance – is a procedure through which *Work Every Day* occupies the opposite pole from the theatre of assertion and explanation that what goes on in the society should be assertible in theatre. The theatre of assertion and explanation, which has been experiencing its second youth on the Croatian scene, especially in the form of propaganda theatre, supposes that it can positively present what the spectator knows and what the mass media perpetuate. However, the contingency of the material vehicles of theatrical action corrupts the certainties of knowledge that it enacts. The only certainty left is the certainty of uncertainty. Therefore, what we have here is the theatre of subtraction: what we have brought with us *may not be so*, and what we take home with us *may not be so*. It is a theatre that we leave deprived of what we have brought with us, a theatre that impoverishes us instead of striving to enrich us.

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Dear ----,

But the ineffable part of the utopia is that what defies subsumption under identity—the “use value,” in Marxist terminology—is necessary anyway if life is to go on at all, even under the prevailing circumstances of production. The utopia extends to the sworn enemies of its realization. Regarding the concrete utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be free of it: neither a system nor a contradiction.*

Love,

* Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (1966).



Dear----,

To be intemperate means at once that you do and do not belong to a time, just as to be a-topian means that you do and do not belong to a place. Being intemperate or a-topian communists means being thinkers and actors of the unconditional equality of anybody and everybody, but this can only happen in a world in which communism has no actuality bar the network framed by our communistic thoughts and actions themselves. There is no such thing as an ‘objective’ communism already at work in the forms of capitalist production or able to be anticipated in the logic of capitalism. Capitalism only ever produces capitalism. So, if communism is to mean anything, it must be radically heterogeneous to the logic of capitalism. This type of ‘separate’ communism might seem overly restrictive. However, instead of forever predicated communism on the development of capitalism, of basing the eternal actuality of communism on that of capitalism, we ought to reassert the radicality of communism as a power of separation. Whether or not it is overly restrictive, it seems to me crucial that we experiment with its powers.*

Love,

* Jacques Ranciere, *Dissensus: on politics and aesthetics* (2010).

Audio obscura ili 'Strepnja u palom gradu'⁰¹

Louise Owen


S engleskoga preveo Makso Herman

01 Naslov je ujedno i naziv jedne od razina internetske igre *Lord of the Rings Online*.

02 Lavinia Greenlaw, *Introduction: Dark Listening, Audio Obscura* (Woodbridge: Full Circle Editions 2011), str. 5.

03 John McAuliffe, *Turning for home*, <http://www.artangel.org.uk/projects/2011/audio_obscura/turning_for_home/turning_for_home_by_john_mcauliffe> [datum pristupa: studeni 2011.]

04 Michael Symmons Roberts, *Waiting*, <http://www.artangel.org.uk/projects/2011/audio_obscura/waiting_michael_symmons_roberts/waiting_by_michael_symmons_roberts> [datum pristupa: studeni 2011.]



udio Obscura Lavinije Greenlaw iz 2011. djelo je zvučne umjetnosti i prvi je puta izvedeno na željezničkoj stanici Piccadilly u Manchesteru u sklopu Manchester International Festivala, a potom i na londonskom St Pancras Internationalu. Predstava svoju publiku stavlja u položaj dobronamjernih špijuna. Ta pažljiva kompozicija isječaka i nesretnih priča o neuspjeloj intimnosti, nasilju, frustraciji i mentalnoj bolesti podlastire svoj sadržaj u obliku natruha tajnovitih i neartikulisanih iskustava koje u svojim glavama nose slučajni putnici na željezničkoj stanici. Publika Greenlawičinog djela nenametljivo sluša i gleda svoje 'kolege putnike'. Greenlaw je zamislila svoje djelo kao zvučnu varijantu tehnike camera obscura, "nekoć popularnog oblika zabave i umjetničkog sredstva"⁰² – u ovom je slučaju otvor slušateljevo uho, a 'zrcala' su riječi koje su napisali umjetnici i izveli glumci, pa su kasnije pažljivo uređene i isprepletene kako bi stvorile gusto zvučno tkanje. Kao što ova mješavina metafora daje naslutiti, djelo je kreirano, ali i služilo se, recipročnošću između onoga što se osjeća, gleda i sluša. Muškarac za štandom na St Pancras Internationalu – blijedo siva kocka koju je Ingrid Hu dizajnirala u namjeri da je neprimjetno uklopi u okružje javnog prostora – savjetovao nam je da bismo, dok slušamo djelo, trebali prvo prošetati uokolo pa se onda smjestiti negdje i promatrati druge ljude kako prolaze. Po-lusatnu bi izvedbu tako svaki slušatelj 'iskusio uživo' i to preko slušalica i crnog MP3 playera koji, a to upada u oči, na sebi nema nijednu tipku.

Djela poput *Audio Obscura*, koja teže publiku privremeno uroniti u alternativne svjetove, zahtijevaju posebnu vrstu kontemplativnog pisma: opisi koji govore o svakodnevnim lokacijama poput

željezničke stanice koja nam se ukazuje kao nova, performativne demonstracije simpatije prema zakupljenosti nekog djela 'spontanošću' i 'događajem' kroz uporabu prezenta. U svojoj recenziji mančesterske izvedbe djela, John McAuliffe započinje pitanjem: "Preuzmimo svoje slušalice na štandu i kažu nam da bismo se trebali šetati po stanici. Prisluškujemo li ili smo publika, sudionici? Glas nam govori da 'slušamo' i mi to činimo".⁰³ Slično tome, prve rečenice članka Michaela Symmons Robertsa bave se 'primjećivanjem': "Pogleđaj ženu u plavom kostimu kako gleda ekran s polascima jedva susprežući uzbuđenje. Je li dobila ono promaknuće? Uspjela sklopiti onaj posao? Ku-pila onaj stan? Ne, pogledaj ponovno. Ne gleda odlaske nego dolaske".⁰⁴ U svojim se recenzijama *Audio Obscura* i McAuliffe i Roberts bave dramatizacijama 'čekanja', 'priječnog stanja' i nesigurnosti svijeta koji je iznenada postao kazališni – drugim riječima, konstruiranim osjećajem liminalnosti koji ukazuje na 'činjenicu' da je ljudsko postojanje nestabilno. To je ideja na kojoj djelo inzistira i koju orientacija teksta prema sadašnjosti (u prezantu) potvrđuje.

Boreći se u analizi ovog djela s prinudom da sei sama time pozabavim, palo mi je na pamet kako uvodne rečenice ovih recenzija, kao i drugih njima sličnih, donekle predstavljaju diskurzivne eksstenzije dramske forme djela. Uz to, ono što me pogotovo zainteresiralo kod Greenlawičinog komada, kao primjera performativnog djela koje od nas očekuje da u njega 'uronimo', uprizorenje je 'nestabilnog prezenta' kroz vrlo detaljno kalibriranu i kontroliranu dramaturgiju. Na taj se način rigorozno nastoji proizvesti precizni osjećaj 'nesigurnosti' (*precarity*), što jedan od likova eksplicitno ističe pri kraju: "Ljudi ne vide koliko je sve ne-

sigurno. Za njih je tlo mjesto. Oni su na mjestu". Greenlawova piše sljedeće o svom djelu: "Bez obzira radi li se o kratkoj uznemirenosti ili polaganoj realizaciji, perturbaciji ili inzistiranju, ono što se čuje ne smije imati težinu – mora biti poput laganog poput misli".⁰⁵ Iako se to može reći za tehničku uređenost narativa o nesretnim likovima kao prolaznim figurama – preklapaju se, blijede i postaju jasniji, smješteni su u okružje zvukova koračanja, plakanja i povremeno suprotstavljeni rezonantnom šumu – kontroliranja struktura koja slijedi djelu je podarila formu.

Nakon prvog posjeta predstavi i igranja po pravilima, odlučila sam poći i drugi put, no s nakanom da pravila prekršim. Kako bih preciznije identificirala način na koji funkcioniра struktura predstave, sjela sam na klupu, izvadila svoj laptop i počušala transkribirati sve što sam čula. Naravno, ovaj put djelo nije uspjelo pretvoriti željezničku postaju St Pancras u kazališnu predstavu. U prvom je navratu vizualno 'lijepljjenje' govora preko ljudi prisutnih u prostoru kreiralo promjenjivu vrstu estetskog realizma, omogućujući 'ispravne' poveznice između glasa koji se sluša i tijela koje se promatra, dok je cjelokupni efekt zavisio o određenoj vrsti asocijativnog stereotipiziranja. ("Kako je jadan onaj sredovečni muškarac! Pogrljen je, neobrijan i nosi tugu u očima. Nema nikoga. Nikoga tko bi rekao da je uvijek bio štogod da je bio"). U pokušaju da napišem 'scenarij', postala sam iznimno svjesna Greenlawičinog majstorskog koreografiiranja različitih glasova i nemogućnosti da zabilježim riječi koje izgovaraju dok nadiru i odlaze. Međutim, strujanja narativa tekla su oko čvršćih isječaka teksta koje izgovara tek jedan jedini autoritativni glas – smirena razmišljanja jedne žene, pažljivo raspoređena između nemirnih meditacija drugih likova i često ukotvljena u rezonantnom, zlatnom šumu.

Na početku nas djela ženski glas upoznaje sa svijetom predstave sljedećim upozorenjem: "Po-slušaj – srce svega" – srce koje spominje je nježna no uznemirujuća kakofonija govora iz koje su postepeno nastale pojedinačne priče. Glas nas tješi: "Netko uvijek pada, ne bojte se pasti. / Uvijek nešto ostavljamo za sobom. Nešto uvijek isklizne, ili izgubi, ili zaboravi i to je u redu. / Želim da znate da je netko vidio". Nudi nam sveznajuću opservaciju: "Proći će pokraj nje. Uvijek tako biva. Jadan čovjek. Jadan čovjek. / Ne traže jedno drugo. / On ne govori ono što želi reći. Kako bi i mogao?". U ovim je primjerima glas poprimio polubožanska obilježja, slična onima koja posjeduju anđeli iz filma *Nebo nad Berlinom* (1987) Wima Wendersa. Na primjer, inzistirajući kako "Tlo nestaje i vi stojite na nekom drugom mjestu", glas je potvrdio osnovnu nestabilnost svijeta u kojem svi mi (tj., likovi i stvarni slušatelji) živimo. Usred vapaja likova – o brizi, mrtvorođenčadi, grozomornoj (zločinačkoj?) izdaji – umirujući autoritativni glas razvija i osna-

žuje osjećaj neminovnoga, mirno prihvaćanje onoga što će se zbiti: "Opusti se. / Moglo bi se dogoditi. Moglo bi biti prekasno. To nije pitanje odluke". Pri samom kraju djela, jedna od dramatis personae ubrzano šapuće nešto što bi se najbolje moglo opisati kao molitva (može je se također primjetiti u knjizi koja prati djelo, koja je više niz dekontekstualiziranih fragmenata tekstova i fotografija nego scenarij):

Molim vas uzmite ovu ljutnju i bol / i dopustite mi da osjetim ljubav koju znam da posjedujem / i dopustite mi da mogu govoriti o ljubavi / i pokažite ljubav i dopustite mi da ho-dam slobodno [...] i dopustite da bude vreme-na i dopustite mi da otvorim svoje srce / i dopustite da se na nadu odgovara s ljubavlju / i da sva želja bude jednostavna i dobra i dopustite mi da budem voljena i dozvolite mi da budem dobra.⁰⁶

Ženski glas ubrzo nakon toga izgovara svoje posljedne riječi – "Okrećući leđa domu, napuštamo sami sebe. Odlazimo. Sami". – koje su naposljetu prekinute zvukom "korak, korak, korak", odražavajući zadatak koji bi i sama publika ubrzo trebala izvršiti. Zatim slijedi vraćanje MP3 playera na stand i odlazak u budućnost ispunjenu obećanjem tuge.

Michael Symmons Roberts bavi se kvazireligioznom dimenzijom djela bez da se konkretno poziva na njegov sadržaj. Željezničke postaje uspoređuje s "hramovima čekanja",⁰⁷ čin čekanja naziva kreativno plodnim, a jesen – vrijeme izvedbe djela u Londonu – znakovitom prethodnicom adventa, "doba velikog iščekivanja".⁰⁸ U čudu se pita mogu li izvedbe djela poput *Audio Obscura* omogućiti publici da ponovno iskusí,

kao što je pjesnik Patrick Kavanagh napisao u svojoj pjesmi Advent, "novinu koja je bila prisutna u svakoj ustajaloj stvari / kada bismo je promatrali kao djeca". Gledajući tim naočalamu, vrijeme provedeno na željezničkim postajama bitno gradi karakter. Oplemenjuje dušu.⁰⁹

Oplemenjivanje duše? Za mene ovo djelo sugerira beznadnu analizu. Njegovo bavljenje tugom i nesigurnošću – i mogućnošću iskupljenja u budućnosti – zasnovano je na individualizaciji likova i slušatelja. To vrijedi i za narativnu razinu i materijalizaciju djela. Dok sam kružila po stanici slušajući djelo po prvi put, odjednom mi je na pamet pala misao: "Što ako sretнем nekoga s posla kako se vraća kući? Pošto ne mogu zaustaviti snimku, propustit ћu dio". Stvarajući uvjete za kontemplaciju, djelo odbija mogućnost društvene interakcije. *Audio Obscura* dijeli tu orientaciju s drugim primjerima performansa koji od nas očekuju da u njih

05 Lavinia Greenlaw, str. 7.

06 Lavinia Greenlaw, str. 60.

07 Michael Symmons Roberts.

08 Michael Symmons Roberts.

09 Michael Symmons Roberts.

“uronimo”, a koje su Sophie Nield i skupina istraživača prekrasno dekonstruirali time što su zajedno postali Promatrač (*Spectator*), ukazavši na mnogostrukе slojeve društvenoga koje takve forme izvedbe nužnosti odbacuju. Promatrujući estetski i logički realizam svijeta djela kazališnih grupa Goat, Monkey i Punchdrunk, Nieldsova se pita:

Ako su njegovi vrijeme i prostor “stvarni”, ako je on uronjen u svoju vlastitu koheziju, onda se pitam tko smo mi: duhovi, nekakva prijelazna bića? Zamišljeni i prije nego što smo stigli, kako se može nositi s našom različitošću? On ne zna tko smo mi.¹⁰

Audio Obscura nije bila suočena s problemom uključivanja publike u vizualno kohezivnu društvenu situaciju gdje jedini mogući problem predstavljuju slušalice, ionako sasvim uobičajene i svakodnevne pojave. Njeno ‘realno’ je društveni subjekt koji zamišlja – usamljena figura, nesposobna vjerovati bilo kome. Čini se kao da čestita članu publike koji uspije shvatiti “koliko je zapravo sve nesigurno”. Očigledno je da se nalazi u snažnoj suprotnosti s lažnim dramatizacijama zajednice putem *flashmobs* koje korporacije plaćaju u svrhu oglašavanja, poput T-Mobileovog nagrađivanog masovnog plesa, koji se zbiva u ‘stvarnom’ okruženju željezničke stanice¹¹ i u kojem se koncepti promatranja i iskupljenja također sukobljavaju.

¹⁰ Sophie Nield, ‘The Rise of the Character Named Spectator’, *Contemporary Theatre Review*, 18.4 (2008): 531-535 (str. 534).

¹¹ Mark Sweeney, ‘T-Mobile flashmob wins TV ad of year: Mobile phone commercial set in London railway station takes accolade at British Television Advertising Awards’, *The Guardian*, 11. ožujak 2010.

***Audio Obscura*, or, 'Dread in the Fallen City'**⁰¹

Louise Owen

01 This title is also the name of a level in the online role-playing game *Lord of the Rings Online*.

02 Lavinia Greenlaw, 'Introduction: Dark Listening', *Audio Obscura* (Woodbridge: Full Circle Editions 2011), p. 5.

03 John McAuliffe, 'Turning for home', <http://www.artangel.org.uk/projects/2011/audio_obscura/turning_for_home/turning_for_home_by_john_mcauliffe> [accessed November 2011].

04 Michael Symmons Roberts, 'Waiting', <http://www.artangel.org.uk/projects/2011/audio_obscura/writing_michael_symmons_roberts/waiting_by_michael_symmons_roberts> [accessed November 2011].

avinia Greenlaw's *Audio Obscura* (2011), a piece of sound art staged first at Manchester Piccadilly Rail Station as part of the Manchester International Festival, and then at London St Pancras International, invited its audience members to take on the character of a benign sort of spy. The work, a careful composition of snatches of unhappy stories about failed intimacy, violence, frustration and mental illness, offered the stories up as glimpses of secret, unarticulated worlds of experience carried around in the heads of the travellers populating the station. The audience of Greenlaw's piece would listen and watch its 'fellow travellers' unobtrusively. Greenlaw conceived the work as an aural variant of the technology of the camera obscura, "a once popular form of entertainment and artist's tool, which uses a small aperture and mirrors to project a reflection of the passing world"⁰² – the aperture in this case being the listener's ear, and the 'mirrors', the words written by the artist, performed by actors, and then carefully cut, edited, and woven together to create a textured aural fabric. As this mix of metaphors suggests, the work produced, and played upon, a certain reciprocity between the felt, the watched and the heard. The steward manning the booth at St Pancras International – a pale grey block artfully designed by Ingrid Hu to harmonise inconspicuously with the surrounding shopping arcade – advised that in listening to the piece, it was best first to walk around, then to settle down somewhere to watch people passing by. The half-hour piece would thus be 'experienced' by each listener 'live' with the use of headphones and a black MP3 player conspicuously lacking any controls.

Immersive works like *Audio Obscura*, which seek to plunge audience members temporarily into alternative worlds, elicit a particular sort of contemplative writing in response: descriptions that talk of encountering a quotidian venue, such as a train station, afresh, and performative demonstrations of sympathy with a work's engagement with 'spontaneity' and 'event' through the employment of the present tense. In his review of the work in Manchester, John McAuliffe offers this opening meditation: "We pick up our headphones at a platform and are encouraged to walk around inside a station. Are we eavesdroppers, an audience, participants? A voice tells us, 'Listen' and we do".⁰³ Similarly, the first sentences of an article by Michael Symmons Roberts perform a gesture of 'noticing': "That woman in a blue business suit scanning the departure boards with barely contained excitement. Has she got that promotion? Made that deal? Bought that flat? No. Look again. It's not departures but arrivals that hold her attention".⁰⁴ McAuliffe and Roberts each go on to consider *Audio Obscura*'s dramatization of 'waiting', 'inbetween-ness', and the uncertainty of a world suddenly become theatrical – in other words, a constructed sensation of liminality designed to point towards the 'fact' of the instability of human existence, an idea upon which the work insists, and which a writerly orientation towards 'the present' corroborates.

Having wrestled, in writing this analysis of the work, with a compulsion to do exactly the same, it occurred to me that the opening gestures of these critiques and others like them in a sense represent discursive extensions of the dramatic form of the work. Alongside this, what particularly interested me about Greenlaw's piece, as an example of

immersive performance work, was its staging of the 'unstable present' through a very finely calibrated and controlled dramaturgy. It rigorously contrived to produce a precise sense of 'precarity', named explicitly by one of its characters as the work moved towards a conclusion: 'People don't see how precarious everything is. For them the ground is in place, they are in place'. Of her work, Greenlaw writes: "Whether a brief agitation or a slow realization, however perturbing or insistent, what is heard should be as weightless as it can be – like thought".⁰⁵ Though certainly true of the piece's technical styling of the narratives of its unhappy characters as evanescent – overlapping, fading in and out, placed within a surrounding soundscape of footsteps, crying, and, occasionally, juxtaposed with a resonant humming – a more controlled supervening structure gave it shape.

Having attended the performance once, and played the game by its rules, I decided to attend a second time, and to break them. To identify more precisely how its structure worked, I sat down on a bench, got out my laptop, and attempted a live transcription. On this occasion, of course, the piece failed to theatricalise St Pancras Station. Before, the visual 'wallpapering' of the fictional speech over the people present in the space had produced a volatile kind of aesthetic realism, encouraging 'appropriate' links between the listened-to voice and the watched bodies, dependent for this effect on a mode of associational stereotyping. ('How miserable that middle-aged man must be. He has a stoop, a five o'clock shadow and downcast eyes. 'There's no-one. No-one to say he was always whatever'.) Instead, in attempting to write the work's 'script', I became acutely aware of Greenlaw's masterful choreographing of the piece's numerous voices, and the impossibility of seizing upon their elusive words as they surged and receded. The streams of narrative, however, flowed around more solid fixtures of speech offered by a single authoritative voice – the calm reflections of a woman, distributed carefully throughout the distressed meditations of the other characters, and often embedded in the resonant, golden hum.

At the commencement of the work, the woman's voice introduced us to the world of the performance with the injunction: 'Listen – the heart of it' – the heart in question a gentle yet unsettling cacophony of speech from which individual stories gradually emerged. The voice comforted us: 'There is always someone falling, do not be afraid to fall.' / 'There is always something left behind. Something always slips, or is lost, or forgotten, and it's alright.' / 'I want you to know that someone has seen'. It offered omniscient observation: 'He's going to walk straight past her. He always does. Poor man. Poor man.' / 'They are not looking for each other.' / 'He is not saying what he wants to say.'

How can he?" In these instances, the voice took on semi-divine attributes, akin to the watching angels in Wim Wenders' *Wings of Desire* (1987). In insisting, for example, that '*The ground falls away and you are standing in a different place*', the voice affirmed the essential instability of the world we (that is, the fictional characters and the actual listener), inhabit. And, in the midst of the characters' cries into the void – about anxiety, a still-birth, a heinous (criminal?) betrayal – the calming authoritative voice developed and encouraged a sense of the inevitable, a zen acceptance of what will be: '*Let go*' / '*It might happen. It might be too late. It's not a question of deciding*'. In the last moments of the work, one of the *dramatis personae* whispered urgently what might best be described as a prayer (also reproduced in the performance's accompanying book, less a script than a series of decontextualised fragments of text and photographs):

Please take this anger and this pain / and let me feel the love I know I have / and let me be able to speak of love / and show love and let me walk free [...] and let there be time and let me open my heart / and let the hope be met with love / and all the wanting be simple and good and let me be loved and let me be allowed to be good.⁰⁶

The woman's final words closely followed – '*Turning from home, we leave ourselves. We leave. Alone.*' – which themselves ceded to the sound 'step, step, step', reflecting the actions shortly to be taken by audience members themselves, returning the MP3 player to the booth and walking on into a future filled with the promise of sorrow.

Michael Symmons Roberts takes up the quasi-religious dimension of the work without specifically alluding to its content, instead framing railway stations as "temples to waiting",⁰⁷ the act of waiting itself creatively fecund, and the autumn – the moment of the piece's performance in London – the significant precursor to Advent, "the great season of waiting".⁰⁸ He wonders, in conclusion, whether performances like *Audio Obscura* might allow audiences to re-experience,

as the poet Patrick Kavanagh put it in his poem 'Advent', 'the newness that was in every stale thing / when we looked at it as children.' See[n] through that lens, time spent waiting in railway stations is more than character-building. It is soul-building.⁰⁹

Soul-building? For me, the work offered a bleak analysis. Its curation of misery and uncertainty – and the possibility of future redemption – is predicated on the individualization of character and listener alike. This is the case at the level of the

05 Lavinia Greenlaw, p. 7.

06 Lavinia Greenlaw, p. 60.

07 Michael Symmons Roberts.

08 Michael Symmons Roberts.

09 Michael Symmons Roberts.


narrative and the work's material enactment. As I meandered around the station, listening to the work for the first time, I thought with sudden alarm: 'what if I meet someone I know on their way home from work? I can't stop the recording, and I will miss the performance'. In producing the conditions for contemplation, the work refuses the possibility of social encounter. *Audio Obscura* shares this orientation with other examples of immersive performance, beautifully deconstructed by Sophie Nield and a group of fellow researchers brought together to become 'Spectator', who draw attention to the multiple layers of the social that such forms of performance of necessity disavow. Of the aesthetic and logical realism of the world of works by Goat and Monkey and Punc-hdrunk, Nield asks:

If its time and space are 'real' to it, if it is immersed in its own cohesion, then who are we; some ghosts, some transient presences? Imagined before we ever arrived, how else can it cope with our difference? It doesn't know who we are.¹⁰


Audio Obscura was not faced with the difficulty of inserting audience members into a visually cohesive social situation, the only possible interruption being the headphones, already a common enough sight. Its 'real' is the social subject it imagines – a lonely figure, able to trust no-one. It seems to congratulate the audience member who realizes '*how precarious everything is*'. Arguably, it represents the opposite number of the corporate flashmob's fake dramatizations of community for the purposes of advertising, likewise staged, like T-Mobile's awarding winning mass dance, in the 'real' environment of the railway station,¹¹ and in which concepts of surveillance and redemption also collide.

¹⁰ Sophie Nield, 'The Rise of the Character Named Spectator', *Contemporary Theatre Review*, 18, 4 (2008): 531-535 (p. 534).

¹¹ Mark Sweeney, 'T-Mobile flashmob wins TV ad of year: Mobile phone commercial set in London railway station takes accolade at British Television Advertising Awards', *The Guardian*, 11 March 2010.



**Useful gestures, 126
Useless gestures, 125–6, 191**




Dear ----,

But the concept of ‘affective labor’ strips the feminist analysis of housework of all its demystifying power. In fact, it brings reproductive work back into the world of mystification, suggesting that reproducing people is just a matter of producing ‘emotions,’ ‘feelings.’ It used to be called ‘a labor of love;’ Hardt and Negri instead have discovered ‘affection.’ The feminist analysis of the function of the sexual division of labor, the function of gender hierarchies, the analysis of the way capitalism has used the wage to mobilize women’s work in the reproduction of the labor force—all of this is lost under the label of ‘affective labor.’ When we said that housework is actually work for capital, that although it is unpaid work it contributes to the accumulation of capital, we established something extremely important about the nature of capitalism as a system of production. We established that capitalism is built on an immense amount of unpaid labor. Also, when we said that housework is the work that reproduces not just ‘life,’ but ‘labor-power,’ we began to separate two different spheres of our lives and work that seemed inextricably connected. We became able to conceive of a fight against housework now understood as the reproduction of labor-power, the reproduction of the most important commodity capital has: the worker’s ‘capacity to work,’ the worker’s capacity to be exploited. In other words, by recognizing that what we call ‘reproductive labor’ is a terrain of accumulation and therefore a terrain of exploitation, we were able to also see reproduction as a terrain of struggle, and, to conceive of an anti-capitalist struggle against reproductive labor that would not destroy ourselves or our communities.*

Love,

* Silvia Federici, “Precarious labor: A feminist viewpoint” (2006).



Dear ----,

You refer to Perret's unsuccessful attempts to take housing out of the city. But this too is quite understandable. He severed an isolated member from a complex organism. That member inevitably wasted away. We are removing from the city nothing less than the city itself, its entire system of supply and culture. In other words, we are creating a whole new organism. This is quite different from what Perret was trying to do. You write that the peasant does not love flowers and does not hear the song of the skylark. But of course he doesn't when he is exhausted with backbreaking labor. But we want our peasant to listen to the skylark. And all this will be possible not by smoothing out the contradictions with which the modern capitalist system is riddled, but by creating new forms of human settlement more worthy of the future. We are aware that we have yet to find the solution to this very difficult problem. But we cannot refrain from posing it, we cannot refrain from trying to solve it. That is our duty, the duty of architects who would like to become the architects of socialism.*

Love,

* Moisei Ginzburg, "Letter to Le Corbusier" (1930).

Skice otkopane prošlosti

Antonija Letinić

01 Karl Krauss u "Ekstremist s razlogom: Još o Karlu Krausu", Boris Buden, *Kaptolski kolodvor*, (Beograd: Centar za savremenu umetnost, 2001), str. 78.

Pozornica u polumraku. U gornjoj trećini slike u pravilnom je ritmu raspoređeno pet televizijskih ekrana na kojima se naizmjence ispisuju sudio-nici pojedinih scena, ne osobnim imenima već zbirnim imenicama: mještani, gradona-čelnik, novinari i ostali. Četvero, u crno odjevenih izvođača jedva da se razaznaju u prigušenim svjetlima scene. Iz pozadine, poput jeke, razlijeva se utišan, ravnometrijan, bestjelesan glas koji ponavlja "Cigani, Cigani, Cigani...". Pozornica će ostati takvom od početka do kraja predstave. Iako se na sceni ne događa ništa, ili je barem tako naizgled – sve što je na njoj odsutno već se odvilo negdje drugdje. I prisutno je, gotovo sigurno, u svakom trenutku na nekom mjestu, mimo kazališne pozornice. Ono što se događa na kazališnoj sceni u predstavi SNG ogoljena je stvarnost tog sveprisutnog prizora. Riječ je o predstavi *Slovensko narodno gledalište Janeza Janše*. Svojedobno znan i kao Emil Hrvatin, umjetnik, redatelj i sociolog, voditelj ljubljanske Maske, na scenu postavlja apstrahiranu, od mjesta i vremena razdvojenu priču o obitelji Strojan iz mjesta Ambrus. Predstava reproducira zbivanja koja su se odvijala tijekom listopada 2006. Tih je dana romska obitelj Strojan, koju čini trideset i jedan član, izgnana sa svog posjeda te prisilno preseljena u izbjeglički centar u Postojni. Dva su dana proveli pod opsadom, zarobljeni go-milom sumještana koji su zahtijevali da napuste mjesto prijeteći im smrću u suprotnom. Sumještani su ih optuživali za ilegalno prisvajanje zemlje, ostavljanje smeća u obližnjem potoku, a situaciju je dodatno uzburkala tuča u kojoj je jedan od sudi-onika završio u bolnici u komi. Priča će doživjeti svoj vrhunac kada se u nju upletu mediji, organi vlasti pa i sam predsjednik.

Glumci na sceni, sa slušalicama na ušima, slušaju televizijske reportaže i materijale snimljene na mjestu događanja koje izravno reproduciraju publici. Njihova je korska izvedba lišena bilo kakvih svojstava, kao i koru svojstvenih komentara, te svedena na puko mehaničko ponavljanje onoga

što čuju. Jedinu kulisu, rekvizitu, zvučni i vizualni efekt, scenografiju i kostim čini glas iz pozadine koji se prostorom razliježe kontinuiranim, monotonim i bezizražajnim tonom ponavljajući riječ "Cigani, Cigani, Cigani...". Tek na samom kraju predstave glas će dobiti i tijelo – ono Janeza Janše. Hrvatin priču zaokružuje simboličkim utjelovljenjem glasa iz sjene u liku samoga sebe, odnosno nekoga tko već nekoliko godina živi pod novim identitetom – onim Janeza Janše. Ovo ime na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije primarno se vezuje uz lik političara i predsjednika Slovenske demokratske stranke, koji je u vrijeme događaja oživljenih u predstavi obnašao dužnost predsjednika Vlade Republike Slovenije. Zatvarajući predstavu njegovim likom, Janša-umjetnik priču o ksenofobiji, netrpeljivosti spram Drugoga, diže na razinu kojoj ona i pripada – onu čitave nacije.

Kao što je Karl Kraus dramom *Posljednji dan covječanstva*, sačinjenom od citata iz bečkog tiska tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata, u korice smjestio ludilo rata, ratnih stradanja i proslave beščutnosti, tako je i Janša istom tehnikom pod prigušena svjetla pozornice postavio ksenofobiju. Sam je Kraus opisujući svoju dramu rekao "Najnevjerojatnija djela o kojima se ovdje izvješćuje doista su se dogodila; ja sam naslikao samo ono što su oni činili. Najnevjerojatniji razgovori koji su ovdje vođeni, doista su od riječi do riječi izgovoreni; najžešće izmišljotine su citati". I Janšini i Krausovi likovi lišeni su osobnosti, svedeni na tipove, a za ovaj će postupak Kraus reći: "Ja sam im oduzeo meso! Ali sam mislima njihove gluposti, osjećajima njihove zloće, užasavajućem ritmu njihove ništavnosti dao tijelo i omogućio mu da se kreće"⁰¹. Teško je bolje dočarati učinak onoga što Janša čini u *Slovenskom narodnom gledalištu*. Upravo doslovnošću, zato-mljavanjem vizualnog aspekta predstave, gašenjem zvučnih efekata, uklanjanjem svih pomoćnih elemenata koji bi mogli na bilo koji način promijeniti dokumentarnost, stvarnost i čistoću slike, u prvi plan stavlja toliko negirano lice zemlje koja si utvara da je oaza mira i prosperiteta pod velom

tempiranog Balkana. Stvarni akteri ovih događaja ne žalju za stradalim sumještaninom, već u tra- gičnom incidentu pronalaze priliku da otjeraju ne- mile im sustanare. Njihove pogrde razotkrivaju lice ne samo onih koji sudjeluju u arhiviranim prizori- ma, već svih onih koji su ih u tome podržali. U SNG-u nema slike, ostao je jedino ton. Jezik potpu- nom vjernošću prenosi događaje koji su se odigra- li. Mehanička reprodukcija glumaca lišena je bilo kakve ekspresivnosti kojom su televizijski prilozi kao i događaji na licu mjesta bili protkani, ako ne upravo od nje i sačinjeni. Riječima izgovorenima bez osobnog naboja, koje robotizirano ponavljaju glumci, oduzeta su bilo kakva retorička svojstva, emotivni zanos uznenimore gomile iscijedjen je, a one su gledatelju dane u svom temeljnem znače- nju, u svoj njihovoj okrutnosti i beščutnosti.

I dok se Janša bavi ksenofobijom kroz recen- tne događaje, Yael Bartana joj se obraća kroz one iz malo dalje prošlosti. U poljskoj trilogiji video ra- dova naslovljenoj ... and Europe Will Be Stunned, izraelska video umjetnica eksperimentira sa svoje- vrsnom "nacionalnom psihoterapijom" prizivajući historijske demone kako bismo se s njima suočili. Trilogija koju čine video radovi *Mary Koszmary – Noćne more* iz 2008, *Mur i Weiza – Zid i toranj* iz 2009, te *Atentat* iz 2011, iako istražuje povijest Aškenaza u Europi i usredotočena je na kompleksnu sliku poljsko-židovskih odnosa, nudi univer- zalan narativ o spremnosti da prihvativimo Drugog i problemima kulturne integracije u nestabilnom svijetu satkanom iz političkih tenzija i stalnih naci- onalnih, klasnih, etničkih, identitarnih prijepora. Prvi puta predstavljena u cjelini u Poljskom pavi- ljonu na Venecijanskom bijenalu 2011., Bartanina trilogija gradi se oko fiktivnog Pokreta židovske renesanse u Poljskoj (Jewish Renaissance Move- ment in Poland).

Prvi Židovi naselili su područje današnje Polj- ske prije više od tisuću godina i ovaj je prostor stoljećima bio dom najveće i najznačajnije žido- vske zajednice u svijetu. U osvit Drugog svjetskog rata, emigracijom iz sovjetske Rusije i Ukrajine, židovska se populacija u Poljskoj naglo povećava dosežući broj od 3 300 000. Pitanje tretmana Židova postaje ključno nakon nacističke invazije na zapadnu Poljsku koju nastanjuje oko dva milijuna Židova. U najvećim poljskim gradovima oformlje- na su geta u kojima je stanovalo židovsko stanovništvo u iščekivanju preseljenja u eksterminacijske logore. U Drugom svjetskom ratu stradalo je šest milijuna Poljaka, od čega su tri milijuna bili Židovi. Zajednica poljskih Židova danas broji oko 20 000, iako je stvaran broj onih nevezanih uz neku specifičnu židovsku zajednicu ili kulturu, nekoliko puta veći.

Prvi film trilogije svojevrsni je manifest tog zamišljenog, utopijskog pokreta koji upućuje poziv Židovima da se vrate u zemlju svojih predaka. Glavni protagonist video rada je Slawomir Sierako-

wski, aktivist i glavni urednik časopisa *Krytyka Po- lityczna*. Stojeci na praznom, zapuštenom varšavskom stadionu, Sierakowski upućuje ispriku Žido- vima za nedjela počinjena u ne tako davnoj pro- šlosti.

[...]Ovo je poziv, ne mrtvima nego živima. Mi želimo da se tri milijuna Židova vrate u Poljsku, želimo da opet živite s nama. Potrebiti ste nam! Molimo vas da se vratite! Kad ste otišli, krišom smo se radovali. Govorili smo: "Barem smo svoji na svome." Poljski Poljak u Poljskoj, kojeg nitko ne ometa. No, kako ni ta- da nismo bili sretni, s vremenom na vrijeme pronašli bismo nekog Židova i rekli mu da na- pusti Poljsku. Čak i kada je bilo jasno da vas više nema, još uvijek je bilo onih koji su vam govorili da odete. I, što?
Danas nam je dozlogrdilo da gledamo u naša lica koja sva nalikuju jedna drugima. Na ulica- ma naših velikih gradova tragamo za stranci- ma i pažljivo slušamo kada progovore. Da!
Danas znamo da ne možemo živjeti sami. Po- treban nam je netko drugi, a nema bližeg dru- goga od vas! Dođite! Isti, ali drugačiji. Živjet ćemo zajedno.^{o2}

Sierakowski govori polagano, naglašavajući svaku riječ, ostavljajući im prostor da se razlegnu pra- znim amfiteatarskim prostorom stadiona. Kamera usredotočena na govornika zaboravlja ispravljen prostor stadiona, dok zvučna kulisa oblikovana je- kom, s reminiscencijama na govore karizmatika i velikih vođa pred gomilama, gradi monumental- nost i uzvišenost trenutka. Izokrećući standarde komunikacije, u ulozi dinamičnog političara i kori- steći se jezičnim stilom propagande iz Drugog sv- jetskog rata, empatična propovijed Sierakowskog, odjevenog u kožni baloner djelatnika tajnih službi, praćena je snažnom tjelesnom gestikulacijom.

[...] Jednim jezikom, ne možemo govoriti. Jednom religijom, ne možemo slušati. Jednom bojom, ne možemo vidjeti. Jednom kulturom, ne možemo osjećati. Bez vas se čak ne možemo ni sjećati. Bez vas, ostat ćemo zarobljeni u historiji – s vama, za- nas će se otvoriti budućnost. Nema budućno- sti za odabране narode. Nema budućnosti ni za kakve narode. Kad se pogledamo oči u oči, oklop će pasti i zajedno ćemo ostvariti ono što filozofi nisu mogli ni sanjati. Židovi! Sunarodnjaci! Naaaaarode!
Ako ne sad, onda kad? Ako ne mi, onda tko?
Tko će izvući Poljsku iz blata, da ne potone?
Ne čekajmo da nas globalno tržište sve učini sličima, ne čekajmo na novi uzlet nacionali- zama – tih tumorâ na tijelu slobodnog tržišta – da nas još jednom pokrene jedne protiv drugih ili protiv drugih drugih. Umjesto iden-

tični, postanimo jedno. Više nikada nećemo izrabljivati jedni druge, ponižavati jedni druge, krasti jedni drugima plodove njihova rada. Uz groblja čemo sagraditi škole i bolnice. Zasadit čemo drveća i sagraditi puteve. Ako želite, otpovijet ćemo na Mjesec zajedno. Vratite se danas i Poljska će se promjeniti, Evropa će se promjeniti, svijet će se promjeniti. I vi ćete postati drugačiji. Vratite se, ne kao sjene prošlosti nego kao nada za budućnost.^{o3}

U drugom dijelu govora, propovijed izlazi iz prošlosti, napušta prostor krivnje i isprike te se zagleđava u sadašnji trenutak i budućnost kakvu nam sadašnjost daje naslutiti. Iako se obraća izravno Židovima, otvaranjem pitanja o odabranom narodu, osvrтанjem na sadašnjost, umjetnica izdiže priču iznad individualne kompleksnosti odnosa Poljaka i Židova, krivca i žrtve, te klizeći u prostor ambivalentnosti napušta crno-bijelu tehniku i uzdiže je na univerzalnu razinu, možda se obraćajući i izraelsko-palestinskim nesuglasicama.

Dok Sierakowski drži svoj govor, na igralištu stadiona grupa mladih tinejdžera ispisuje bijelim prahom poziv bivšim sugrađanima. Mladi protagonisti simboliziraju sokratovsku krivnju "kvarenja mladih" zbog čega je osuđen na smrt. Ista će sudbina zadesiti i Sierakowskog u trećem dijelu trilogije, *Atentatu*, posvećenom njegovu smaknuću, odnosno posljednjem ispraćaju. No Bartana ga koristi u badjuovskoj interpretaciji kvarenja. "Ovdje "kvariti" znači naučiti nekog mogućnosti da odbije bilo kakvo sljepo podređivanje ustanovljenim mišljenjima. Kvariti znači dati mladima alate da promijene svoje viđenje svih socijalnih normi; kvariti znači nadomjestiti imitaciju raspravom i racionalnom kritikom, pa čak i, ako su principi u pitanju, nadomjestiti poslušnost pobunom."^{o4}

Oba rada usredotočena su na verbalni komunikacijski aspekt ostavljajući riječima da ostvare svoju punu težinu. Janša svoju kompoziciju gradi isključivo zvučnim alatima kroz zvučni aspekt riječi, uronjen u sadašnjost, gleda iza ograde političke korektnosti, u mržnju prema drugom i drugačijem. Njegova je budućnost ograđena bodljikavom žicom prigušene netrpeljivosti koja strpljivo čeka ratni zov. Bartanine pak riječi svoje puno ostvarenje nalaze u slici, u gesti protagonista koja prati zvučnu kulisu. Iako filmski, njezin se rad približava site-specific izvedbenom, teatarskom komadu. Janša se koristi kazalištem samo kako bi pokazao što je u stvari Slovensko narodno gledališće – ne kazališna pozornica, već svakodnevni performativ zaplotne malograđanstine i malodušnosti.

Bartana svoju utopiju gradi na slikama čije su asocijativne poveznice uobličene u prošlosti i na njima crpi nadu u svoju utopijsku budućnost. Ona gleda u budućnost iz sadašnjeg trenutka zaodjevenog scenografijom prošlog vremena velikih ko-

lektiva, vremena izgradnje novog, boljeg svijeta, vremena u kojem se gradila bolja budućnost, vremena u kojem se vjerovalo u jednakost, bratstvo i jedinstvo. Na tim slikama ona crta vjeru u bolju budućnost.

U djelu *Singular Modernity* Frederic Jameson ističe:

U iskušenju sam tvrditi da sadašnjost ne može s punim pravom samu sebe osjećati kao povijesno razdoblje bez tog pogleda iz budućnosti koje je zapečaćuje i snažno istjeruje iz vremena koje će doći kao što je to moglo činiti sa svojim izravnim prethodnicima. Ne trebamo pretjerano naglašavati pitanje krivnje (koje, ipak, s pravom prianja uz svaki oblik prakse) koliko ono odgovornosti koje možda ne može biti povrđeno bez sumnje u krivnju: jer odgovornost sadašnjosti je u samoodređenju svojih misija koje će je učiniti punopravnim historijskim razdobljem, a to zahtijeva odnos sa budućnošću onoliko koliko uključuje i zauzimanje pozicije prema prošlosti. Povijest, naravno, čine obje dimenzije.^{o5}

Oba se rada usredotočuju upravo na to, zauzimanjem pozicije u sadašnjosti koja tvori relaciju prema prošlosti iz pogleda budućnosti. Budućnost gledanu kroz pitanje drugoga i kako ćemo mu doškociti. Zadatak sadašnjosti jest zauzeti aktivnu poziciju, preuzeti odgovornost prema ovom trenutku, prema prošlosti koje smo nasljednici i izgraditi prostor za suverenu budućnost. Prihvatići odgovornost, priznati pogreške, zapamtiti ih kako ih ne bismo ponovili te na tim iskustvima graditi budućnost koja će se susresti s nekim novim zaprekama, ali neće ponavljati one prošle, zadatak je naše sadašnjosti. Bartana kroz trilogiju gradi dvije budućnosti – u prvom dijelu ta je budućnost utopijska sljednica vremena nakon oslobođenja, ona kva kakvom se možda budućnost varljivo slikala pobjedom nad fašizmom, nacizmom i nepravdom. Budućnost u njezinu trećem filmu, u kojoj je njezin protagonist žrvtovan zbog svojeg uvjerenja – budućnost je kakvu ishoduje budućnost one prošlosti iz koje je njezina utopija izrasla. U tom se smislu njezina utopija zaokružuje u zbilji, kao i Janšina i vraća u sadašnji trenutak u kojem još uvijek imamo prilike zagledati se u varljive prikaze budućnosti iz koje će nam se sadašnjost činiti boljom od onoga prema čemu smo hitali. No, prošlost nas ipak uči vjerovati u budućnost – čisto mogućnošću koja je prošlosti oduzeta – mogućnošću da budućnost ipak bude drugačija.

o3 Ibid. str. 127-128.

o4 Alain Badiou, 'Philosophy as Creative Repetition', http://www.lacan.com/symptom8_articles/badiou18.html [20. listopad 2011.]

o5 Frederic Jameson, *Singular Modernity* (London: Verso, 2005), str. 26

Drafts of the excavated past

Antonija Letinić

Translated from Croatian by Mirna Herman Baletić

01 Kark Krauss in "Ekstremist s razlogom: još o Karlu Krausu", in Boris Buden, *Kaptolski kolodvor* (Beograd: Centar za savremenu umetnost, 2001), p. 78

The stage is half-lit. The upper third of the scene is composed of five evenly distributed TV screens displaying the protagonists of each scene, not by their individual names, but through group names: the locals, the mayor, the news reporters and others. Four performers dressed in black can be barely seen under the dimmed lights of the stage. Slowly, like an echo, a silent, even, non-physical voice starts to repeat: "Gypsies, gypsies, gypsies..." The stage remains unchanged during the entire performance. Even though nothing is happening on the stage, or so it might seem, – everything that is absent from it has already happened somewhere else. It is present, almost certainly, in every moment at some other setting, outside the stage. What does happen on the scene of SNG is the revealed reality of this omnipresent image. This is a short description of Janez Janša's performance *Slovensko narodno gledališče*. Also known as Emil Hrvatin, the artist, director and sociologist, head of the Maska organization from Ljubljana, tells us the abstracted story, containing no place or time, about the Strojan family from the village of Ambrus. The play reenacts events from October 2006, when 31 members of the Roma family Strojan were evicted from their estate and forced to move to the refugee center in the town of Postojna. For two days, the family was under siege, because a large number of their fellow Ambrus inhabitants surrounded them, threatening to kill them if they did not leave. They accused them of acquiring their land illegally and dumping trash in the nearby stream. The situation got even worse when a fight broke out and one person ended up in the hospital in a coma. The story reached its climax when the media began reporting about it and the authorities, including even the president, got involved.

The actors on the scene wear headphones and listen and watch to media reports and TV footage about the event, thus telling the story to the audience. Their joint performance is deprived of any

features, including commentaries, and reduced to a mere mechanical repetition of what is heard through their headphones. The only setting, prop, audio and visual effect, scenic design and costume is the voice in the background, which steadily, monotonously and inexpressively repeats the word "Gypsies, gypsies, gypsies..." It is not until the end of the play that the voice is given a body – the body of Janez Janša. Hrvatin concludes the story with the symbolic embodiment of the voice in the background in the form of his own body, that is, someone who has lived under a new identity for several years – the identity of Janez Janša. In the countries of former Yugoslavia, the name Janez Janša primarily evokes the figure of politician and president of the Slovenian Democratic Party Janša, who at the time of the events in question was also the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia. By concluding the play with Janša's figure, Janša the artist raises the story of xenophobia and intolerance to the Other on a befitting level – the level of the entire nation.

As Karl Kraus, in his play *The Last Days of Mankind*, composed of quotes from the Vienna press during World War I, depicted the insanity of war, destruction caused by war and the celebration of insensitivity, Janša used the same technique to depict xenophobia under the dim light of the stage. Kraus himself described his play with the following words: "The most unlikely deeds reported here really happened; I just portrayed what they did. The most unlikely conversations held here were literally spoken; the most outrageous inventions are quotes." Both Janša's and Kraus' characters are deprived of any personality, reduced to types, and Kraus explains: "I took away their flesh! But I gave a body to the thoughts of their stupidity, the feelings of their malice, the horrifying rhythm of their nothingness and enabled it to move."⁰¹ There are hardly any better words to illustrate the effect of Janša's *Slovensko narodno gledališče*. It is precisely its literality, its suppression of any visual aspect, its restraint to use any audio effect, and its removal of all aiding elements which would in any way change the do-

cumentary quality, realness and purity of the image, that highlight the overly negated face of the country that flatters itself to be an oasis of peace and prosperity in the tumultuous surroundings of the Balkans. The true protagonists of the event do not feel any grief for their fellow villager who had to be hospitalized, but seek an opportunity to use the tragic incident to forever chase away the object of their hate. Their insults reveal to us not only the faces of those who are shown on the TV footage, but also the faces off all those people who supported them in doing so. SNG contains no imagery, there is only the sound. The words faithfully describe the events that took place. The mechanical performance of the actors is deprived of the expressivity contained in the TV reports. The words are uttered without any emotion; the actors repeat them as if they were robots. They are deprived of any rhetorical features, the emotional enthusiasm of the crowd has been drained away and they are given to the viewer in their basic meaning, in all their cruelty and meanness.

And while Janša deals with xenophobia through recent events, Yael Bartana tackles it through not so recent events. The Polish trilogy of videos entitled ...and Europe Will Be Stunned, the Israeli video artist experiments with a certain kind of 'national psychotherapy', invoking the demons of history to confront us. The trilogy comprising videos *Mary Koszmary – Nightmares* (2008), *Mur and Wieża – Wall and Tower* (2009) and *Assassination* (2011), even though exploring the history of Ashkenazi Jews in Europe and focusing on the image of Polish-Jewish relations, offers a universal narrative about the preparedness to accept the Other and the problems of cultural integration in an unstable world made up of political tensions and constant national, class, ethnic and identity disputes. Bartana's trilogy, premiered in its entirety at the 2011 Venice Biennale, revolves around the fictitious Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland.

The first Jewish settlers started coming to the area we now call Poland more than one thousand years ago and since then the area had been home to the largest and most significant Jewish community in the world. In the eve of World War II, the Jewish population in Poland increased to 3,300,000 as more and more Jews started to emigrate from Russia and the Ukraine. Their fate came into question when the Nazis invaded the western part of Poland, which was inhabited by over 2 million Jews. The Germans immediately formed ghettos in Poland's largest cities and resettled Jews there before transporting them to extermination camps. Six million Poles, including three million Jews, were killed during World War II. The present Jewish population in Poland is 20,000, but the real number of Jews not connected to a specific Jewish community or culture is several times greater.

The first part of the trilogy is a certain kind of

manifest to the imaginary, utopian movement inviting Jews to return to the land of their forefathers. The main protagonist of the video is Slawomir Sierakowski, activist and chief editor of the *Krytyka Polityczna* magazine. Standing on an empty, decrepit Warsaw stadium, Sierakowski apologizes for the evils done to the Jews in a not so distant time.

[...]This is a call, not to the dead, but to the living. We want three million Jews to return to Poland. We need you! Please return! When you were gone, we were pleased, we told ourselves: At last, we're alone. But since we still weren't happy, we always found some Jew to get rid of. Even when it was clear that there were no more of you, there were always some who were still trying to get rid of you. And then what happened?

Today we look tediously at our faces so like one another. In the streets of big cities we seek out strangers and listen intently to their speech. Yes, today we know we cannot live alone. We need others, and there are no others dearer to us than you! Come back! The same but different. We will live together.⁰²

Sierakowski speaks slowly, stressing every word, leaving room for them to spread throughout the empty space of the stadium. The camera is focused on him; it forgets the empty space of the stadium, while the sound ambience, formed by echo and reminiscing of speeches from charismatic figures and great leaders, creates monumentality and exaltation. Perverting the standards of communication, playing the role of a dynamic politician and using language characteristic for WWII propaganda, Sierakowski, dressed in a leather coat like the one members of the secret police use to wear, delivers his empathic speech with powerful body gestures.

[...]With one language, we cannot speak.
With one religion, we cannot listen.
With one color, we cannot see.
With one culture, we cannot feel.
Without you we cannot even remember. Without you, we shall remain trapped in history – with you, we will have a future. There is no future for chosen peoples. There is no future for any people. When we look into each other's eyes, our masks will come off and together we shall experience what philosophers dared not dream.
Jews! Compatriots! Peeeeople!
If not now, when? If not we, who? Who will take Poland out from the mud, prevent it from sinking? Let us not wait for the global market to make us all similar to one another, let us not wait for another uprising of nationalisms – cancers on the body of the free market – to once more turn us against each other or against other others. Instead of identical, let us become one.

We shall never more exploit each other, humiliate each other, steal from one another the fruits of our labour. Next to graveyards, we shall build schools and hospitals. We shall plant trees and build paths. If you wish, we shall travel to the Moon together. Come back and Poland will change, Europe will change, the world will change. You too shall become different. Come back, not as shadows of the past, but as hope for the future.⁰³

In the second part of the speech, the words exit the past; leave the space inhabited by guilt and apologies and gaze onto the present and the future our present promises to have. Even though he speaks directly to Jews, by opening the question of the chosen people and speaking about the present, the artist sets the story above the individual complexity of the relationship between Poles and Jews, the guilty and the victim, and, sliding in the space of ambivalence, it abandons the black and white technique, raising it to an entirely new level, thus maybe even confronting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

While Sierakowski is holding his speech, a group of young teenagers uses white powder to write out an invitation to their former compatriots on the field of the stadium. The young protagonists symbolize Socrates' guilt of "spoiling the youth", for which he was sentenced to death. The same fate befalls Sierakowski in the third part of the trilogy, *Assassination*, which is dedicated to his execution and ceremony of burial. However, Bartana utilizes it in Badiou-styled interpretation of corruption. "Here "to corrupt" means to teach the possibility of refusing any blind submission to established opinions. To corrupt is to give to young people some means of changing their minds about all social norms; to corrupt is to substitute discussion and rational criticism for imitation, and even, if the question is a question of principles, to substitute revolt for obedience."⁰⁴

Both works focus on the verbal communication on aspect, enabling words to achieve their full strength. Janša builds his composition exclusively with sound tools through the audio aspect of words; immersed in reality, he looks beyond the fence of political correctness, into the hate pointed toward the other and the different. His future is surrounded with the barbed wire of a muted intolerance patiently waiting for war to emerge. Bartana's words find their full meaning in imagery, in the protagonist's gesture which follows the sound. Even though filmed, her work is in many ways similar to a site-specific performative, theatre piece. Janša uses theatre merely to define exactly what *Slovensko narodno gledališče* (Slovenian national theatre) stands for – not a theatre stage, but an everyday performative of foul provinciality and dispiritedness.

Bartana builds her utopia upon images whose associative links have been formed in the past and on them she draws hope for her utopian future. She looks into the future from the present moment, which is dressed in the scenery of past times of the great collectives, the times when a new and better world was in construction, the time when a better future was built, the time in which people believed in equality, fraternity and unity. It is on these images that she shapes her faith in a better future.

In his work *Singular Modernity*, Frederic Jameson points out:

I am tempted to argue that the present cannot feel itself to be a historical period in its own right without this gaze from the future, which seals it off and expels it as powerfully from time to come as it was able to do with its own immediate precedents. We need not overemphasize the matter of guilt (which, however, rightfully clings to every form of praxis) so much as that of responsibility which cannot perhaps be affirmed without the suspicion of guilt: for it is the present's responsibility for its own self-definition of its own mission that makes it into a historical period in its own right ad that requires the relationship to the future fully as much as it involves the taking of a position on the past. History is to be sure both dimensions.⁰⁵

Both works focus precisely on that, by taking up a position in the present which forms a relation to the past from the gaze of future, a future perceived through the question of the other and how to answer that question. The mission of the present is to take up an active position, assume responsibility for this moment, for the past we inherited and then to build a space for a sovereign future. To assume responsibility, admit mistakes, remember them in order not to repeat them and then build on these experiences a future that will encounter some other obstacles, but will not repeat the ones from the past – that is the mission of our present. In her trilogy, Bartana builds two futures: in the first part that future is the utopian successor of the time following the liberation, similar to the image of the future deceitfully painted after the defeat of fascism, Nazism and injustice. The future in the third film, in which her protagonist is sacrificed for his beliefs, is the future that results from the past on which her utopia developed. In that sense, her utopia is concluded in the reality, like Janša's, returning to the present moment in which we still have the opportunity to gaze into the deceitful images of the future, from which point our present might seem better than the one we were heading to. However, the past teaches us to believe in the future – purely because of the possibility that has been taken away from the past and that is the possibility that the future might somehow turn out differently.

03 Ibid. pp. 127-128.

04 Alain Badiou, "Philosophy as Creative Repetition", http://www.lacan.com/symptom8_articles/badiou18.html [accessed 20 October 2011]

05 Frederic Jameson, *Singular Modernity* (London, Verso, 2005), p. 26.




soaked	drenched
sodden	flying the ensign
steeped	over the bay
soused	half-seas-over
sloshed	decks awash
saturated	down with the fish

Dear ----,

We have seen then that the nature of commodity exchange itself imposes no limit to the working day, no limit to surplus labor. The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the working day as long as possible, and, where possible, to make two working days out of one. On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the worker maintains his right as a seller when he wishes to reduce the working day to a particular normal length. There is here therefore an antinomy, of right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchange. Between equal rights, force decides. Hence, in the history of capitalist production, the establishment of a norm for the working day presents itself as a struggle over the limits of that day, a struggle between collective capital, i.e. the class of capitalists, and collective labor, i.e. the working class.*

Love,

* Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Vol. I (1867).



1 maj

Dear ----,

Zero growth is a necessity and zero growth is incompatible with capitalism. The necessity is, therefore, that we must all become anti-capitalists. Alternative ways to survive and prosper must be found. That is the imperative of our times. This is what we should commit to on this May Day.*

Love,

* David Harvey, "Nice day for a revolution: Why May Day should be a date to stand up and change the system," *The Independent* (2011).

Koreografski odnosi – povezivanje koreografija

Stefan Hölscher

Petra Sabisch, *Choreographing Relations: Practical Philosophy And Contemporary Choreography*
(München: e_podium, 2010), 280 stranica

S engleskoga prevela Tijana Gojić

01 André Lepecki, *Exhausting dance*
(New York i London, Routledge,
2006)

 To bi se dogodilo kada koreografiju ne bismo promatrali kao nešto što se sastoji od stalnih i nepromjenjivih setova formi koje se upisuju u naša tijela ili, kao kod Andréa Lepeckog u *Exhausting Dance*,^{o1} kao sredstvo preuzimanja kontrole, nego započeli potragu sa spinozijanskim pitanjem što, prema vlastitom koreografskom potencijalu, tijelo može učiniti? Tada bismo bili manje zabavljeni odgovorima na pitanja što koreografija u svojoj biti jest, i mogli bismo lakše iskristalizirati njene kreativne i generativne aspekte. Tada ne bismo razmisljali o njoj u smislu ograničavajućih pravila koja se nužno moraju slijediti, ili u smislu jasno definiranih procedura. Sada ćemo se ponajviše fokusirati na problem kako izmislići i aktivno proizvesti uvijek nova pravila. Oho, naši plesovi ne slijede kulturni tekst (Susan Foster) nego aktivno sudjeluju u stvaranju koreografije – na sceni, u institucijama i u odnosu na širi socijalni kontekst!

U *Koreografskim odnosima* Petra Sabisch transverzalno slijedi ove ideje i razvija jedan od najdobjavljinjivih konceptova koreografije u posljednje vrijeme. Ona ostavlja za sobom hilomorfne ideje koje uokviruju već uspostavljen savez koreografije kao forme i plesa kao aktivnosti koja joj je podređena te vidi i koreografiju i ples kao jednakovrijedne i konstitutivne čimbenike iznimno pragmatičnog i konstruktivističkog procesa nastajanja same koreografije. U svom istraživanju ona provocira susret dvaju suvremenika i dva koncepta: Rancièreovu ideju "raspodjele osjetilnog" radikalizira i prebacuje sa svoje prioritizacije Kantove sheme na stvarnu sintezu, rani Gilles Deleuze i njegova monografija o Humeovom empirizmu susreće se s produkcionističkim estetičarskim shvaćanjima *Product of Circumstances* Xaviera Le Roya, a originalna anali-

za *Holding Hands* Antonie Baehr (o kvalitativnim transformacijama tijela u istoimenom komadu) gotovo je jednako bliska koreografiji slova i riječi koje izvodi Juan Domínguez u *All Good Spies Are My Age* i tjelesnim rekonfiguracijama Eszter Salamon u *What A Body You Have, Honey*.

Koreografija kao kreativna i transduktivna ge- neza. Koreografija ne kao nešto što koreografira nešto drugo nego nastanak koreografiranja samog. Kako misliti koreografske odnose? Mogu li odnosi biti koreografirani? Jesu li oni ti koji koreografiraju? Mogu li odnosi koreografirati druge odnose? Je li koreografija odnos? – Sve do sada, prevladavalo je mišljenje da uvijek mora postojati nešto što koreografira štогод drugo, ono što koreografira i ono što biva koreografirano. Tijela nasuprot forme. Forme nasuprot tijela. Sabisch dokazuje suprotno: predmet interesa bi prvenstveno trebao biti odnos među stvarima i tijelima – odnos bez termina, organi bez već konstituirane organizacije tijela. *Kad koreografiramo, moramo početi u sredini, negde između.* Samo odande možemo postići više nego smo ikada mislili da možemo.

Postoji jedan važan uvid (najprije ga je izrazio Hume, da bi ga kasnije razvio Deleuze) koji bi trebao natjerati da promjenimo naše još neadekvatne ideje o koreografiji: *Odnosi su uvijek izvan svojih pojmova.* Stoga nam zadanosti nisu dane kao subjekti. Naprotiv, mi kao subjekti zapravo proizlazimo iz zadanosti i iskustva odnosa koje aktivno stvaramo. U svom pristupu i njegovim implikacijama o tome kako valja razmišljati o tijelima i stanju stvari, Sabischeva se ne slaže s dominantnim pristupom koreografiji u kulturnim studijima i teoriji plesa. Zaista nismo, kao što je Susan Foster jednom ustvrdila, nositelji kulturnih križaljki koje nam se dodjeljuju. Mi smo ti koji prije

svega imaju sposobnost da aktivno izgrađuju odnose koji nas se tiču i dotiču. Od Sabischeve možemo saznati da mogućnosti ne uvjetuju već kodirane križaljke i nikakvi sredstva preuzimanja kontrole, pa čak ni sedimentiranje tjelesnih aktivnosti. Naprotiv, tjelesni potencijal i kapacitet da proizvedemo afekt i toga da doživimo afekt i sami su ono što može generativno proizvesti koreografiju... tijela...i nas.

S te pozicije, koreografija kao koreografiranje *odnosa i odnosima*, ne može se smatrati u tom smislu već zadanom formom. Ona se događa ispod formi, sama formirajući i povezujući tijela potpuno jednako kao i institucionalne sredine i druge skupove, poput društvenosti kao procesa. Ništa nije podređeno formama. Sve, naprotiv, može razotkriti svoj vlastiti početak.

Sabischeva predlaže prizor za ilustraciju ove razlike koji je jednostavan koliko je i komplikirano objasniti tu razliku. Na 103. stranici knjige nalazi-


mo skicu ruke. U sredini, povezujući podlakticu i nadlakticu, nalazi se lakat. Mogli bismo zauzeti dvije perspektive u odnosu na tu scenu: možemo li promatrati nadlakticu i podlakticu kao već konstituirane entitete ili kao još nedefinirane dijelove, odnosno, samo virtualne intenzitete koji se aktualiziraju kroz generativne momente koji ih povezuju? Lakat ili zglob, samo su dva primjera onih pokretačkih sila koje sklapaju tijela, njihove dijelove, sklopove tijela i institucije kao takve. *Zglobovi nisu spojeni, oni spajaju.* Njihova konstitutivna sila opisuje se onim što Sabisch naziva "kontaminacija" (kapacitet da doživimo afekt) i "artikulacija" (kapacitet da proizvedemo afekt). I jedno i drugo uviđek streme aktivnoj i pragmatičnoj konstrukciji spajanjem i konstrukciji spajanja. Ono što se njima povezuje su koreografije. Forme koje još ne postoje, ali koje se mora izmisliti, kao što bi Deleuze možda rekao, inkluzivnim disjunkcijama. I...i...i... stoga plešimo koreografirano! Koreografirajmo!

Choreographing Relations – Relating Choreographies

Stefan Hölscher

Petra Sabisch, *Choreographing Relations: Practical Philosophy And Contemporary Choreography*
(München: e_podium, 2010), 280 pages

01 André Lepecki, *Exhausting dance*
(New York and London, Routledge, 2006)

What if we did not consider choreography as something consisting of a fixed set of forms being inscribed into bodies or, as André Lepecki famously argues in his *Exhausting Dance*,⁰¹ as an apparatus of capture, but rather start our inquiries with the Spinozian question of what, according to its own choreographical potential, a body *can do*? We will then be less busy with answers to the question what choreography essentially *is*, and we will be able to crystalize out more easily its creative and generative aspects. We would then not think about it in terms of constraining rules to be followed necessarily, or in terms of a clearly defined series of procedures. To a greater degree we will now be focused on the problem of how to invent and actively produce ever new rules. Wow, our dances do not follow a cultural text (Susan Foster) but affectively participate in the production of choreography – on stage, in institutional environments and in respect of wider social contexts!

In her *Choreographing Relations* Petra Sabisch transversally moves along these tracks and develops one of the most striking concepts of choreography since quite a while. She leaves behind hylomorphic ideas which frame an already constituted alliance between choreography as a form and dance as an activity subsumed under it, and thinks both choreography and dance as equal and constituent agents of a deeply pragmatist and constructivist becoming of choreography itself. In the course of her research she provokes encounters between various contemporaries and issues: Jacques Rancière's concept of "the distribution of the sensible" is radicalized and shifted from its prioritisation of the Kantian scheme to a real synthe-

sis, an early Gilles Deleuze and his monograph on David Hume's empiricism meet productionist aesthetic views on Xavier Le Roy's *Product of Circumstances*, and a unique analysis of *Holding Hands* by Antonia Baehr (dealing with qualitative transformations of bodies being involved in that piece) shares a resonative vicinity with the choreography of letters and words performed by Juan Domínguez in *All Good Spies Are My Age* and Eszter Salamon's bodily reconfigurations during *What A Body You Have, Honey*.

Choreography as creative and transductive genesis. Choreography not as something which choreographs something else but as the emergence of choreographing itself. How to think choreographing relations? Can relations be choreographed? Are they the ones choreographing? Can relations choreograph other relations? Is choreography relations? – So far, many have claimed that there always has to be necessarily *something* that choreographs something else, things choreographing and things being choreographed. Bodies versus forms. Forms versus bodies. Sabisch proves the opposite: it is, first of all, the relation between things and bodies we have to deal with – relation without terms, organs without an already constituted organization of the body. When choreographing, we have to start in the middle, in-between. Only there, can we always do more than we could have imagined before.

There is one important insight (firstly expressed by Hume, later on further developed by Deleuze) that should force us to change our not yet adequate ideas on choreography: *Relations are always external to their terms*. Therefore the given is not given to us as subjects. On the contrary, it is us as subjects – we are actually coming out of the

given and the experience of relations which we actively produce. Through her approach and its further implications in regard to the question of how to think about bodies and states of affairs, Sabisch disagrees with a dominant approach toward choreography in the field of cultural studies and dance scholarship. We are indeed *not*, as Susan Foster had once proclaimed, subjects of the cultural grids we are ascribed to. Instead we are the ones having, first of all, the capacity to actively constitute the relations relating us. From Sabisch we can learn that it is not the already coded grids and no apparatuses of capture which condition the possibility of, or even sediment our bodily activities. On the contrary, it is our bodily potential and our capacity to affect and to be affected that is capable to generatively produce choreography... and our bodies... and us.

Viewed against this background, choreography as the choreographing of and by relations cannot be considered an already given form in that sense. It takes place beneath forms, itself forming and relating bodies as much as institutional environments and other assemblages such as the social as a process. Nothing is subsumed under forms. Everything is, instead, able to unfold its

own becoming. Sabisch proposes an image which is as simple as it is complicated to demonstrate this difference. On the 103 page of the book we find a sketch of an arm. In the middle, connecting upper and lower arm, there is the elbow. One could develop two converse perspectives regarding this scene: whether one could imagine upper and lower arm as already constituted entities or as not yet defined parts and as only virtual intensities which are actualized through a generative moment relating them. The elbow or the joint, these are just two examples of those driving forces which put together bodies, their parts, assemblages of bodies, and institutions in general. *Joints are not jointed but joining*. Their constituent power is given through what Sabisch calls "contamination" (our capacity to be affected) and "articulation" (our capacity to affect). They both always move toward an active and pragmatist construction by and of joinings. What is related by them are choreographies. Forms which do not exist yet, but which have to be invented via, as Deleuze might have put it, inclusive disjunctions. And... And... And... So let's let's dance choreographically! Let's choreograph!



Dear ----,

Gentrification becomes a diagram of the contemporary forms of accumulation. As Carlo Vercellone pointed out, contemporary capitalistic modes of production are better understood in terms of rent extraction, instead of profit production. In an industrial organization the capitalist has to organize production setting up machinery and infrastructures, in order to make labor productive and extract profit from it. On the other hand, rent is a form of value extraction which doesn't need the organization of the means of production. The owner of a piece of land enjoys a rent just for the fact of possessing it, even if he or she doesn't produce anything on it. In other words, the production of value occurs somewhere else, without any intervention from the one who finally collects it. As Vercellone argues, 'rent is the new profit.' If production becomes social, this doesn't imply the end of capitalistic exploitation: capital can always capture the value produced in common by setting up technologies of rent extraction.*

Love,

* Amir Djalali, "Matteo Pasquinelli: On the Ruins of the Postfordist City" (2010).



Dear ----,

This is a deep depression. The welfare of the economy, in a moment like this, is in contradiction to our own welfare. Anti-austerity struggles have to become more radical. They have to concentrate on immediate material goods. For example, there are now millions of people who have been thrown out of their houses. There are a lot of empty houses, so we have to begin moving into those houses. There is a lot of food, so we have to take the food. We have this enormous productive apparatus. We have a world full of buildings, offices, schools, factories, farms, and technology. And there is absolutely no reason why we shouldn't simply take that stuff and start using it. What holds people back is that, on the one hand, it doesn't occur to them that they can do it and, on the other hand, that the police, the army—an enormous apparatus—prevents them from doing it. The way people are raised makes it very hard for them to think that you can just take this over, that this belongs to you. The problem is that people are so used to the existence of capitalism, they're so used to the idea that you have to work for somebody else, that they don't see that they can just take it over. We want food, we want boats to go sailing on the lake.*

Love,

* Paul Mattick, Jr., "The Economic Crisis in Fact and Fiction" (2011).

Tamo gdje nisi – Tom Lubbock i gubitak riječi

Sarah Wishart

S engleskoga preveo Makso Herman


01 Lubbock, Tom, "A memoir of living with a brain tumour," The Observer. Datum objave: 7.11.2010. Datum pristupa: 18.5. 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2010/nov/07/tom-lubbock-brain-tumour-language>

02 Lubbock, 2010

03 Barthes, Roland A Lover's Discourse: Fragments (Vintage, London, 2002) str. 59

04 Lubbock, 2010

05 Lubbock, 2010

 d samog početka, kako Tomu Lubbocku stvari klize, odlučan je da opiše svima koji ne dijele njegova iskustva, što se točno zbiva. Prvi ga puta riječi doslovno iznevjeravaju nakon prvog napada. On nas nježno vodi kroz to iskustvo: "Ne mogu više tečno govoriti. Zaboravio sam kako se to čini. Ne dolazi mi samo od sebe. Ne čujem izlazi li iz mojih usta ijedna riječ onako kako bi trebala ili ne. Kao da ja nisam taj koji govorи, nego nekakva vrsta neučinkovite zamjene".⁰¹ Njegovi su opisi procesa gubitka riječi na putu od uma do usta detaljni u svojoj boli i on nam to iskustvo do kraja rekonstruira, baš kao što je svaku riječ morao rekonstruirati "do zadnjeg fonema".⁰² Njegova su nastojanja da razumije taj proces nalik Barthesovom opisu iskustva zaljubljenja po kojem "iznenada uočavajući ljubavnu epizodu kao petlju neobjasnivih razloga i limitiranih rješenja, subjekt uskljike 'želim shvatiti (što mi se događa)'".⁰³

Osjećam koliko je uznemirujuća nemilosrdna razlika između njegovih kapaciteta baratanja pisanim riječi i služenja izgovorenom. Nježno je znatiželjan; kao da u opisima izgubljene riječi sam sebe promatra iz vanjske perspektive: "moj govor postaje ozbiljan problem. Ponekad, nakratko i iznenada, primjećujem da više ne znam što govorim, ali svejedno nastavljam i nastavljam govoriti – poput nadahnute proročice".⁰⁴ Promotrimo li njegovo pisanje, ono je dobro, unatoč tome što Lubbock čitatelju objašnjava kako nije savršeno. "Poteškoće oko pisanja još su veće. Odabirem pogrešna slova: uvijek promašim prvo slovo u riječi, a nakon toga, ostala slova izazu krivim redoslijedom, ili zamijenja drugima pa se neprestano moraju prepravljati".⁰⁵

Prvi sam puta čitala Lubbockovu isповijest o iskustvu bolovanja od tumora mozga u završnoj fazi u studenom 2010., samo dva tjedna prije nego što sam se trebala preseliti. Iako sam bila suočena s nevjerljivom količinom kaosa u svojem domu, nisam mogla prestati razmišljati o Lubbockovom članku iz Observera. Poželjela sam ga pročitati ponovno i uz više koncentracije pa sam tu stranicu pažljivo presavila, a ostatak novina stavila na strunu kako bi mi poslužile za umatanje stvari.

Za očekivati je da je, unatoč svemu sa čime se morao nositi, Lubbock kao novinar bio i više nego sposoban objasniti proces gubitka vještine služenja jezikom, kao i posljedice koje takav gubitak ostavlja na njega kao autora. Kao pisca, potencijalni gubitak moći služenja mozgom naprsto me užasava pa nije ni čudo što me njegove riječi probadaju, plaše i diraju s lakoćom. No tu je i nešto drugo – neobična fasciniranost temom. Ima nešto u načinu na koji je članak napisan, kao i u načinu na koji sam ga pročitala i potom ponovno pročitala, a što me navodi na razmišljanje o poeziji ljubavne tematike. To je njegova odlučnost da opiše suočavanje s gubitkom govora i, kao dijela toga, sa smrću koja neupitno dolazi.

Lubbock se ne uspijeva othrvati smrti; on na posljeku umire, ostavljajući za sobom ženu i sina. No narativ pred nama ne bavi se gubicima Lubbocka kao supruga, jer nema govora o promjenama u njegovom obiteljskom životu, nego s iskustvom gubitaka onoga koji piše. U posljednje vrijeme objavljen je zaista veliki broj memoara koji se bave gubitkom voljene osobe; *After You* britanske glumice Natasche McElhone knjiga je napisana u formi pisama i dnevnika posvećenih njenome mužu, koji je neočekivano preminuo samo dan prije njihove desete godišnjice, u trenutku dok je bila

o6 "Matt, Liz and Madeline, life and death all in a 27 hour period".
Datum pristupa: 18.5.2011.
<http://www.mattlogelin.com/>

o7 McElhone, Natascha *After You, Letters of Love, and Loss, to a Husband and Father* (Viking, London, 2010)

o8 Bernardo, Melissa Rose "Theatre review: The Year of Magical Thinking, Booth Theatre, New York" *The Observer*. Datum objave: 1.4.2011. Datum pristupa: 21.10.2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2007/apr/01/theatre.broadway>

o9 Brantley, Ben "The Sound of One Heart Breaking The Year of Magical Thinking: Review – Theater – New York Times".
Datum objave: 30.3.2007.
Datum pristupa: 21.10.2011.
<http://theater.nytimes.com/2007/03/30/theater/reviews/30magi.html?pagewanted=all>

o10 *Exquisite Pain – Forced Entertainment*. Datum pristupa: 21.10.2011. <http://www.forcedentertainment.com/page/144/Exquisite-Pain/90>

o11 Clapham, Rachel Lois "Spill Festival presents *Exquisite Pain* by Forced Entertainment".
Datum objave 4.4.2007. Datum pristupa: 21.10.2011, <http://www.a-n.co.uk/interface/reviews/single/369717>

o12 Clapham, Rachel Lois, 2007

o13 Etchells, Tim *Certain Fragments: Contemporary Performance and Forced Entertainment* (London: Routledge, 1999) str. 63

o14 Etchells, str.63

o15 Krauss, Nicole "Antwerp – Roberto Bolano – review" *The Guardian*. Datum objave: 29.9.2011. Datum pristupa: 29.9.2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/sep/29/antwerp-roberto-bolano-review?INTCMP=SRCH>

trudna s njihovim trećim sinom. Memoari Joyce Carol Oates i Joan Didion još se nalaze na listama bestselera; *Year of Magical Thinking* Joan Didion pretvorena je u kazališnu predstavu, a Didion su igrale neke od najpoznatijih glumica na svijetu putem Vanesse Redgrave. Na svim krajevima svijeta ljudi pišu blogove koji se na ovaj ili onaj način bave temom gubitka voljene osobe. Na primjer, blog Matt, Liz and Madeline Matta Logelina govori o smrti njegove žene uslijed komplikacija nakon rođenja njihove kćeri i kasnijem Logelinovom životu samohranog roditelja.^{o6} Logelinov je blog nedavno privukao podosta medijske pažnje, jer će po njegovim iskustvima iz života nakon Lizine iznenadne smrti uskoro izaći knjiga. Zaista je ogroman broj blogova koje pišu udovci i udovice, baš kao što je velik broj blogova koji se bave rakom, HIV-om i hepatitisom C. Format boga kao stalne praktike, ili McElhonečina pisma preminulom suprugu označavaju te procese kao redovite aktivnosti: činjenica što se pišu svakodnevno ide ruku pod ruku s idejom da onaj koji piše nema na umu kako to radi za neku širu publiku. Na njih se može gledati kao na način da se preživi svaki novi dan, da se udalji od vlastite brige ili straha ili da se stvorи komunikacija s osobom koja više nije tu, s osobom koja ne odgovara. Činjenicu da se to djelo može obraćati ne samo onome koga nema, nego i nekom budućem nepoznatom čitateljstvu, autori često nemaju u vidu u trenutku njegova stvaranja. McElhone, na primjer, potvrđuje da njena pisma suprugu "nikad nisu pisana s mišlju da će ih netko drugi čitati" i da ih je objavila za svoju djecu, da bi mogla pristupiti svojem ocu i ljubavi svojih roditelja u nekom kasnjem trenutku.^{o7} No njihov je odnos toliko detaljno prepričan da je teško zamislivo da bi dijete ikada htjelo imati pristupa toj užasnoj količini tuge koju njihova majka nosi u sebi, njenoj žalosti suprotstavljenoj njenim odgovornostima kao trudnice. Razumijem potrebu McElhone, Oates i Didion da pišu ovakve tekstove, no nešto je teže razumjeti zašto ih se adaptira za javnost. *Godina magičnog razmišljanja* Joan Didion jedan je takav tekst. David Hare ga je pretvorio u kazališnu predstavu, a Didion je igrala Vanessa Redgrave. Neke od kritika usredotočuju se na učinak prisutnosti glumice poput Redgrave – "Malo je reći da je publika zaokupljena glumicom. Gotovo svaki njen pokret nas hipnotizira".^{o8} No mišljenja sam da bi se aspekt duboke intimnosti, neizbjježno prisutan pri čitanju knjige, izgubio u svom prijelazu na kazališne daske. Toliko poznata glumica kao Redgraveova samo bi pojačala takav dojam. Kao što je jedan kritičar istaknuo – Didioničino stavljanje na glaska na detaljnost traume umanjen je izvedbom Vanesse Redgrave, koja umjesto da inzistira na toj preciznosti, preuzima ulogu junakinje. Kritičarka je zaokružila svoju recenziju mišlju "da nema sumnje kako je ona velika umjetnica. Kao i Didion. Problem *The Year of Magical Thinking* je što njihove

umjetničke kvalitete vuku svaka na svoju stranu".^{o9} Upitno je pomaže li ta razlika artikulaciji ove priče.

Jedna druga varijacija djela o traumi također je pretvorena u kazališni komad. Nakon traumatičnog kraja ljubavne afere, francuska umjetnica Sophie Calle napisala je tekst naslovjen "Exquisite Pain", sačinjen od odgovora koje su njeni prijatelji i kolege dali na pitanje: "Kada ste najviše patili?". Odgovori prate autoričin narativ o kraju njenih romantičnih veza. Djelo je evidentno nastalo kako bi joj pomoglo zaliječiti slomljeno srce "dok ne zaboravim na svoju bol uspoređujući je s tuđom, ili potrošim vlastitu priču pukom repeticijom".^{o10} Ovaj je tekst 2005. poslužio kao osnova za predstavu u izvedbi kazališne družine Forced Entertainment i to je bio prvi put da je ta družina izvela tekst kojem sama nije i autor. Izvedba je opisana kao "bolna dva i pol sata repetitivnog monologa".^{o11} Rachel Lois Clapham je za magazin AN napisala kako su, umjesto da pokušaju razotkriti autoričinu bol, Forced Entertainment ustvari postavili djelo s primarnim naglaskom na izvedbeni aspekt. Clapham tvrdi da "opipljiva bol koja rezultira gledanjem *Exquisite pain* ima jasnú svrhu: Forced Entertainment izlaže publiku svoj toj boli kako bi postavili pitanja: 'Može li opetovana repeticija banalne priče zainteresirati gledatelja?', 'Koliko je ponavljanja potrebno da nešto postane zanimljivim?'".^{o12} Predstava je prije test izdržljivosti nego novi način doživljavanja autoričine boli, a iz svega toga publika je potpuno isključena. U svojim izvedbama, Forced Entertainment uglavnom koriste određene trenutke kako bi publiku uključili u predstavu, čak i ona kada odmah nakon toga forsiraju distancu između gledatelja i izvođača, emociju i iskustvo kontrasta. U njihovoj predstavi Showtime, izvođačicu Cathy Naden pita se kako bi počinila samoubojstvo, a Cathy meko i polagano daje detaljni odgovor na to pitanje govoreći pritom u mikrofon. Publici objašnjava i najmanji korak do samoubojstva u kadi. Kada završi, drugi izvođač, obučen u kartonsko drvo, pojuri prema publici vičući: "Koji kurac gledate? Koji je vaš jebeni problem? Odjebite! Voajeri! Postoji jebena granica i vi ste je prešli".^{o13} Privući publiku, a onda je odbiti tako nasilno i naglo može dovesti do trenutka razmjene; "kao da vas je vaša prisutnost na ovom događaju morala koštati nečega".^{o14} Mogli bi tvrditi da se ovdje vidi uključenost publike na način koji se ne manifestira u adaptacijama djela Joan Didion i Sophie Calle.

U svjetlu ove, moguće neizbjježne redukcije koja proizlazi iz adaptacije za kazalište, u jednom novijem članku objavljenom u *Guardianu*, Nicole Krauss opisuje proces pisanja kao "vječitu ekspanziju".^{o15} Smatram da se ta ekspanzija zbiva osobito kada je u pitanju autorovo shvaćanje smrti. Ili se čitatelju govori o nekoj smrti koja piscu uzrokuje ogromnu količinu tuge, ili se najavljuje nadolazeća tragedija kao kod Lubbocka. No una-

¹⁶ Lubbock, Tom "View of Delft (1660) By Johannes Vermeer – Great Works of Art" *The Independent*. Datum objave: 10.10.2008. Datum pristupa: 18.5.2011. <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/great-works/view-of-delft-1660-by-johannes-vermeer-956444.html>

¹⁷ Bersani, Leo & Phillips, Adam *Intimacies* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008) str. 29

¹⁸ Kellaway, Kate, "A Widow's Story: A Memoir by Joyce Carol Oates" *The Observer*, Datum objave: 6.3.2011. Datum pristupa: 22.4.2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/mar/06/widows-story-carol-oates-review>

¹⁹ Kester, Grant *Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art* (Berkley: University of California Press, 2004) str. 78

²⁰ Kester, str. 115

²¹ Bersani, & Phillips, str. 28

toč dijagnozi i svim poteškoćama, Lubbock nastavlja "ekspanziju", on se nastavlja ponašati kao recenzent tijekom svoje bolesti. Godine 2008., nakon prvotne dijagnoze, prve operacije na mozgu i ciklusa radioterapije, objavljuje recenziju Vermeirove slike *Pogled na Delft*. Lubbockova bolest tada još nije bila poznata široj javnosti pa je čitanje te recenzije nakon njegove smrti sasvim drugačiji doživljaj za informiranog čitatelja. Lubbock se ne usredotočuje na neobičan prikaz nalik fotografiji, nego na materijale i učinak jednog malog dijela slike na promatrača. Koristeći referencu iz *U potrazi za izgubljenim vremenom*, gdje pisac romana Bergotte umire fokusirajući se na maleni komad žutog zida sa Veermerove slike, Lubbock u 630 riječi raspravlja o smrtnosti, svijesti i o Vermeirovoj vještini da prikaže više od jednog pogleda.¹⁶ Čitanjem o patnji, u tihom dijalogu između čitatelja i pisca, empatija dolazi u prvi plan. Smatram da je to proizvod onoga što Bersani i Phillips nazivaju "radošć davanja i primanja preko utjelovljenog jezika, svojstva drugih kao subjekta".¹⁷ Kroz razmjenu narativa i riječi daje se i potencijalno prima dar; u takvoj razmjeni postoji mogućnost razumijevanja drugoga.

Pisanje je gotovo uvijek solipsistička aktivnost, a usamljeni karakter te aktivnosti posebno je naglašen kada se autor pokušava pomiriti s odsutnošću, smrću ili kada sebe promatra u trenucima koji prethode neuspjehu i propasti. Čak je i naglašeniji kada napisana riječ toliko izravno usmjerava pojedinca na iznenadnu odsutnost neke osobe. Kate Kellaway u svojoj recenziji *A Widow's Story* autorice Joyce Carol Oates piše: "pisanje ... je sredstvo kojim sebe činimo vidljivim samima sebi".¹⁸ Ljudi posjećuju blogove poput onog Matta Logelina ili čitaju tugom ispunjene memoare iz različitih razloga, no moramo imati na umu da njihov odgovor na pročitano može biti ispunjen isključivo brigom za vlastitu dobrobit. Kada osjećamo empatiju prema nekoj situaciji, u opasnosti smo da počнемo svoje želje, koje nastaju procesom suošjećanja s drugom osobom, smatrati empatičnima, iako su one mogući rezultat vlastitih interesa. Grant Kester opisuje probleme tog procesa:

Empatična identifikacija (pogotovo ona vrste 'osjećam tvoju bol') posjeduje manje zdravu stranu: može djelovati u smjeru nijekanja specifičnosti i autonomije drugih, korištenja drugih za vlastite emocionalne i psihološke potrebe ili projiciranja na njih naših vlastitih imaginarnih karakteristika ili želja.¹⁹

Kester opisuje pitanja svojstvena empatiji konkretno u slučaju posebne vrste dijaloškog stvaranja umjetnosti, no svejedno je bitno promotriti njegov stav kada je u pitanju dinamika između pisca i čitatelja. Na primjer, čitatelj može biti u potrazi za katarzičnim oslobođenjem tijekom čitanja tužne

priče ili joj možda pristupa iz jednog praznovjernog kuta; želi čitati o tragediji kako bi bio spremjan za slična iskustva. Iako Grant Kester izbjegava problematiku govorenja u ime drugih, koja je svojstvena empatiji, on ističe njen kapacitet da nas promijeni. Ističući kako nam empatija omogućuje da sebe zamislimo u drugačijim okolnostima, upozorava nas da "ta identifikacija nikada ne može biti potpuna – nikada ne možemo ustvrditi da u potpunosti zauzimamo tuđi položaj subjekta. No možemo ga zamisliti, a ta imaginacija, ta aproksimacija, radikalno nam može promijeniti svijest o tome tko smo zapravo. Ona može postati osnovom za komunikaciju i razumijevanje razlika na metnutih rasom, spolom, etnicitetom, itd".²⁰

Članak Toma Lubbocka ne "uvlači" me na isti način kao formati dnevnika/pisma potresnih memoara. Lubbockov je rad primjer nesvakidašnjeg iskustva, on je žurnalistički obilježen, a poruka mu je istovremeno jednostavna i zamršena. Isto se može reći i za iskustva Natasche McElhone, no u Lubbockovom radu prisutna je odlučnost da se prikaže ono što mu se događa, a ne da se pisanje upotrijebi kao sredstvo premještanja boli. Postoji distanca, iako Lubbock vrlo živo opisuje ono što prolazi. Najiskreniji je u dijelovima gdje ga od strahote vlastite bolesti odvraća iznenadno razumijevanje toga do koje mjere kapacitete svog mozga uzimamo zdravo za gotovo. Na primjer, uočava misterij koji je nastao tek nakon što je obolio

Neprestano sam suočen s misterijem o kojem drugi ljudi nemaju ni najmanje poimanje, s misterijem generiranja govora. Ni u jednom trenutku nemam kontrolu, stalno sve nazaduje. Dok u srcu izrečene riječi uvijek stoji 'ja', onaj koji generira tu riječ uvijek je u magli. To vrijedi za svakoga, no većina ljudi uopće ne razmišlja o tome. Generiranje riječi dolazi automatski. Kod mene je taj automatizam prekinut. Generiranje riječi uključuje napor, nagađanje, poteškoće, nepreciznost.

Ekspanzija procesa kojim dolazi u stanje u kojem se više ne može služiti jezikom navodi nas na diskusiju Bersanija i Phillipsa o analitičkoj razmjeni prisutnoj kod govora.

Lacan tvrdi nešto doista neobično: 'sva je ljubav zasnovana na određenoj vrsti odnosa između dvaju nesvesnih znanja'. Nesvesno kao znanje, a ne kao želja.²¹

No čak i dok opisuje proces gubitka dara služenja jezikom, on nastavlja pisati. Pisao je recenzije do posljednjeg trenutka. Pisao je za *The Independent* sve do srpnja 2010. Čak i dok opisuje kako mu sve otkazuje, nastavlja pisati. Opisuje svoj strah od onoga što mu se događa, no priznaje da je strah nerazdvojivo povezan s fascinacijom. Objasnjava

- 22 Lubbock, 2010
23 Lubbock, 2010
24 Barthes, str. 99
25 Barthes, str.100

kako "početni impuls nije strah, nego zaokupljenost neobičnošću i čudovitošću svega te svim novim stvarima koje dolaze".²² Prisutna je znatiželja, a u njegovom pokušaju da objasni i opiše prisutna je ljubav. Ovdje, u razmjeni između Lubbocka i čitatelja, nalazimo spajanje dvaju znanja.

Lubbock ne piše o detaljima svog privatnog života i možda se upravo zbog toga ne osjećam poput uljeza, kao da zurim u njegovu obitelj njegovim očima, kao da se nalazim u nekom neugodnom trenutku vojerizma iz filma *Biti John Malkovich*. No unatoč tome što mi je ovakvo štivo draže od neugode koju u meni često izazivaju tujgom ispunjeni memoari, u onim (izrazito) rijetkim trenucima kada spominje svoj dom osjećam ogromni jaz između govora i pisanja, a unutar te praznine стоји bol nastala iz promjena koje će se zbiti u odnosima s najvažnijim osobama u njegovom životu. "Danju nisam sposoban voditi bilo kakav razgovor. Govor mi je iznimno ograničen i Marion je nesretna".²³ Nešto je nepodnošljivo kada je u pitanju bolest, nešto što se ne može staviti na papir, baš kao što postoji nešto što se ne može staviti na

papir kada je riječ o ljubavi. Bokurešlijev opisuje istraživanje osjećaja zaljubljenosti pisanom riječju: "pokušati pisati o ljubavi znači suočiti se s neredom u jeziku: ona vrsta histerije gdje je jezik istovremeno previše i premalo".²⁴ Pokušati pisati o voljenoj osobi, prostoru koji pojedinac dijeli s njom, razotkriva suvišnost takvog pokušaja, jer ćemo doživjeti neuspjeh onog trenutka kada to pokušamo. Pisanje nikada ne može biti dovoljno za opisati emocije, zanesenost, voljenu osobu, a nešto slično i Barthes kazuje:

Znati da jedno ne piše za drugo, znati da sve što će napisati nikada neće navesti osobu koju ja volim (drugoga) da voli mene, znati da pisanje nije nadomjestak ni za što drugo, da ništa ne sublimira, da se nalazi točno tamo gdje ti nisi – to je početak pisanja.²⁵

Proces pisanja u prostoru odsutnosti voljene osobe jest početak pokušaja pisanja o ljubavi. U Lubbockovom slučaju, prostor odsutnosti voljene osobe je sve veća odsutnost samog jezika.

Where You Are Not – the Loss of Tom Lubbock's Words

Sarah Wishart

01 Lubbock, Tom, 'A memoir of living with a brain tumour,' *The Observer*, November 7 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2010/nov/07/tom-lubbock-brain-tumour-language> [accessed 18 May 2011]

02 Lubbock, 2010

03 Barthes, Roland A Lover's Discourse: Fragments (Vintage, London, 2002) p. 59

04 Lubbock, 2010

05 Lubbock, 2010

Right from the beginning, as things start to fall away from Tom Lubbock, he is determined to attempt to describe to everyone else outside of his experience, what exactly is happening. The first time that words literally fail him following his first fit, he follows the experience gently through; 'I'm no longer fluent. I've forgotten how to do it. I can't do it automatically. I can't hear whether a word I say has come out right or not. It's as if it's not me that's speaking, but some kind of inefficient proxy forming the words'.⁰¹ He painstakingly recreates the experience of losing a word between mind and mouth, reconstructing the experience for us, as he had to reconstruct the word 'phoneme by phoneme'.⁰² He wants to understand the process of this loss in a way that echoes Barthes description of the experience of falling in love 'suddenly perceiving the amorous episode as a knot of inexplicable reasons and impaired solutions, the subject exclaims 'I want to understand (what is happening to me)'.⁰³

I feel how distressing the relentless expansion between his capacity with the written word and his delivery of the spoken word is. There is a gentle curiosity as if he is watching himself from an external perspective in descriptions of the lost word; 'my speech is now becoming a radical problem. Sometimes, for a short period, and suddenly, I find that I no longer know what I am saying, but I still go on talking and talking sense – like an inspired sibyl'.⁰⁴ His writing in comparison works well on the page, even as he tells the reader that it was not perfect in its creation. 'The problems with my writing seem to be worse. The letters come out wrong: I always miss out the first letter of a word; after that, the letters come in the wrong or-

der, or with replacements, and have to be rewritten all the time'.⁰⁵

I first read Tom Lubbock's account of the experience of having a terminal brain tumour in November 2010, just a fortnight before I moved house. With so much frenzy in the space beyond the bedroom, I found myself unable to get beyond Lubbock's article in the *Observer*. I wanted to read it again with a better span of concentration, and so I carefully folded it up, and consigned the rest of the newspaper to the pile for wrapping crockery.

It is to be expected that despite everything he was facing, as a journalist, Lubbock was well equipped to explain the process of his language skills failing him, as well as what that meant to him as a writer. As a writer myself, the possible deterioration of the brain terrifies me, so it is perhaps inevitable that his words puncture, scare, and move me with ease. Yet there is something else – it is not only a grim fascination with the subject matter. There is something in the way this is written, and also in the way I have read it and re-read it, which makes me think about love poetry. His determination to describe the process of facing the failure of his language, and within this, death, as it is happening.

Inevitably Lubbock does not face down death, Lubbock dies from this disease and his wife and son lose him. Yet the narrative we are given, is not the loss of Lubbock the significant other, as we are not given the narrative of this affect on his family life, but instead we are given the experience of the losses of the one who writes. There have been a raft of memoirs concerned with losing a significant other recently; the British actress Natascha McElhone's *After You* is a book written as letters

o6 'Matt, Liz and Madeline, life and death all in a 27 hour period' <http://www.mattlogelin.com/> [accessed 18 May 2011]

o7 McElhone, Natascha *After You, Letters of Love, and Loss, to a Husband and Father* (Viking, London, 2010)

o8 Bernardo, Melissa Rose 'Theatre review: The Year of Magical Thinking, Booth Theatre, New York' *The Observer*, 1 April 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2007/apr/01/theatre.broadway> [accessed 21 October 2011]

o9 Brantley, Ben 'The Sound of One Heart Breaking The Year of Magical Thinking: Review – Theater – New York Times' March 2007 <http://theater.nytimes.com/2007/03/30/theater/reviews/30magi.html?pagewanted=all> [accessed 21 October 2011]

o10 Exquisite Pain – Forced Entertainment <http://www.forcedentertainment.com/page/144/Exquisite-Pain/90> [accessed 21 October 2011]

o11 Clapham, Rachel Lois 'Spill Festival presents Exquisite Pain by Forced Entertainment, 4 April 2007, <http://www.a-n.co.uk/interface/reviews/single/369717> [accessed 21 October 2011]

o12 Clapham, Rachel Lois, 2007

o13 Etchells, Tim *Certain Fragments: Contemporary Performance and Forced Entertainment* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 63

o14 Etchells, p.63

and diary entries to her husband who died unexpectedly a day before their 10th anniversary while she was pregnant with their third son. Joyce Carol Oates and Joan Didion's widow's memoirs are still on best-seller lists; Didion's *The Year of Magical Thinking* was adapted for the stage and actresses as famous as Vanessa Redgrave played Didion in the role. There are countless blogs from all around the world that deal in some way on issues of loss. For example Matt Logelin's blog *Matt, Liz and Madeline* is the account of the death of his wife following complications after the birth of their daughter and his subsequent single parenthood.^{o6} Logelin's blog has attracted media attention recently, as he publishes a book that stems from this account of his life following Liz's sudden death. There are countless widow and widower blogs, just as there are countless cancer blogs, HIV blogs, and hepatitis C blogs. The format of blogging as an ongoing exercise, or in McElhone's letters to her dead husband flags the process as a regular task. That they are something to be written every day assists with the idea that the one that writes does not necessarily have a wider audience in mind. They can be seen as a focus in order to get through the day, to distance one's self from anxiety or fear, or to enable communication to the one who is not there, the one who does not reply. The fact that these tracts might speak, not only to the absent other, but a future unknown readership is often invisible to the writer at the time the writing takes place. McElhone for example confirms that her letters to her dead husband were 'never written with the intention of anyone else reading them' and that she published them for the sake of her children, so that they'd be able to access their father and their parent's love and relationship at a future point.^{o7} Yet their relationship is told in such detail that it can be difficult to imagine a child wanting to access this terrible grief that inhabits his mother, her desolation in stark contrast to her responsibilities as a pregnant mother. I understand the need for McElhone, Oates and Didion to write these texts, but what is less easy is why they might be adapted into a more public format. Didion's *The Year of Magical Thinking* is one such text, adapted for the stage by David Hare, and Didion was played by Vanessa Redgrave. Some reviews focus on the effect of Redgrave's presence 'that the audience is rapt is an understatement. We are practically hypnotised by Redgrave's every movement'.^{o8} Yet my feeling is that the deeply intimate aspect inherent in reading the book would be lost in this shift to performance. This would be doubly so when the performer is such a well known actress like Redgrave. As one reviewer assesses it – Didion's focus on the detail of the trauma is reduced by Redgrave's performance on stage which rather than illuminate that detail instead lends itself to a 'heroic scale', the reviewer sums it up

when she suggests that, 'there is no doubt that she is a great artist. So is Ms. Didion. The problem with *The Year of Magical Thinking* is that their artistry pulls in different directions'.^{o9} Whether this difference between the two forms expands the telling of this story is questionable.

Another variation on the trauma text was also adapted for stage, following the traumatic end to a love affair, the French artist Sophie Calle wrote a text entitled 'Exquisite Pain' which emerged out of the answers her friends and colleagues provided in response to her question: 'When did you most suffer?'. Their responses accompany Calle's narrative on loss of her relationships. This text was ostensibly created to assist her in getting over her heartbreak 'until I had got over my pain by comparing it with other people's, or had worn out my own story through sheer repetition'.^{o10} This text formed the basis of a performance by Forced Entertainment in 2005 and was the first time the company had used a text that wasn't theirs. The performance was 'an excruciatingly long two and a half hours of repeated monologue'.^{o11} Rachel Lois Clapham writing in AN magazine suggested that rather than attempt to open up Calle's pain, the company created the work in order to ask particular things of performance, she suggests that 'the tangible pain that results from experiencing *Exquisite Pain* has a clear purpose: Forced Entertainment subjects its audience to this hurt in order to ask the question 'Can the continual repetition of a banal plot be engaging?' 'How many repetitions does it take before something becomes interesting?'^{o12} It was a test of endurance rather than a new way to experience Calle's pain, and it excluded the audience. In comparison, in their own performances, Forced Entertainment use moments to draw the audience in, even as they immediately then force a distance between audience and performer, emotion and contrasting experience. In *Showtime*, the performer, Cathy Naden, is asked how she would commit suicide, and Cathy responds softly and slowly into a microphone, in great detail. She talks the audience through each and every step that she'd take to commit suicide in a bath. Once she finishes, another performer, dressed as a cardboard tree rushes forward and starts screaming at the audience 'What the fuck are you looking at? What the fuck is your problem? Fuck off! Voyeurs! There's a fucking fine line and you've just crossed it'.^{o13} To pull the audience in and then force them away so violently, can effect a moment of exchange; 'like your presence at this event had to cost something'.^{o14} There is arguably an involvement of the audience in a way absent in either of these adaptations of a trauma text.

In comparison to this perhaps unavoidable reduction that adaptation creates, in a recent review in the Guardian, Nicole Krauss describes the

¹⁵ Krauss, Nicole 'Antwerp – Roberto Bolano – review' *The Guardian* 29 September 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/sep/29/antwerp-roberto-bolano-review?INTCMP=SRCH> [accessed 29 September 2011]

¹⁶ Lubbock, Tom 'View of Delft (1660) By Johannes Vermeer – Great Works of Art' *The Independent*, 10 October 2008 <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/great-works/view-of-delft-1660-by-johannes-vermeer-956444.html> [accessed 18 May 2011]

¹⁷ Bersani, Leo & Phillips, Adam *Intimacies* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008), p. 29

¹⁸ Kellaway, Kate, 'A Widow's Story: A Memoir by Joyce Carol Oates' *The Observer*, 6 March 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/mar/06/widows-story-carol-oates-review> [accessed 6 March 2011]

¹⁹ Kester, Grant *Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art* (Berkley: University of California Press, 2004) p. 78

²⁰ Kester, p.115

process of writing as 'always an expansion'.¹⁵ I argue this expansion occurs specifically in relation to the writers understanding of death. Either the reader is being told about a death that devastates the writer, or suspects an impending tragedy as with Lubbock. Yet despite the diagnosis and difficulties, Lubbock continues with this 'expansion', he continues as a reviewer throughout his illness. In 2008, after his original diagnosis, first brain operation and the first round of radiotherapy, he writes a review on Vermeer's *View of Delft*. Lubbock's illness had not been made public by this point, so to read it after his death, it takes on a different tone for the informed reader. In it he focuses, not on the painting's eerily photographic-like rendition, but instead on the materials, and the effect one small part can have on a viewer. Using the reference from *A la recherché du temps perdu*, where the novelist Bergotte dies focussing on one small patch of yellow wall in the painting, Lubbock discusses mortality, consciousness, and the skill of Vermeer to capture more than simply a view in 630 words.¹⁶ In the act of reading about suffering, empathy is foregrounded in the quiet dialogue between reader and writer. I would argue that this is due to what Bersani and Phillips identify as the 'the jouissance of giving and receiving through embodied language, the subjecthood of others'.¹⁷ Through the exchange of narrative and the word, a gift is given and potentially received; there is the prospect of understanding the other in this exchange.

Writing is nearly always a solipsistic activity, and the loneliness of the activity is heightened when one is attempting to come to terms with an absence, a death, or when you are watching yourself for the moments of failure coming in. This may be even more pronounced when the writing focuses an individual so purely on the sudden absence in their lives. As Kate Kellaway muses in her review on Oates' *A Widow's Story*, 'writing, [...] is a means of making oneself visible to oneself'.¹⁸ People might seek out blogs like Matt Logelin's or read sorrow memoirs for various reasons, but it has to be accepted that their response might be peppered with self-concern. When we empathise with a situation, we are in danger, of presuming our own desires, which arise in the process of feeling sympathetic with someone, are empathetic, when actually they might be formed out of self-interest. Grant Kester describes the problems within this process:

'Empathetic identification (especially of the "I feel your pain" variety') has a less salutary side: it can function to deny the specificity and autonomy of others, to "make use" of them for our own emotional or psychic needs, or to project onto them our own imaginary characteristics or desires'.¹⁹

Kester is describing issues pertaining to empathy specifically in relation to a particular kind of dialogical art making, but it is still relevant to consider this angle in the case of the reader and writer dynamic. For example, a reader might be seeking out some sort of cathartic release in the process of reading a sad story, or perhaps they have a superstitious angle, they want to read about this tragedy because they will then ward off similar suffering. Whilst Grant Kester warns of the problematics of speaking for others inherent in empathy, he also flags up its capacity to alter us. In suggesting that empathy enables us to imagine a different circumstances for ourselves he warns that 'this identification can never be complete – we can never claim to fully inhabit the other's subject position; but we can imagine it, and this imagination, this approximation, can radically alter our sense of who we are. It can become the basis for communication and understanding across differences of race, sexuality, ethnicity and so on'.²⁰

Tom Lubbock's article does not pull me in, in the same way that the diary/letter format of the sorrow memoir does. Rather Lubbock's work is a rendition of an extraordinary experience, it is journalistic, its message simple and complicated by turns. This is true of McElhone's experience as well, but there seems to be a determination in Lubbock's writing to convey what is happening to him, rather than to use the writing as a tool to displace pain. The writing feels factual rather than in McElhone's case, when the reader instead is a witness to her grieving. There is a distance set up here even as Lubbock describes vividly what this process feels like. This can often be most frank in the areas where he is distracted by the terribleness of his illness by his sudden understanding of exactly how much we take the brain's capacities for granted. For example, he sees a mystery that has only presented itself in the process of this disease

'I am faced continually with a mystery that other people have no conception of, the mystery of the generation of speech. There is no command situation, it goes back and back and back. Where the self lies at the heart of the utterance, the speaker generating the word, is always clouded. This is true for everyone, but for most people this is not something to think about. The generation of words is automatic. For me, that automatic link is broken. Word generation involves strain, guesswork, difficulty, imprecision'.

The expansion of the process of his language failing him evokes Bersani and Phillips discussion on the analytical exchange in talk.

²¹ Bersani, & Phillips, p. 28

²² Lubbock, 2010

²³ Lubbock, 2010

²⁴ Barthes, p. 99

²⁵ Barthes, p. 100

'Lacan makes an astonishing claim: "all love is based on a certain relationship between two unconscious knowledges." The unconscious as knowledge rather than desire'.²¹

Yet even as he describes this failing process of language in writing, he continues in writing. He was writing reviews for as long as he could. He was still writing reviews for the Independent up until at least July 2010. Even as he describes everything failing, he continues. He describes his fear at what is happening to him, but he acknowledges that fear is inextricably bound up with fascination. He explains that 'the impetus at the start is not to fear but, rather, to be taken up by the strangeness and wonder of it and examine all the new things it brings'.²² There is curiosity here – and in his attempt to explain and describe, there is love. Here is the coming together of two knowledges, in this exchange between Lubbock and his reader.

Lubbock does not detail his intimate home life and maybe this is why I do not feel as if I am intruding, staring at his family through his eyes, like some unpleasant moment of 'Being John Malkovich' voyeurism. Yet despite preferring this to the discomfort that the sorrow memoirs often provoked in me, it is in the (extremely) brief moments when he does reference his home life that I most feel the chasm between speech and writing, and within that gap exists the pain of what this means to his most important relationships. 'In the dayti-

me, I cannot muster up any conversation. My language is so limited. And it makes such little joy for Marion'.²³ There is something unbearable, un-writable about the experience of illness, just as there is always something un-writable about the experience of love. As Boucourechliev describes exploring how one feels when one is in love with the written word; 'to try to write love is to confront the muck of language: that region of hysteria where language is both too much and too little'.²⁴ To attempt to write about a lover, the space between one and a lover uncovers the impossibility of the attempt, because the moment one tries, one fails. Writing can never be enough to describe the emotions, to capture the lover, which is at the heart of what Barthes describes here:

To know that one does not write for the other, to know that these things I am going to write will never cause me to be loved by the one I love (the other), to know that writing compensates for nothing, sublimates nothing, that it is precisely *there where you are not* – this is the beginning of writing.²⁵

The process of writing across the space of the lover's absence is to begin to attempt to write the event of love. In Lubbock's case, the space of love's absence is the increasing absence of language itself.



Dear ----,

When I try to think of the idea of intellectual emancipation, there is no distinction between the idea that now we are struggling, now we are constructing, and, now we are preparing the future and the future will be wonderful. The art of emancipation is precisely to get out of this relationship between means and ends, which in the leftist tradition is based on the idea that now we create the conditions for a better future, we are preparing the weapons for the future, which means a certain phase in historical necessity. But what I think is at the heart of emancipation is precisely the idea that time is everyday. This does not mean that you have to be entirely swallowed in the everyday, but that the question of time is not to be thought of in terms of present and future, it has to be related to the partition between here and now.*

Love,

* Jacques Ranciere, "Interview with Jacques Ranciere," *Kafila* (2009).



Dear ----,

While condemning the old schools, while harbouring an absolutely justified and necessary hatred for the old schools, and appreciating the readiness to destroy them, we must realize that we must replace the old system of instruction, the old cramming and the old drill, with an ability to acquire the sum total of human knowledge, and to acquire it in such a way that communism shall not be something to be learned by rote, but something that we ourselves have thought over, something that will embody conclusions inevitable from the standpoint of present-day education. That is the way the main tasks should be presented when we speak of the aim: learn communism.*

Love,

* Vladimir Lenin, "Speech Delivered At The Third All-Russia Congress of The Russian Young Communist League" (1920).

Theatre as the Home of the Affective (Dis)Obedience

Nataša Govedić, *Emocionalna predanost i politika afekata* [Emotional Dedication and Politics of Affects] (Zagreb: Antibarbarus i Hrvatsko društvo pisaca, 2009), p. 133

Translated from Croatian by Mirna Herman Baletić

01 Nataša Govedić, *Emocionalna predanost i politika afekata* (Zagreb: Antibarbarus i Hrvatsko društvo pisaca, 2009), p. 34.

02 Ibid., p. 32.

03 Ibid., p. 32.

04 Ibid., p. 19.

05 Ibid., p. 19.

06 Ibid., p. 19.

07 Ibid., p. 21.

08 Ibid., p. 91.

theatre represents a master class of affectology^{o1}, theatre as a media "is a multi-millennial scene for human intimacy and its affective turmoil".^{o2} That is "one of the reasons why people come to watch other people performing something on a specially marked space of the stage".^{o3} This is the thesis of *Emotional Dedication and Politics of Affect*, the book written by Nataša Govedić, theatrologists and theatre critic.

There are "affects revealed only to myself and that is why we call them *feelings*" and "there are affects that I want to share with others and that is why I call them *emotions*".^{o4} Nataša Govedić explains, underlying that "emotions are the most complex and subtle combinations of different aspects of affects".^{o5} "The social aspect of emotions makes them extremely open to mimetic transactions (acting, learning, identifying something or somebody, recognizing, presenting, concealing)"^{o6} but "only when our social behavior gets staged, when we dissect it from the multiplicity of events and place it in a shared and distanced space of the stage, are we willing to witness the losses of the presentational and not necessarily our own or performative emotional control",^{o7} and that very evasion results in a productive uncertainty, creativity and real flow of emotional energies, regardless of whether we are active in theatre, medicine, marketing or something else." "...creativity demands particular quality of emotional devotion",^{o8} and that is the intention of the book entitled *Emotional Dedication and Politics of Affects*, where the author makes a distinction between three levels of emotions, Andrea Zlatar explains.

Andrea Zlatar: Nataša also analyses the primary level one often forgets: how does one feel, express and perform emotions, whether in everyday life, whether in theatre and finally, and that is extremely important for the text itself, how does one transcribe, narrate and analyze emotions. I believe that this triple aspect of feeling, performing and reflecting an emotion, intertwined in all sections of the book because the aspects are connected through theatre performances, reveals the totality of Nataša's approach. Nataša's dramaturgy follows a set of very clear positions, and I would not say that it starts from the objective towards the subjective, but from a critical account of a theoretic situation – how does one comprehend feelings, how does one think about them and how does theory treat the emotional space – towards very clear attitudes.

Lada Čale Feldman: Chapters are named according to separate auratic, so-called 'simple' words, that lead to diverse theatre strategies used by the author in order to describe and analyze performances that disturb or question the pace of emotional inertia. The emotional inertia is then repeatedly evoked as the sprout/offspring or effect of a subtle and sometimes even direct socio-cultural repression that the author calls a script, defined scenario of one's emotional responses or a channeled, disciplined, organized and, most importantly, drastically reduced repertoire of pseudo-affects – a repertoire that can be easily destabilized by every potential and even minimal emotional explosion on stage, encouraging

spectators to explore their own affective mines. In this case emotions do not fall under the category of irrational but remain closely related to cognition, evaluation and activism and in that sense the epistemological-ethical-political theatre laboratory proves to be a privileged medium by means of which this triple attribution of emotions and their inter-subjective friction can best be recognized no matter which segment of the performative process the critic intends to underline as the most valuable neuralgic point of such an awareness: directing, text, rehearsals, acting, stage design or the audience and the critic.

If we are to look into artistic performances, we would be automatically struck by the fact that we are moved by the performances that broaden the radius of allowed emotional boundaries, or the vocabulary of their expression. When actress Ksenija Marinković, in the performance *Polet* produced by the Zagreb Youth Theatre, mockingly screams: "Do you think I was good?", provokingly prolonging the last word and looking at her brother, played by Sreten Mokrović, placing her arms around her waist, the audience knows that there is no way that the heroine has accepted the model of "a good girl" expected from her by her petit-bourgeois milieu. On the contrary, Ksenija Marinković swings this disciplinary strategy of being a good girl and crashes it against the floor so to cancel the self-explanatory character of self-denying female drill. In a single sentence the actress shakes the pillars of emotional acceptance of the policy according to which little girls are not to get neither parental nor institutional permission to express excessive anger since such an act is not quite in line with the submissive feminine ideal, just as preschool or school boys really should not cry too much in their parents laps if they get emotionally hurt. Such an act of admitting vulnerability really does not go hand in hand with the future role of a leader or a warrior. However, this still does not mean that children of both genders really accept the affective script to which they are exposed. [...] It is interesting to note that playing the emotional convention on stage or screen does not imply the imitation of the standardized boulevard topics related to gesture or grimace where one actually witnesses layered summarization of complex emotional codes relevant for different historical and performative contexts, but rather implies

a fresh exploration of its instable traces. The performance of a convention by no means implicitly mean the construction of a scheme; on the contrary, any behavior presented on stage or outside of stage implies repeated active probing of the overall common field of conventionality.⁰⁹

Lada Čale Feldman: This book is, therefore, framed with a conceptual roof intending to attract our interest for everyday environment in which, as it vividly presents, emotions are on the one side used for extensive manipulation whereas on the other any direct inclination to a personal emotional seismography or direct mention of affection tends to be avoided, hidden or intellectually underestimated or trivialized with a stigma of sentimentalism which the author sharply discerns from a productive, disturbing and contradictory nature of our unexplored emotional resources. Such a choice of the two objectionable fellow-travelers -emotions and theatre- seems brave on many levels and full of latent meanings, yet the bravery of this source is that it sees theatre primarily as an epistemological, ethical and political challenge which then relates to the promotion of affects as a key lever of that attractiveness within a culture where affectivity tends to be eliminated from the public speech as something fundamentally typical for women; therefore it is fundamentally bound to a very concrete feminist policy of Nataša's narrative that is not afraid to break the rules of the behavioral protocol of the private and public sphere, thus freely involving author's personal affective relations with her daughter or lost mother and grandmother into the discussion on professional relations that she nourishes with different people in theatre, from actors to the audience as a critic, theoretician, writer, dramaturge and stage director.

The title of the book refers to a hybrid form combining psychology and political science but in spite of that, Lada Čale Feldman notes, theatre remains the focal point of the author's reflection and political involvement.

Lada Čale Feldman: But most of all, theatre is the place where the target of the author's long-term struggle becomes most acutely apparent; general indifference as the most powerful weapon/tool of the culture of fear, indifference as a form of emotional deprivation but also citizen and political irresponsibility that poisons theatre regardless whether that poison comes from the financiers, institutions, performers or the media which covers them.

09 Ibid., p. 22, 23.

Connecting emotions and theatre is not surprising, Andrea Zlatar says, since theatre is an exemplary place for staging emotions.

Andrea Zlatar: I like to watch performances from the dim audience because I do not like other people to see what I am feeling. When a performance or a film ends, I try very hard to quickly wipe any tears because I am ashamed of crying. The same goes for laughter. When a performance starts everyone looks around to see who will start laughing first and is it a genre where one is supposed to laugh. As soon as we are exposed to a collective reception, we tend to dissociate from abandonment. What if something is funny or sad only to us – why we should not have the right to express that feeling? We are forced to accept a form of forced reticence and that is something that Nataša has not only given up but she has completely rejected it; she is also entering her projects by cutting or pushing away boundaries between the rational and irrational but also between the spiritual and the physical. That is the reason why she finds theatre so interesting since it is an artistic form in which those who perform it participate with their whole bodies. Theatre is a space where the staging of personality becomes most obvious; we can see the investment of a complete personality whose heart is beating, who sweats, who might be hot, cold or have this or that feelings.

Attending theatre may be defined as a kind of emotional engagement and even dedication to "the civil body of a particular society, because it implies that we shall share the psycho-physical space with complete strangers and that we shall remain connected to them after the theatre event through some kind of joint reaction to what we had witnessed." The theatre thus confirms and demonstrates the social aspects of emotions as no other type of art, not because we identify ourselves with the characters or performers, but because we exchange affective work with them intensively and at very different levels of distance and closeness. [...] If we return to the definition of emotions as complex sets of judgments, we will notice that critique and enthusiasm in processes of creation appear almost as identical twins when it comes to "devotion" or dedication, precisely because they result from the conventions of "safe distance" and "unwanted non-interference". To look at the actors directly in the eyes, just as to look at those persons close to

you straight in the eyes, implies a two-way policy of being exposed that is completely different from a gaze aimed down at the page of a book or a glance at a relatively speedy search through TV channels. Just as an actor or actress, the critic repeatedly performs in an interactional partnership in which production and reception, as Marco De Marinis points out, are "deeply connected processes", with the added fact that the critic later publishes his or hers reactions, unlike the actors and actresses, who mostly discuss them in a private context. The emotionality of this joint performance is one of the reasons why I consider going to theatre and writing about the events on the scene as some kind of social passion, i.e. a willing consent to be a "part" of the performance at any point of its duration. I never find myself surprised when performers approach me with a question directly from the stage, nor do I find it possible to pretend that I am a mere distanced observer, guest or "judge" of what is taking place on stage.¹⁰

Andrea Zlatar: The basis for her discourse is critical theory and an extremely firm attitude towards the manner in which emotions are spoken of and in which emotions are presented in all the various forms of our culture. Simultaneously, this is a book that makes room for poetics; the type of poetics that is linked precisely to creativity. I did not have any presumptions about what would await me in the penultimate chapter entitled "Emotivna predanost" (Emotional Dedication). I expected the chapter to perhaps be the one in which the reaction between 'I' and 'you' would once again set into action, however, Nataša dedicated it to creativity. When a person completely gives herself emotionally to a creative relationship, a theme, a job, he or she forgets about the need to eat, to wash one's hair, to remain within the boundaries of a normal everyday rhythm. It is only in the final chapter that, from this devotion, she once more inscribes the other person in the dedication and truly speaks about the relationship between I and you, about the trust that forms precisely on the fact that a viewer (specifically of Vilim Matula's performance *Točka*) bases his or her trust on someone else's devotion. This trust is given in full to the actor in the open space of several minutes when there is no activity that would place us in the middle of everything and instruct us on how to behave. I have already mentioned the feelings in question – fear, shame, guilt and negative feelings of disgust

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 96-97.

and hate. It is no wonder that we are discussing these types of feelings, because they are a very often consequence of modern life in Western cultures. However, Nataša herself does not use the discourse of disgust and hate; she very rarely even uses irony, the type of irony that engulfs a distance from the object it speaks of. It seems to me that Nataša Govedić refuses to agree that irony should be the distance that shields us from devoting ourselves to one thing and speaking with the utmost responsibility when speaking publicly.

One of the goals of this book is closely related to the attempt to destigmatize the emotional devotion of using an analytical vocabulary so as to create a conceptual context in which we argue that the constant silencing and disciplining of affects results in a culture of lies in which solace, catharsis and any possibility of a complex interactional relief are banned forever. The fundamental difference between sentimentality and emotionality consists of the precise scripture of learned sentiments as opposed to the productive incertitude, and the conflictive quality and the true course of affective energies. The creativity of a powerful emotion stems from its capability to shake every little particle of a stale cognitive situation and create new intimate and social "moves". Personally, I am more than certain that our greatest enemy is not the hysterical outburst of "unknown" reactions, moreover, their directness elicits an equally open and uncensored response, directing the relationship towards mutual intimacy. Our greatest enemy is the petty, transient, ultimately "justified" and just as cruel indifference, also characteristic for the cynical "emancipation" from emotions. When we read the sign in the 2005 play *Fruit Fly* by Swiss director Christoph Marthaler: "What is love but a hormonal addiction, a biochemical process that wears out over time," this pseudoscientific claim does not excuse us from both our own and the collective knowledge about the ancient cognitive quality and durability of emotions whose traces (and scars) can by no means be explained through hormonal or instinctive reaction patterns. Quite the opposite, the audience laughs at the very thought that a simplified analysis of the matter is sufficient to comprehend social phenomena, not to mention the general declaration about the death of feelings. That laughter contains a "distance" that

definitely speaks of the inquiring and destabilizing affective effort which is even stronger than the usual identification or understanding from the viewer. Both affective directions are effective in distorting the isolation of the demonstrated human experience.¹¹

Nataša Govedić: I actually wanted to address the area that, for example, exists in the performances of Damir Bartol Indoš, Vili Matula, a series of productions on the independent scene, as well as in acting interpretations in the Croatian National Theatre, the Zagreb Youth Theatre and the Kerempuh Theatre. No play offers a challenging, emotional and affective energy without demanding from us a radical response; it's just that we more often than not do not possess the courage and affective licenses to do so. I have tackled with apathy in my career and written about things I found unbearably difficult. It was interesting to realize that there is an entire series of books and shelves and shelves of literature, called emotional shelves, that deal with self-help and therapy, while books on shelves that are on the opposite side of a bookstore deal with philosophy and respected disciplines. These are all books on ideas. Psychology has for the past fifty years been successfully proving that all emotions are cognitive, that there is no division into the rational and emotional, that man's success, far more than academic achievements, determines the way in which we feel and enter into interactions with other people. Having become aware that we know how to speak of ideas, but do not know how to speak of emotions, I felt motivated to at least try to write about emotions. As a theater studies scholar, I felt I possessed the qualifications, because emotions are almost always defined as values, beliefs, narrative patterns and performances. In that sense, I place the largest amount of importance on the actor, i.e. performer, or to be more precise, the actress as the master of all emotional modulations. Before I started writing this book, I went through the process of rehearsing for a play I had worked on alongside Branka Trlin and Vili Matula, my mentors in many senses of the word and two people who have shown me that I can endure emotional intensities. If they can, why couldn't I? Of course, all performers are my mentors in the theatre, that is, those who do not shy away from affective disobedience. It seems to me that the theatre is the home of affective disobedience and that it enables us everything that is not allowed in soap operas and public discourse, and that it tolerates outbursts whi-

¹¹ Ibid., p. 107.

ch will not be considered a matter to be discussed at therapy, nor will they be considered to be therapy, but something that is in the true sense of the word philosophy, something that forms us. My consent to venture into emotional intensities with the actors is equally connected to my profound need to spot certain kinds of links between otherwise forbidden disciplines. I shall continue spotting them, no doubt about it.

Lada Čale Feldman: The actor's, as Gavella puts it, undeniable reality, is the backbone of affective contacts and partings between the work and the audience, and therefore it is no wonder that the pages which contain the highest amount of intensity in the chapter "Ponavljanja" (Repetitions) are dedicated precisely to this, as the author calls it, the gladiator task, regardless of whether it is live choreography and film images from BADco.'s performance *Poor and One or the durative performance of Miss Julie* by Mislav Čavajda and Nataša Dangubić. Subsequent to the already mentioned presumption about the correlation between the actor's and critic's vocation, the detailed diary of personal reactions on the repeated performance of *Miss Julie* is an especially painful witness even to their interactional interference, because the critic, among other things, does not restrain from revealing that the tension and mutual violence from the actors had reached a point in which she wanted to end the play, thus raising the awareness of the directors, dramaturges and performers about the one-way freedom of their rules. The idea upon which the play relies, that the actor has the right to put an end to the play when he or she cannot endure it anymore, relies, in her words, far too much on the viewer's indifference about a viewer leaving, and not trying to intervene himself or herself into the circle that purposely breaks the veil of illusion, penetrating, however, over the thresholds of both the actor's, regardless of how much it is neglected, and the viewer's tolerance. Conversations, within the same play, about its intentional and public repetiti-

ons, inspire the author, however, to try to make a comparison with theater experiments, which are also famous for outbursts, uncontrolled behavior and impatient behavior: comparisons with the process of preparing a play, rich in opportunities to embellish and polish up details. A word with the process of mutual emotional temptation actualizing it's amplitudes somewhere between rebellion and safety of the isolation from the audience whose presence, on the contrary, makes the actors in *Miss Julie* naked and vulnerable. The intensity of the spectacle of the actor's mutual emotional destruction then confronts the silent, but by no means weak, effect of Shadow Caster's performance *Ekspozicija*, where the relationship between the performers and audience members is so personal that the critic explicitly hesitates about writing about it. The relationship is primarily set in the context of the stage set's energy, the abandoned buildings in which it takes place, the emotional cracks of space and tactile contact with his wounds, with his, as Nataša points out, "sick body". Void of any sight, the viewers give in to the actors and allow them to lead them through the dilapidated building, while the fundamental emotion they must form is precisely trust, the word that is present throughout the final chapter of Nataša's book. It is with that exact word that Branko Gavella tried to explain the normative force and authoritativeness of an actor's performance in front of an audience, fully aware that the actor's trust in himself or herself, and especially in the importance of his or her task, is by no means void of strong social, and perhaps political resonances. Nataša Govedić approaches us with a similar kind of trust when, nearing the end of her passionate essay, she reminds us that our creative ideas have a responsibility towards the atmosphere of trust in the society we function in. Let's give her our trust, let's read the book.


The abbreviated text from the Croatian Radio program *Odeon*, aired on 1 April 2010, edited by Katarina Kolega.
 The editor of *Odeon*: Agata Juniku.



Dear ----,

A single spark can start a village fire.

Love,



Dear ----,

Let us assume you have found the village. Let us assume it is night, a clear night. Having ascertained how big the village is, where it is located in the countryside, pick a good, fairly large meadow. Start running, slowly at first then quicker and quicker. Run as long as you can, until you have a coppery taste in your mouth, until you feel your lungs are going to burst from coughing because you are a smoker, keep running until you collapse from exhaustion. When you can no longer run, get together with others. Each of you should tell a love story--in great detail, in images.*

Love,

* Tomislav Gotovac, *Group Enjoyment* (1972).



Dear ----,

If the house is the oikos on which the economy is built, then it is women, historically the house workers and house prisoners, who must take the initiative to reclaim the house as a center of collective life, one traversed by multiple people and forms of cooperation, providing safety without isolation and fixation, allowing for the sharing and circulation of community possessions, and, above all, providing the foundation for collective forms of reproduction. We can draw inspiration for this project from the programs of the nineteenth century materialist feminists who, convinced that the home was an important “spatial component of the oppression of women,” organized communal kitchens, cooperative households calling for workers’ control of reproduction. These objectives are crucial at present. We cannot build an alternative society and a strong self-reproducing movement unless we redefine our reproduction in a more cooperative way and put an end to the separation between the personal and the political, and between political activism and the reproduction of everyday life. It remains to be clarified that assigning women this task of commoning/collectivizing reproduction is not to concede to a naturalistic conception of femininity. The reorganization of reproductive work, and therefore the reorganization of housing and public space, is not a question of identity; it is a question of labor and, we can add, a question of power and safety. Arguing that women should take the lead in the collectivization of reproductive work and housing is not to naturalize housework as a female vocation. It is refusing to obliterate the collective experiences, the knowledge and the struggles that women have accumulated concerning reproductive work, whose history has been an essential part of our resistance to capitalism.*

Love,

* Silvia Federici, “Feminism And The Politics Of The Commons” (2010).

Bilješke o suradnicima

Ric Allsopp je suosnivač i jedan od urednika Performance Researcha, međunarodnog tromjesečnika o suvremenoj izvedbi (London i New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis). Bio je gostujući profesor (2007.-2011.) na Inter-University Centre for Dance (HZT) pri University of the Arts, u Berlinu te go-stjujući predavač na diplomskom studiju koreografije na ArtEZ-u, Nizozemska (2008.-2011.). Nedavno je uredio Performance Research pod nazivom 'Participation' sa Kai van Eikels (2011.), 'Transplantations' (2009.) s Phillipom Warnellom i 'Choreography' (2008) sa André Lepeckim. Među njegovim su istraživačkim interesima suvremene izvedbe prakse, poetika i povijest 'otvorenog rada', koreografska slika i odnosi između pisanja i pokreta tijela. Trenutačno je programski voditelj smjera 'Ples i Koreografija' na Sveučilištu u Falmouthu u Velikoj Britaniji.

Marija Cetinić je postdoktorski istraživač na Odsjeku za engleski jezik i film pri Sveučilištu u Alberti, gdje predaje kolegije na temu krize i afekta. Za doktorsku je disertaciju izzadila komparativnu studiju tuge kao karakterističnog raspoloženja u novijoj fikciji Amerike i jugoistočne Europe. Njezin trenutačni projekt, *Signs of Autumn: The Aesthetics of Saturation*, bavi se konceptom saturacije i razvojem njegovih implikacija na odnos suvremene umjetnosti i estetike te političke ekonomije.

Melissa Gregg predaje na Odsjeku za rodne i kulturne studije Sveučilišta u Sydneyu. Autozika je *Cultural Studies' Affective Voices* (Palgrave, 2006) i *Work's Intimacy* (Polity, 2011). Zajedno sa Gregozijem Seigworthom uvezila je *The Affect Theory Reader* (Duke University Press, 2010).

Stefan Hölscher pohodao je primjenjeni studij kazališta na Sveučilištu Justus Liebig u Gießenu u Njemačkoj od 2001. do 2008. gdje od 2009. radi kao asistent u okviru novog diplomskog studija koreografije i performansa. Njegov je doktorski projekt naslovjen *Potential Bodies: Contemporary Dance between Aesthetics and Biopolitics*.

Antonija Letinić, živi i radi u Zagrebu. Od 2009. radi u organizaciji Kurziv - Platforma za pitanja kulture, medija i društva kao voditeljica projekata i urednica na portalu Kulturpunkt.hr. Od 2004. do 2009. radila je kao suradnica i producentica festivala Eurokaz. Suradivala je s brojnim organizacijama na nezavisnoj kulturnoj sceni u Zagrebu. Područje interesa su joj suvremene vizualne i izvedbene umjetničke prakse.

Tomislav Medak je filozof s posebnim interesom za političku filozofiju, medijsku teoriju i estetiku. Koordinator je teorijskog programa i izdavačkih aktivnosti u Multimedijalnom institutu u Zagrebu. Zagovožnik je

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Louise Owen je predavačica kazališta i performansa na Fakultetu Birkbeck pri Sveučilištu u Londonu. Njezin istraživački rad preispituje odnos između suvremenog kazališta i performansa, političke ekonomije i načina upravljanja. Objavljivala je u časopisima Performance Research, Drama: the Journal for National Drama, Contemporary Theatre Review i RiDE: The Journal of Applied Theatre and Performance. Trenutačno radi na monografiji koja istražuje kulturno djelovanje i neoliberalizaciju u Velikoj Britaniji, kao i na esejima koji se bave pojmom site-specificity i regeneracijom; postfeminizmom, neizvjesnošću i performansom i alternativnim kazalištem u Londonu od 1972. Suorganizatorica je London Theatre Seminara i godišnje ATHE Performance Studies Focus Group Pre-Conference.

Nicholas Ridout je izvanredni profesor kazališnih i izvedbenih studija pri Sveučilištu Queen Mary u Londonu. Autor je rada Stage Fright, Animals and Other Theatrical Problems (Cambridge University Press, 2006.) i Theatre & Ethics (Palgrave, 2009.). Uz Joea Kellehera, uredio je knjigu *Contemporary Theatres in Europe* (Routledge, 2006.), a uz Cladiju Castellucci, Romeo Castelluccija, Chiazu Guidi i Joea Kellehera autor je knjige *The Theatre of Societas Raffaello Sanzio* (Routledge, 2007.). Također je objavljivao eseje u časopisima *Ait'*, *Culture Teatrali*, *Contemporary Theatre Review*, *Frazkija*, *PAJ*, *Performance Research*, *Theater* i *Theatre Research International*.

Dr. Gregory J. Seighworth je profesor komunikacijskih studija na Odsjeku za komunikaciju i kazalište. Objavljivao je u časopisima kao što su *Cultural Studies*, *Architectural Design*, *Culture Machine* i m/c. Objavio je nekoliko poglavlja u knjigama poput Deleuze: Key Concepts, Animations of Deleuze and Guattari i New Cultural Studies. Zajedno s Dr. Melissom Gregg uredio je zbirku eseja *The Affect Theory Reader* (Duke University Press, 2010).

Darko Suvin je pisac, znanstvenik, kritičar i pjesnik. Rođen je u Zagrebu, u Jugoslaviji, a predavao na sveučilištima u Europi i Sjevernoj Americi. Bio je profesor engleskog jezika i komparativne književnosti na Sveučilištu McGill, gdje je trenutačno professor emeritus i član Kraljevskog društva Kanade. Bio je urednik dva znanstvena časopisa, napisao je 18 knjiga i mnoštvo članaka na temu komparativne književnosti i dramaturgije, teorije kulture, utopija-

stičke i znanstvene fikcije te političke epistemologije. Također je objavio tri zbirke poezije. Poslijednje su mu publikacije "Introductory Pointers toward an Economics of Physical and Political Negentropy" (www.iippe.org/wiki/images/e/ee/CONF_ENV_Suvin.pdf) i *Prezivjeti potop - Fantasy, porobljenost i granična spoznaja* (Zagreb, UBIQ, 2011.).

Helene Vosters je izvođačica, aktivistica i znanstvenica. Trenutačno je na doktorskom studiju kazališne teorije na Sveučilištu u Yorku. Njen se istraživački rad usredotočuje na ulogu javnih praksi tugovanja u konstrukciji narativa smrti koji se bave tematikom militarizma i rata. Helene je izvodila *Impact Afghanistan War*, jednogodišnji memorijalni projekt, u javnim prostorima dijelom Kanade, SAD-a i Europe, između ostalog u Brisbanu 2010. i Utrechtu 2011. Svoj novi rad u trajanju (durational work), *Unravel: A meditation on the warp and weft of militarism*, započela je na festivalu Visualeyez 2011. Kao izvođačica, nastupala je na Rhubarb Festivalu u Torontu (2011.), na F.O.O.T. 2011. i 2010. (s La Pocha Nostra), te u San Franciscu na Garage (2008.), Faultline (2007.) i Intersection for the Arts (2006.).

Vesna Vuković je prevoditeljica, kustosica i istraživačica, član zagrebačkog kolektiva [BLOK] te povremena predavačica na Akademiji likovnih umjetnosti u Zagrebu. Napisala je i objavila brojne radeve. Kao kustos, radila je na projektima i izložbama: *UrbanFestival*, godišnja serija intervencija u javnim prostorima, Zagreb, 2001-2009; *Milk*, komunikacijski projekt s Kristinom Leko (2003.); *Recollecting the City - Recollecting the Time*, Galerija Nova, Zagreb (2006.); *Ako ih sretnete na cesti, pridružite im se...*, serija intervencija u javnim prostorima, Zagreb (2008.); *NOVAC ITD.*, Galerija Miroslav Kraljević, Zagreb (2010.). Kao urednica, objavila je: *Save as...city.doc* (Frakcija 30/31, 2004.); *Politics of Space* (UrbanFestival, 2006.); *Operation:City - manual for living in neo-liberal reality* (2008.); *How we regret*, (UrbanFestival, 2008.), *Removed from the Crowd, Unexpected Encounters I* (2011.).

Sarah Wishart trenutačno pohađa doktorski studij na Sveučilištu u Leedsu i bavi se proučavanjem političke umjetnosti i publike, usredotočujući se na *The Battle of Orgreave* Jeremyja Delleria i Linked Graeme Millera. Uskoro će joj biti objavljeni tekstovi "Nick Cave: The Spirit of the Duende and the sound of the rent heart", u zborniku *The Art of Nick Cave* (urednik Dr. John Baker, Intellect, 2012.), i *Jeremy Deller's "The Battle of Orgreave - the work of mourning and the recovery of a lost community"* u zborniku *Digging the Seam* (urednik Ian McDonald, Cambridge Scholars Press, 2012.).

Notes on Contributors

Dr. Ric Allsopp is a co-founder and joint editor of *Performance Research*, a quarterly international journal of contemporary performance (London & New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis). He was a Visiting Professor (2007-2011) in the new Inter-University Centre for Dance (HZT) at the University of the Arts, Berlin, and visiting lecturer for the MA in Choreography at ArtEZ, Netherlands (2008-2011). He has recently edited issues of *Performance Research* on 'Participation' (2011) with Kai van Eikels, 'Transplantations' (2009) with Phillip Warnell, and 'On Choreography' (2008) with André Lepecki. Research interests include contemporary performance practices, the poetics and histories of 'open work', the choreographic image, and relations between writing and physical movement. He is currently Programme Leader for Dance & Choreography at University College Falmouth, UK.

Marija Cetinić is a postdoctoral research fellow in the Department of English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta where she teaches classes on crisis and affect. Her dissertation was a comparative study of sadness as a characteristic mood in recent American and South East European fiction. *Signs of Autumn: The Aesthetics of Saturation*, her current project, focuses on the concept of saturation, and on developing its implications for the relation of contemporary art and aesthetics to political economy.

Lada Čale Feldman is professor at the Department for Comparative Literature on the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University in Zagreb, where she teaches drama, theatre and performance studies. As a former research associate in the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research, her areas of interest include also folk theatre and political propaganda, as well as gender studies. Her publications include *Brešanov teatar* (Bresan's theatre, 1989), *Teatar u teatru u hrvatskom teatru* (Play-within-the-Play in the Croatian Theatre, 1997), *Euridikini osvrti* (Eurydice's turns, 2001), "Petar Brečić" Award, 2005), *Femina ludens et U kanonu* (In the canon, co-authored with M. Čale, 2008). She also co-edited *Fear, Death and Resistance, an Ethnography of War* (with I. Priča and R. Šenjović, 1993) and *Etnografija domaćeg socijalizma* (An ethnography of indigenous socialism, with I. Priča, 2006).

Nataša Govedić (b. 1969) holds a PhD in theatre studies from the University of Zagreb. From 1995 she works as an independent scholar, critic and visiting lecturer for courses in theatre

studies at the Centre for Women's Studies, Centre for Peace Studies, at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb, at the Faculty of Teacher Education and at the Academy of Drama Arts. She is the co-founder and editor of several magazines such as Zarez, the editor-in-chief of feminist journal Treća and regular theatre critic of Rijeka's daily papers Novi list. She is an activist for children's rights and activist pedagogue, and she holds workshops in communal theatre. She is one of the founders and participants in Publike za posebne namjene, and dramaturge in the performances of Vilim Matula, Darko Japelj, Silvija Marchig and Lenka Udovički. She is the performative collaborator of Selma Banich, Iva Nerina Sibila, Roberta Milevoj and Deana Gobac. She published nine books in theatre studies and one book of fairy tales.

Stefan Hölscher studied Applied Theatre Studies at Justus Liebig University in Gießen (Germany) from 2001 till 2008. Since 2009 he works there as a Research Associate in the frame of the new MA program Choreography and Performance. His PhD project is entitled "Potential Bodies: Contemporary Dance between Aesthetics and Bio-politics".

Katarzina Kolega graduated in Croatian and Comparative literature at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb. She works for Culture Department of Croatian Radio 1, and also collaborates with Croatian Radio 3, for the programme on theatre Odeon. She publishes theatre reviews in Vjenac, Kazalište and Kretanja. She is the author of the monograph of Mala Scena theatre (Mala scena - a 20 year youzney), several radio features, and she also works part-time as a drama pedagogue at the School of Zagreb Youth Theatre.

Antonija Letinić, lives and works in Zagreb. She is a member of NGO Kurziv - Platform for Matters of Culture, Media and Society where she works as project manager and editor on the portal Kultpunkt.hr since 2009. From 2004 to 2009 she worked as a producer of Eurokaz festival. She collaborated with numerous organisations on the independent cultural scene in Zagreb. Her interests include contemporary visual and performing arts practices.

Tomislav Medak is a philosopher with interests in constellations of contemporary political philosophy, media theory and aesthetics. He is co-ordinating theory program and publishing activities of the Multimedia Institute/MAMA (Zagreb, Croatia). He is a free software and free culture advocate. He is project lead of Croatian Creative Commons team and board member of international commons organization iCommons. He is member of urban

activist initiative Right to the City and a member of the Zagreb based theatre company BADco.

Louise Owen is Lecturer in Theatre and Performance at Birkbeck College, University of London. Her research examines the relation between contemporary theatre and performance, political economy and modes of governance. Her writing has been published in *Performance Research*, *Drama: the Journal for National Drama*, *Contemporary Theatre Review* and *RiDE: the Journal of Applied Theatre and Performance*. She is currently working on a monograph exploring cultural work and neoliberalization in Britain, and essays examining site-specificity and regeneration; 'post-feminism', 'precarity' and performance; and alternative theatre in London since 1972. She currently co-convenes the London Theatre Seminar and the annual ATHE Performance Studies Focus Group Pre-Conference.

Nicholas Ridout is Reader in Theatre and Performance Studies at Queen Mary University of London. He is the author of *Stage Fright, Animals and Other Theatrical Problems* (Cambridge University Press, 2006) and of *Theatre & Ethics* (Palgrave, 2009). He was the co-editor, with Joe Kelleher, of *Contemporary Theatres in Europe* (Routledge, 2006), and co-author, with Claudia Castellucci, Romeo Castellucci, Chiara Guidi and Joe Kelleher, of *The Theatre of Societas Raffaello Sanzio* (Routledge, 2007). He has also published essays and articles in *ArtO*, *Cultute Teatrali*, *Contemporary Theatre Review*, *Frakcija*, *PAJ*, *Performance Research*, *Theater and Theatre Research International*.

Darko Suvin, writer, scholar, critic and poet, born in Zagreb, Yugoslavia, has taught in Europe and North America. He was Professor of English and Comparative Literature at McGill University, and is now its Professor Emeritus and Fellow of The Royal Society of Canada. Was editor of two scholarly journals, wrote 18 books and many articles on Comparative Literature and Dramaturgy, Theory of Culture, Utopian and Science Fiction, and Political Epistemology; published three volumes of poetry. Latest publications "Introductory Pointers toward an Economics of Physical and Political Negentropy", www.iippe.org/wiki/images/e/ee/CONF_ENV_Suvin.pdf; *Preživjeti Potop - Fantasy, po-robljenost i granična spoznaja*. (Surviving the Deluge: fantasy, commodification and limited cognition). Zagreb: UBIQ, 2011.

Helene Vostex M.A., M.F.A. is a hyperformer, activist and scholar. Currently a PhD candidate in Theatre Studies at York University, Helene's research focuses on the role of public mourning practices in the construction of narratives of death related to militarism and war. Helene performed Impact Afghanistan War, a year-

long performance memorial project, in public spaces throughout Canada, the U.S. and Europe and exhibited Impact in Brisbane (2010) and Utrecht (2011). She launched her new durational work, *Unravel: A meditation on the warp and weft of militarism*, at Visualeyez 2011. Helene has performed at Toronto's Rhubarb Festival (2011) and F.O.T 2011; with La Pocha Nostra (2010); and at San Francisco venues including the Garage (2008), Faultline (2007), and Intersection for the Arts (2006).

Vesna Vuković is a translator, curator and researcher, member of Zagreb-based collective [BLOK], associate and periodic lecturer at the Academy of Fine Arts Zagreb. She writes and publishes here and there. Projects and exhibitions, as curator: *UrbanFestival*, an annual series of interventions in public spaces, Zagreb, 2001-2009; *Milk*, communication project with Kristina Leko, 2003; *Re-Collecting the City - Re-Collecting the Time*, *Gallery Nova*, Zagreb, 2006; If you meet them on the streets, join..., series of interventions in public spaces, Zagreb, 2008; *Money etc*, *Gallery Miroslav Kraljević*, Zagreb, 2010. Publications, as editor: *Save as...city.doc*, *Frakcija* magazine 30/31, 2004; *Politics of Space*, *UrbanFestival* catalogue, 2006; *Operation:City - manual for living in neo-liberal reality*, 2008; *How we regret...*, *UrbanFestival* catalogue, 2008, *Removed from the Crowd. Unexpected Encounters I*, 2011.

Sarah Wishart is currently undertaking a PhD at Leeds University looking at political art and audience, focussing on Jeremy Deller's 'The Battle of Orgreave' and Graeme Miller's 'Linked'. Forthcoming publications include "Nick Cave: The spirit of the Duende and the sound of the rent heart" - in *The Art of Nick Cave* edited by Dr John Baker published by Intellect in 2012 and "Jeremy Deller's The Battle of Orgreave - the work of mourning and the recovery of a lost community" in the edited collection *Digging the Seam* edited by Ian McDonald published by Cambridge Scholars Press in 2012.

Dr. Andrea Zlatač is Professor at the Department for Comparative Literature at the Faculty for Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb. She has also been working as a journalist and editor (Omladinski radio, Studentski list, Gordog, Vjenac, Zarez). She is the author of *Istinito, lažno, izmišljeno. Ogledi o fikcionalnosti* (1989), *Marulićeva "Davidijada"* (1991), *Veliko spremanje. Dnevnik učene domaće* (1995), *Autobiografija u Hrvatskoj* (1998), *Ispovijest i životopis* (2000), *Tijelo, tekst, tzauma* (2004), *Prostor grada, prostor kulture* (2008).

Frakcija

Časopis za izvedbene umjetnosti /
Performing Arts Journal
No. 58/59,
Ijeto/summer 2011.

IZDAVAČI Centar za dramsku umjetnost /
PUBLISHERS Centre for Drama Art
Andrijevićeva 28, Zagreb, Croatia
&
Akademija dramske umjetnosti /
Academy of Dramatic Art
Trg maršala Tita 5, Zagreb, Croatia

ADRESA UREDNIŠTVA CDU – Centre for Drama Art
/ EDITORIAL ADDRESS Andrijevićeva 28
10 000 Zagreb
Croatia
tel: +385 91 8929 747
e-mail: frakcija@cdu.hr
http://www.cdu.hr

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